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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of problem . The problem of this study is
to identify, analyze, and summarize all existing decisions of
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which govern in part, the
administration of the public school system in the State of
Maine. The jungle of statutes relating to education with
which school administrators, school committees, teachers and
other school personnel must be familiar and by which they are
governed, represents the mere skeleton of the law. The inter-
pretation of these statutes by the courts is what adds the
real meat to the body of school law. It is the judicial
interpretation of the statutes by the courts and their opinions
of the original intent of the legislature in enacting
the
statutes that is of real significance to school
officials and
provides the guidelines under which they must make
adminis-
trative decisions in the day-to-day operation of
the public
schools.
In the absence of litigation on a
particular point,
opinions are often sought from the Attorney
General's office.
While not binding on the courts, or
carrying the weight and
effect of a court decision, these
opinions are helpful to the
school official in providing additional
guidelines on how the
courts would probably rule should the
question be litigated.
2Consequently, all opinions of Attorneys General relating to
education in the State of Maine will be included.
Need and significance of study . The need for studies
pertaining to legal aspects of educational administration is
generally recognized by educators. Until statutory enactments
have been given judicial interpretation, laymen can never be
certain as to the meaning of the law. Furthermore, principles
of law are established by court decisions where statutes are
silent. Ruling principles concerning public education resulting
from court decisions should be known to those who work in the
schools. A systematic arrangement of the ruling legal prin-
ciples, as established by the Maine courts, should provide an
additional tool to assist those who serve public education in
the state.
Edwards believes that those persons responsible for the
formulation of educational policy should understand the position
of the schools in legal theory. Those who assist in the work
of the schools--school boards, superintendents, and school
principals—need to understand the legal principles governing
their actions. Thus, he points out:
The relation of the school to civil society, on the one
hand, and to the individual, on the other, is nowhere so
well defined as in the great body of decisions rendered
by the highest of our state and federal courts. It
would
seem obvious that both the educational statesman and
the
practical school administrator should
fundamental principles of law governing the operation
of
our system of public education.
(2d ed.
p. vii.
^Newton Edwards
rev.; Chicago:
The Courts and the Public Schools
University of Chicago Press, 1953 ;
»
3Bolmeier expresses a similar need for an understanding
of the legal aspects of school administration. His opinion is
that an interest in school law is on the increase because school
board members, superintendents, supervisors, principals and
teachers need to know our legal machinery as it operates in the
control of public education. Specifically, he says that they
must have an understanding of the legal principles emanating
from court decisions; they should be aware of the legal frame-
work of public school control; they must be in a position to
2
apply legal principles for the school and community welfare.
The only way such knowledge may be acquired is by an
exhaustive study of court decisions as found in law libraries.
For the layman, such a procedure would be difficult, if not
impossible.
The need for such a study in Maine is evident from the
fact that no similar or related study has ever been undertaken.
Other than a periodic compilation of the school laws of the
state and a partial summary of opinions from the Attorney
General’s office,^ no publications dealing with the legal
aspects of the operation of Maine’s schools exist.
That court decisions are affecting the operation
and
^Edward C. Bolmeier, "What Should the Principal
Know
D.C., April, 1955) » pp* •
^«itflte School Boards Association, Attorney
Generals
Education (Orono. Main^r-^aL Schoor
Boards Association, 19ooj*
administration of the public schools of Maine and, indeed, of
all of our states is becoming increasingly apparent. Both the
number of such decisions and the multiplicity of the subjects
with which they deal have increased within recent years. New
statutes relating to education are being added at an increasing
rate to cope with the major problems of our time including
school district reorganization, finance, school construction,
church-state relationships, liability, collective bargaining
for teachers and many others.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to identify,
analyze and summarize all existing decisions of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court relating to public school education.
In the absence of court rulings on important legal
principles,
opinions from the office of the Attorney General are
included
where available. Leading court decisions from other
state
jurisdictions are cited if they deal with vital questions which
have not as yet come before the courts of
this state. Rulings
of the United States Supreme Court which
negate existing Maine
statutes or otherwise affect educational
policy within the state
are also included.
The completed project should provide, under one
cover,
a useahle reference to Maine School
law which can be revised
and updated in future years as new
statutes and court decisions
supersede the existing ones. It is also
hoped that this study
might be helpful in identifying
areas where legislative reform
is needed.
5Delimitation
. This study will be limited in scope to
public elementary and secondary education. It will be further
limited to a survey of decisions rendered by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, although decisions of courts of a lesser juris-
diction may b© referred to if within them are embodied important
legal principles which have not been ruled on by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court. Where court decisions apply to statutes or to
sections of the constitution no longer applicable, because of
changes in the law or because of amendments to the constitution,
such decisions generally will not be a part of this study.
An analysis and evaluation of the Maine statutes on
education currently in effect are not a part of this study.
Observations pertaining to the organization of the statutes
and outdated or ambiguous language will, however, be included
in the summary chapter.
Related studies . Althou^ many studies have been made
dealing with various legal aspects of education, only a very few
have given their major enqphasis to a consideration of the in-
of court decisions in the formulation of educational
policy. Among this latter group, a major contribution in the
field of legal research was the study of Newton Edwards, author
of the textbook. The Courts and the Public Schools . In his
study, Edwards stated that his purpose was to accomplish two
things
:
(1) to make clear the fundamental principles underlying
the relation of the state to education; (2) to reduce to
systematic organization the principles of the case or
6common law which are applicable to practical problems of
school organization and administration
A
Lee 0, Garber has been another significant contributor
cr
to the field of school law. His school law yearbooks'^ have
provided an up-to-date review of court rulings of significance
to education, covering all of the states. A recent publication
by Drury and Ray, Principles of School Law ,^ presents many of
the more important principles of school law and many leading
court cases.
A number of studies have been made based upon court
n
rulings of selected states. Stephenson' conducted a study of
court decisions in Indiana in 1929, for the stated purpose of
establishing principles of school law for teachers and laymen.
A similar study by Campbell® was made for the State of Kentucky
in 1937, for the purpose of determining the extent to which
principles of public school administration had been shaped by
the courts.
The primary related studies which the author has used
^Edwards, op. cit ., p. vii.
111 .:
^Lee 0. Garber, The Yearbook of School
Interstate Printers and Publishers, annually since 1959 )•
^Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School
Law (New York: Apple ton-Century-Crofts , 19o5j.
Frank R. Stephenson, Handbook of Indiana School L^
(Fowler, Indiana: The Benton Review Shop, 1929).
7are Johnston’s "Judicial Decisions Affecting the Administration
of the Public School System in Pennsylvania,"^ and Earl
Lightcap’s Judicial Decisions Affecting the Administration of
the Public School System in Maryland."^® These dissertations
have been followed closely in format and organization although
the content chapters will vary. Johnston, for example, omitted
chapters on pupils and teachers, since these areas had been
treated in other research studies. Lightcap did not include a
chapter on school district reorganization.
Method of procedure . The procedure used in the solution
of the problem is known as the case or common-law method. The
writer has followed, in general, the approach used by Edwards
and Garber in their discovery and organization of principles of
law by the study of court decisions. The sources for the data
have been the decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
as found in the Maine Reports, Attorneys General opinions and
miscellaneous policy statements and by-laws of the Maine State
Department of Education,
^Paul H. Johnston, "Judicial Decisions Affecting the
Administration of the Public School System in Pennsylvania”
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation. Graduate School of Education,
University of Pennsylvania, 1957).
^^Earl J. Lightcap, Jr., "Judicial Decisions Affecting
the Administration of the Public School System in Maryland"
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation. Graduate School of Education,
University of Pennsylvania, I960),
8CHAPTER II
THE STATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
Introduction
The responsibility of providing for the education of
youth is a governmental one. All civilized countries provide
a systematic, formalized procedure for educating their citizens,
particularly children. The responsibility for this vital
function is vested with the highest level of government to be
found in the country or with some political subdivision of
government, depending upon the form of government.
It is important that school personnel have a clear
understanding of the division of responsibilities with respect
to education in this country. It is the purpose of this chapter,
therefore, to delineate these responsibilities as they are
legally constituted at the national, state and local levels.
The Federal Government and Education
The Constitution of the United States makes no specific
mention of education. Any power over education which the
federal government has is, therefore, an implied power.
The
only clause in the constitution from which power with
respect
to education can he implied is the general welfare
clause.
This clause confers upon Congress the power "to
lay and collect
9Tsixes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the Common Defence and General Welfare of the United States.”^
Prom the very start, the interpretation of this clause
has given rise to conflicting views. The opposing points of
view, first enunciated by Madison and Hamilton, have been
widely
reported and need not here be repeated. The power to tax and
spend under the general welfare clause was finally
established
by the Supreme Court during the depression years
preceding
World War II. In United States v. Butler^ and in
Helvering v.
Davis^ the Court sustained the use of proceeds of
taxation for
particular purposes (Agricultural Adjustment Act and Social
security Act) as an exercise of authority under
the general
welfare clause.
While no case involving the power of Congress
to tax
and spend in support of education
appears to he on record,
there is little doubt that Congress
under the general welfare
clause would be accorded authority to
make any reasonable
appropriation for the support of education
if challenged.
While congress cannot use its taxing
and spending power
.0 purchase control of some
matter reserved to the states, it
.ay use this power to induce
the states to cooperate with the
.ational government in meeting some
social need that is nation-
wide in scope, certainly
education is a matter of national
lu.S., constitution. Art. I. sec.
8.
2nnited States v. Butler . 397 U.S. 1.
56 3. Ct.. 312
3Helvering V. Davis , 3°! O.S. 619, 57
3. Ct. 901^ (
10
concorn* It would seom, therefore, that the national government
in sponsoring a host of federally supported programs for public
school education is not invading the reserved powers of the
states by en5>loying its taxing and spending power to collaborate
with the states in the promotion of education.
It would seem that the Tenth Amendment, passed in 1791,
was intended to reserve to the states matters of education,
among other things. The Amendment states, "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people."^ Nevertheless, there are limitations
provided by the United States Constitution which are applied to
public education in various states and, in some cases, to all
states. One such limitation is the clause which prohibits any
state from passing legislation impairing the obligation of
contracts.^ In the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, the Supreme Court held that a college charter is a
contract between the state and the college and cannot later be
changed. Of more interest to school personnel is a
related
decision in which the Supreme Court held that an act of a
state legislature providing for teacher tenure was
so worded
as to constitute a contract.^
^,S,, Constitution , Amendment X.
^U.S., Constitution , Art. I, sec. 10.
^
state ex rel. Anderson v. Brand , 58 3. Ct. lOl-S. 303
0.3
95 ( 1938 ).
11
A second limitation upon the power of the states is
found in the First Amendment, It reads: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
•7
the free exercise thereof,” The Supreme Court has hold that
the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States" makes the First
Amendment applicable to all states.® The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this amendment as establishing a "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state. Specifically, it has been interpreted
as a denial of authority of either the national government or
the government of any state to appropriate and spend moneys
raised by taxation in support of sectarian instruction. As was
said in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education , "No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities, or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.
"
The First Amendment also goes very far in protecting
the right of the individual to be free from official censorship
or control in the realm of intellect or spirit. Thus,
in a
*^U.S., Constitution , Amendment I,
^Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of
Ewing
,
330 U.S. ^1, 67 sTctT 962 (194-7 ) •
^minois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, bB s.ct. 4-^>i ( 194-y)*
12
far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court has held as unconstitu-
tional a state law making it compulsory for children in the public
schools to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag of the
10
United States.
Another limitation upon the powers of the states is con-
tained in the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides
that no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." This means that no state
may enforce legislation which discriminates in favor of one
class of citizens over another. In the historic 1954 decisions
of the Supreme Court it was ruled that racial discrimination in
the public schools is unconstitutional.^^ While public education
is considered a state function, state legislators must exercise
their responsibilities in such a manner as to be consistent with
the provisions of both state and federal constitutional pro-
visions.
•Education as a State Function
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the effect of
the Tenth Amendment was to reserve to the states, matters per-
taining to education. The courts have consistently upheld this
^^Board of F-dncation of West Virginia v. Barnett^,
319 U.S. 624., ^>3 S. Ct. Il7b Cl543r
^^Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 4^3 » 74 ^
686
,
98 L. Ed. "873 (1954) I ^£2^
U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753. 99 L. Ed. 653 (1955T.
13
12doctrine. In State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth , it was held that
education is a function of the state government. Furthermore,
it has been held by the courts that the state legislature has
plenary control over educational matters within the state, sub
ject to whatever constitutional provisions may affect the
13
exercise of legislative authority.
Article VIII of the Maine Constitution adopted in 1820,
places the responsibility squarely on the legislature for pro-
viding for public schools in the several towns. The Article
reads as follows;
A general diffusion of the advantages of education being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of
the people, to promote this important object, the legislature
are authorized and it shall be their duty to require the
several towns to make suitable provision, at their own
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools;
and it shall further be their duty to encourage and suitably
endow, from time to time, as the circumstances of the people
may authorize, all academies, colleges, and seminaries of
learning within the state; provided, that no donation, grant,
or endowment shall at any time be made by the legislature to
anv literary institution now established, or which may
hereafter be established, unless at the time of making si^ch
endowment, the legislature of the State shall have the right
to grant any further powers to alter, limit or restrain
any
ot ISrpoweL vested in, any such literary institution, as
shall be judged necessary to promote the best interesi;
thereof
This Article has been challenged from time to
time by
local municipalities but the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court has
consis ently upheld the premise that education
is basically a
Instate ex rel. Clark v. Haworth , 122 Ind. 462, 23
H.E.
946 (isgo):
13Monagl^ V. School District No. 1, 211 Ore. 360 , 315
?
(2d) 797 (1957).
^^Maine, Honstitution , Art. VIII.
V,
11+
state function and that the legislature, under Article VIII, has
the authority to pass legislation to ensure compliance with the
intent of the Constitution. In an I878 decision, the Court
stated that the law of I872
,
establishing a school mill fund,
was authorized by Article VIII of the Constitution, empowering
the legislature to make "suitable provisions" for the support
of public schools, and a general tax on the property of the state
could be imposed therefor,
A 1912 decision^^ declared that Article VIII is mandatory,
and not prohibitory and that the word "suitable" is an elastic
term depending upon the times and subject to the legislature's
discretion in determining what is suitable. In the Squires case
of 1959 , the Court stated that:
The state educational policy cannot and must not be
interfered with by any subordinate governing body. In
enacting the laws pertaining to education, the legis-
lature intended that no municipality should regulate
by ordinance or order any subjects which would affect
or influence general education unless permitted to do
so by an express delegation of power, , . , [T]he con-
stitutional provision imposing the duty upon the
legislature to promote the cause of education, in effect,
is in the nature of a constitutional mandate.^'
16
Finally, in the McGary case of I960, the Court held
that: "Under constitutional provisions stating that it is the
^
^
Opinion of Justices , 68 Me. ^62 (I878 ).
Sawyer v, Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912).16
^"^Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta , 155 Me.
151 , 153 A. id 80 (1959)'."'
18McGary v. Barrows , 156 Me. 250, I63 A. 2d 7i+7 (I960),
15
duty of the legislature to require towns to make suitable pro-
vision at their own expense for the support and maintenance of
public schools, the responsibility rests with the legislature."
Evidence of the desire on the part of the state to take
an active role in the control of educational affairs occurred
as early as 1825. At that time, an act was passed that required
the selectmen of the several towns and the assessors of the
several plantations to make a return to the Secretary of State
showing the number of school districts within their respective
towns and plantations, the number of children in each district,
and the amount of money raised and expended for the support of
schools. Although the returns secured under these laws were
of little value, the statute was of great importance since it
marked the beginning of the supervision of the state over its
schools.
In 1835 ^ agency of state control appeared in the
form of a Board of School Commissioners, the first instance
of
the appointment of special school officers in the state.
This
was brought about by a resolve introduced and passed
during the
legislative session of that year.^° Ho evidence is to
be found
that this board ever existed (the resolve was
repealed in I836)
but the attempt of the legislature to establish
some sort of
agency of control at the state level was
significant. Ten years
^^Maine, Public Laws (1825), c. Ill, sec. 5-
^^Maine, Resolves (1835) » *73*
16
later, in I8I4.6, a committee appointed at the first meeting of
"teachers and friends of education" held at Augusta, presented
a memorial to the legislature which strongly recommended the
establishment of a State Board of Education as a means of
correcting the evils in the school system. The committee on
education and the governor supported the measure. The result
was that "An Act to Establish a Board of Education" was enacted
by the legislature and approved by the governor on July 27 ,
1814.6. The elected board was:
. , . [A]uthorized and required to collect and
disseminate information in regard to the location and
construction of school houses; on the arrangement of school
districts and the use of the best school apparatus; to con-
sult with superintending school committees and school
agents on the best and cheapest method of introducing
uniform school books and on the practicability and expe-
diency of establishing school district libraries; to inquire
and report upon the advantages of normal schools or schools
for the education of teachers; to consider the best method
in aiding and promoting education in the new settlements
of the State; to devise improvements in teaching the
branches of instruction now pursued in the common schools
Sind for the introduction of such other branches of useful
knowledge as may then be practicable.21
It might be supposed that with the establishment of the
Board of Education accomplished, with the work of its members
and its secretary presenting more and more information to the
people, and with the importance of state supervision in some
measure duly recognized, this agency of state control would
meet with general favor. But the politicians, being unable to
control the elections of the members of the Board, did not
favor
^^Maine, Public Laws (1814.6), c. 195 •
this form of administration. The result was that, in 1852,
the State Board of Education was abolished. The same legis-
lation which abolished this form of state control established
17
another type of supervision by providing for County Commissioners
22
of Education. Under this system, each county had a Com-
missioner of Common Schools whose duties were as follows;
It shall be the duty of each school Commissioner
to spend at least fifty days (during the term of the
winter school) in visiting the towns in his county,
for the purpose of promoting by addresses, inquiries
and other means, the cause of common school education,
and annually to make a report to the Legislature of his
doings under the act, of the character of the teachers,
and of the order and condition of the schools and school
-
houses in his county, together, with all such other
information and suggestions as his experience and observa-
tions may enable him to offer, calculated to advance the
cause of popular education. 23
Pew records remain of the work of this commission and
its existence was for a brief period of two years. It is
evident that the Board of County Commissioners of Education
did not meet the educational needs of the state; nor did
it
receive popular approval. This is shown by the fact that
the
legislature in iQSk repealed the act creating that commission
and in its place enacted a law establishing the
office of
State Superintendent of Common Schools. This
law, with some
changes and amendments, is in effect at the
present time. No
more important or enduring educational
legislation has ever
been enacted in Maine. From this date,
the people of Maine
^^Maine, Public Laws (l85D» 357. sec. 1.
^^Ibid.
18
ceased to experiment with the different forms of state control
and devoted their efforts to the expansion of the office. Be-
cause of the significance of the legislation, it is here quoted
in full.
There shall be appointed by the Governor and Council a
Superintendent of Common Schools who shall be duly sworn
and whose term of office shall continue for three years
from the first day of May next, and on the expiration of
said term or the occurrence of a vacancy in said office
by death, resignation or removal, a new appointment shall
be made for a like term of three years.
He shall devote his time to the improvement of common
schools and the promotion of the general interests of
education. He shall investigate the operation of school
laws and collect information in regard to the arrangement
of school districts. He shall familiarize himself with
the location and construction of schoolhouses and the use
of the best school apparatus. He shall consult and advise
with the Superintending School Committees on the selection
of textbooks adapted to the wants of the schools and in
methods of ascertaining the qualifications of teachers for
their duties.
He shall examine the returns made by the Superintending
School Committees to the office of the Secretary of State
and obtain from them such facts and statistics as may be
useful, and in general procure information from every
available source for the' improvement of common schools.
It shall be the duty of the Superintendent by corre-
spondence with teachers, school officers and others, and
by public addresses from time to time in different parts
of the state, to disseminate the information he may have
acquired and endeavor to awaken a more general interest
in public education.
, «
The Superintendent shall annually, prior to the session
of the Legislature, make a report to the Governor and
Council of the results of his inquiries and investigations,
and the facts obtained from the school returns including
such suggestions and recommendations as in his judgment
will best promote the improvement of common schools. ^
It is noteworthy that most, if not all, of the
original
duties imposed upon the Board of Education were assigned
to the
24}{aino, Public Laws (1854)> sec. 11 .
19
new Chief State School Officer* Commensurate with the wider
scope of influence of the office, the title of the Chief State
School Officer was changed in 1923 to "State Commissioner of
Education.
Today, the dutiea and powers of the State Commissioner
of Education are definitely prescribed and backed with such
specific methods of enforcement that the office carries a great
deal of authority and responsibility. A partial list of his
duties as prescribed by law follows:
"l. To exercise a general supervision of all the public
schools and to advise and direct the town committees
and superintendents in the discharge of their duties;
"2. To compile and distribute, in pamphlet form, to the
municipal and school officers of the several towns,
copies of the amended school laws of the State;
"3. To prescribe the studies to be taught in the public
schools . . . and approve any coxirse arranged by the
superintending school committee;
'Ij.. To cause an inspection to be made under the direction
of the board and to report to the school committee and
to the board, his findings and recommendations when
petitioned by 60^ of the parents of, the children of
any one sc^ol
;
”5* To supervise the state colleges;
"6. To appoint supervisors whose duty it shall be to assigt
and direct elementary and secondary teachers. . . .
The office of chief state school officer was strengthened
1
in 1909 when the State Superintendent was authorized to employ
a deputy and an inspector of secondary schools. Further
^^Maine, Public Laws (1923) > c*
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated ( 196I1.), c. 5»
sec. 101.
27jiaine, Public Laws (1909) » o* 125*
JV
20
authority was granted in 1911 when the State Superintendent
was authorized to enqploy a general agent for the purpose of
administration and supervision of schools in unorganized ter-
ritory. At this time, nearly one-half of the total area of the
26
state was classified as unorganized territory. In 1916, the
office was further augmented by the addition of two specialists
in the field of rural education. The State Department has con-
tinued to grow and expand its services through the years. The
most recent state directory lists 69 professional and/or tech-
29
nical positions in the State Department of Education.
Maine, like most states, has a state agency known as
the State Department of Education. This agency includes a
State Board of Education of ten members appointed by the
Governor, with the consent of the Governor's Council, for five-year
terms; a Commissioner of Education appointed by the Board; and
a staff of professional, technical and clerical personnel
appointed by the Commissioner.
Since education is a state function, the courts have
held consistently over the years that the legislature may
empower the State Department of Education to supervise the
state system of education. This means, in the ultimate, that
if a local administrative unit fails to provide a program
of
education which meets minimum requirements, the State
Department
^^Maine, Public Laws (19H)> 127*
^^State Department of Education, Maine Education_^
Directory (Augusta: State Department of Education,
ivoo).
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or Education may takd any reasonable steps to cause sucb a pro-
gram to be provided, including withholding of state subsidies
or failure to accredit schools.
Included in this broad authority are certain specific
responsibilities such as certification of teachers, approval
of building plans and general responsibilities which include
professional assistance and supervisory services. While many
additional responsibilities have been added in recent years,
especially since the advent of federally supported programs,
there appears to be sufficient constitutional and statutory
authority to permit such expansion.
As a policy-making body, the State Board of Education
has the authority to adopt bylaws which have the equal force
and effect of statutes. The exercise of this vital power has
not been tested in the state’s highest tribunal. It has been
held in other Jurisdictions, however, that bylaws having been
formally adopted by the State Board of Education have the force
of law.^^ Existing policy statements and bylaws of the Maine
State Board of Education have been reviewed and are included
where applicable as part of this- study due to their important
5 implications for the administration of the public school system.
t
Local Control of Education
A review of material pertaining to the history
of the
^^Roard of School Commissioner v. Manning, 123 Md. 169,
90 A. 839 (1914)*
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Province of Maine reveals no records of any schools prior to
the time when this Province was united with the Massachusetts
Bay and Plymouth Colonies under the Charter of William and
Mary in 1692.^^
As early as 1652, the Massachusetts Bay Colony contended
that, according to the provisions of its charter, since it
embraced all lands ”... within the apace of three English
miles, to the northward of the River Merrimack and to the
northward of any and every part thereof
. .
.
,
" the Province
of Maine belonged to its jurisdiction. From that date, Mass-
achusetts attenq^ted to enforce its laws upon the inhabitants
of that section.
Among these statutes were the famous school laws
enacted in 161^2 and 1647 requiring the education of all
children and the establishment of schools in towns of 50 and
100 families. There is little evidence that the residents
of the Province of Maine took these laws seriously during the
seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century, under the
settled government and the better conditions in the Province of
Maine brought about by the Charter of William and Mary, towns
began to establish schools. This was especially true of those
towns which were located in the southwestern section of the
Province and which had been among the first to submit to the
3^Charles Augustus Snow, The History of the Development
of Public School Supervision in the State of Maine (Orono;
University Press, 1939)^ PP • ^-13
•
32Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School
Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 4.
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jurisdiction of Massachusetts.
The records of the early schools in Massachusetts Bay
Colony show that the three forms of local control—the town
meeting, selectmen, and school committee--had been used con-
secutively as means of controlling education. In Maine, al-
though the above sequence may be traced in some towns, for
the most part each town chose the form which seemed to meet
its need or was most familiar to the inhabitants who had come
from Massachusetts towns.
Following the practice of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, the people of the Province of Maine began gradually
to change the method of management of their school affairs,
giving more extensive power to a special group or committee.
The use of special committees to meet some situations of
unusual importance or one requiring detailed attention repre-
sented the groping for a new means of control. It was this
idea, born of necessity, which later gave rise to the con-
viction that education, being one of the proper functions of
government, is of such nature that its interest can beat be
served by holding its direction apart from other municipal
affairs. It is evident from the records that the purpose of
this general eommittee at first was to assume the duties
which
had hitherto belonged to the town meeting or selectmen.
They
were to agree with the school master concerning
wages, to
determine the location of the schools and to set
the duration
Later, in addition to the above duties.of the school terms*
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the committee was empowered to examine the teachers in regard
to their ability to teach and to test the quality of their
work by due inspection of the schools*
Every governmental function of the state and of its
political subdivisions has its origin in the state constitu-
tion. Under the constitution, the state, through its legis-
lature, may authorize its cities, towns, and plantations to
assume certain duties and obligations not repugnant to the
general law.
The needs of the people make it necessary for a state
to delegate much of its authority under the constitution to
one of its several divisions in order that the common good
be served. This delegation of power in the field of education
was extended to the towns of Maine in 1821 * In compliance
with Article VIII of the Constitution which directs the
legislature to ”. • • require the several towns to make suit-
able provision, at their own expense, for support and main-
tenanoe of public schools ..." a statute was passed in 1831
creating school districts and establishing them as the legal
unit of education in Maine. 33 This legislation gave
authority
to each town and plantation to determine the
number and limits
of school districts. These divisions or
sections were thereby
made bodies corporate with power to sue and be
sued, to take
and to hold any estate, real or personal, for
the purpose of
33Maine, Public Laws {1821 ), c. 117 , sec. 8
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supporting the school or schools and
to apply the sace agree-
ably to the provisions of the Act
independently of the money
raised by the to«n for that purpose.
In addition the in-
habitants of any school district
qualified to vote in town
affairs were empowered to raise money
for the purpose of
erecting, repairing, purchasing or
removing a schoolhouse and
for the purpose of purchasing land
for the same and equipment
therefor. They were also authorised
to determine the location
of the schoolhouse and the age
at which pupils might be admitted
to the schools.
AS a means of control under
this district system of
schools, the law of 1821
stipulated that each town and
planta-
tion at its annual meeting
should choose a superintending
school committee of not less
than three nor more than
persons. The duties of this
committee were expressly pro-
vided for in the statute.
They were to examine the
school
masters and mistresses who
proposed to teach school wit^n
the town or plantation,
and it was further
provided that
be empowered to dismiss
any school master or>
mistr
..
...» -
“•
Totiona and discipline in
effect in eacn
earning the
,,,
It was
and also give ee influence and best
also the duty of the
committee
districts
to the end that the
youth of the severs
endeavors
authorised to direct
schools regnlsrly»attend the
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and select school books to be used in the respective schools.
This act further provided that at the same or annual
town meeting, a second official, a school agent, be chosen
for each school district to share with the committee in the
control of the schools. The agent's duties as stated were
"to hire the school masters and mistresses and to provide the
necessary fuel and utensils for the schools."
The statute of 1821 laid the legal basis of Maine's
public school system and from it all the subsequent educational
legislation has had its inception.
The structure of a public school system as expressed
in the Massachusetts Law of 1789 was duplicated closely in
the Maine Law of 1821. The practices followed in the control
of schools and legalized by the enactment were basically no
different from those formerly followed in Maine when it was
a part of Massachusetts. Committee control, which had been
legalized by the Law of 1789, was simply augmented by the
addition of a district agent, a practice which had begun in a
few towns in the Province of Maine in the first part
of the
nineteenth century
•
The joint plan of control under the new statute of
l8ai by comnittee and district agent resulted in
a division
of authority. This division is evident in
regard to teachers.
It was the duty of the committee to examine
the teacher as to
his ability to teach: but since the
appointment of the teacher
was the responsibility of the district
agent, the committee
27
could not demand that any particular qualified candidate be
employed. Such division of authority resulted in continual
difficulty, the district agent often usurping the rights of
the town committee in an autocratic fashion.
A very early court case, now of historical interest
only, confirms this weakness in the original legislation. In
Moor V. Newfield^^ plaintiff Moor was employed to teach in
District No. 2 in the Town of Newfield for the month of April,
18214., at the agreed upon salary of fifteen dollars. He was
hired by one of the three elected school committee representa-
tives of the district. Upon completion of his assignment ho
sought to recover his wages but the Town of Newfield refused
to pay on the grounds that he had been illegally employed.
Judge Mellen, in -holding for the defendant, ruled that a
school committee of three, elected by a district, had no
authority to hire a school master; the power was vested in
the school agent.
It is interesting to note that although the district
system was the intended plan for the entire state under which
schools were to be conducted, it did not meet with universal
favor and, as a result, the legislative session of 1822
exempted the Town of Portland and placed the control of an
schools in that town under one general school committee.
^^Moor V. Newfield , ]+ Me. Mi ( 1826 ).
^^Maine, Public Laws ( 1822 ), 0. II6, sec. 1 .
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In 1828, Bath followed the action of Portland and secured from
the legislature the right to elect a superintending school com-
mittee which was to have full control of all public schools
within the town.^^
These trends in school legislation point to the desire
on the part of the people, in a few of the larger communities,
to place the control and supervision of all schools in the
hands of a local committee at large. This feeling increased
with the passing years and finally reached fruition in 1893
in the abolition of the district system.
One wonders how the district system, with all its
obvious defects could exist for such an extended period of
time, perhaps the reason for this reluctance to change
is
best expressed by Coe, who stated:
The old district system probably held on so long
because
the early New Englanders were suspicious of
centralized^
cover^oL in either Church or State. The school
district
was an example oT extreme local self-government,
i”
It was so l^oal in character that the results were
often
bL^ardLss in teaching methods and
of schools, and it was not until 1B93
of centralized government was sufficiently
dispelled o
permit abolition of the district system.
A new policy in the local control
of schools appeared
in an 1850 enactment which provided
that any town containing
two thousand inhabitants or more
might, if it wished, elect
some "competent Individual, an
inhabitant of the town" who
3^Maine, Public Laws (1828), c. U.75>
ae°-
(New York
Vol. II, P* 702.
29
should be constituted a supervisor of the public schools of
the town. This supervisor of schools, when elected, was
clothed with all the authority, privileges, and duties of the
superintending school coranittee in place of which he had been
elected.^® This statute was the first concerning a local
supervisor or superintendent of schools that can be found in
the history of the control of the public schools of the state.
The legislation was permissive rather than mandatory. In
1895 » the act was amended and thereafter it was the duty of
the school committee to elect a superintendent of schools.
Local control of schools was enhanced again in 1897
•
The legislature, not without violent protest, enacted a union
supervision law. The law provided that two or more towns,
liO
having not less than twenty-five nor more than fifty schools,
might unite in the employment of a superintendent of schools.
The school committees of the towns of a supervisory union were
empowered to unite to form a joint committee for the purpose of
electing a union superintendent, to fix and apportion his
salary among the several towns, and to determine the relative
amount of service to be performed by the superintendent in each
town.
Maine, Public Laws (18^0 ), c. 193 > sec. 2.
Maine." Public Laws (1895), c* 120.
^^Since most schools at this time were one-room, one-
teacher schools, the terms school and teacher were synonymous
within the context of the statute.
^Maine, Public Laws (1897 )» 296, sec. 1.
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The supervisory union plan, despite several amendments,
is still in existence in Maine today. The current statute re-
quires in part that:
. . .
Supervisory unions shall include not less than
35 nor more than 75 teachers unless the commissioner
shall find upon representation of any school committee
that owing to geographical situation or other reasons
it is to the advantage of the State and of said towns
that a uniori shall include fewer than 35 or more than
75 teachers .42
The latest and by far the most significant legislation
affecting the local control of public schools was enacted in
1957 . Known as the Sinclair Act, it provides for the formation
of school administrative districts of sufficient size to pro-
vide a more equalized educational opportunity for all pupils.
This Act, and the litigation it has precipitated, will be
dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter IV of this study.
Judicial Decisions and Education
Under our system of government, there are three
branches: the legislative, executive, and
judicial. Courts
are very zealous in maintaining the principle
of separation of
powers
,
and generally will refuse to interfere
with the
ministerial acts of an administrative agency.
Interference
by the courts results only when an
administrative agency has
acted unlawfully, has abused its discretion
in acting arbi-
trarily or in a fraudulent manner or
acted without authority.
liSMaine, Wevlsed Statutes (1954). «• 1’>
^
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Courts also refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature or for boards of education, because with respect to
acts of the legislature, it is not the province of the courts
to decide the wisdom of the laws, and insofar as school boards
are concerned, it is not for the courts to pass upon the wisdom
of their acts, nor attempt to operate the public school system.
A great portion of the actual law of the United States
has been predicated on court decisions nevertheless. It has
been said that the law of the country is not what the state
legislatures or Federal Congress may provide but rather it is
their action as construed, applied, and interpreted by the
courts.^*' As stated in the introductory chapter, laymen can
never be certain as to the meaning of the law until statutory
enactments have been given judicial interpretation.
It is the primary objective of this study, therefore,
to identify, summarize, and interpret the decisions of the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court pertaining to education in order
to discover the basic intent of the statutes as constructed
by the legislature. Decisions of the lower courts are not
generally included since, not being courts of record, the in-
formation is not usually available.
There are a number of school law questions which have
not been adjudicated before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
Many of these questions have been referred to the Attorney
General of the state for his opinion. Consequently, on a large
I
^Drury, op. cit ., p. 329.
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number of important legal questions in education, school per-
sonnel are guided by interpretations from this office. All
such opinions are included where applicable. It should be
called to the attention of the reader, however, that as a
general rule, while such opinions are considered authoritative
as representative of the opinion of the chief law officer of
the state, they are not to be construed as pronouncements of
the law with the same effect as court decisions.
Summary
This chapter has described the division of responsi-
bilities for public school education at the federal, state and
local levels. While the concept that education is a basic
responsibility of the state has been well established, the
delegation of this authority to the local level started almost
from the beginning of Maine's statehood. Beginning with the
district system in 1821, the supervisory union system in 1893
and finally the school administrative district system of
1957 » "the intent of the legislature has been clear in that
local matters pertaining to education should be controlled
and administered locally.
At the same time, recognizing that a central state
agency is also necessary to promote consistency and uniformity
in certain matters of state-wide concern, the legislature over
the years has provided the .necessary machinery for this
important function.
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Prom the earliest attempts to develop school super-
vision at the local level in Maine, school committees, repre-
sentative of the immediate will of the people, have held a
high and important place in the total educational structure.
Very few of its prerogatives have been changed or taken away
over the years. On the contrary, such prerogatives have
generally been expanded. It is a tribute to the good sense
of the people of the state that there has never been any serious
conflict in law or in practice between the two agencies. In-
deed, no court cases involving a dispute between these two
arms of government can be found in the decisions of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court.
CHAPTER III
SCHOOL DISTRICT ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
Introduction
This chapter will consider the legal status of school
districts, which are established by the legislature to carry
out locally the functions of education, as well as their
governing board of officers, known in Maine as school com-
mittees or boards of school directors. The legal status of
the local chief school officer, the superintendent of schools,
will also bo explored.
Much of the school litigation in Maine has centered
around the authority and power of the original school district
organization and the school agent, both of which have long
since been replaced by other forms of control. A review of
court cases in connection with the district and/or agent
generally will not be a part of this chapter since the study
is not essentially a historical one. Appropriate references
are included for the interested reader.
The series of court cases precipitated by the recent
legislation commonly called the Sinclair Act is of such far-
reaching importance and concern to present-day school author-
ities that it will be treated in depth in a separate chapter
on school district reorganization.
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School Districts
Authority and power
. While public education is a
state function, legislatures generally establish agencies of
the state known as school districts to carry out locally the
functions of education under powers expressly or impliedly
granted to them by the legislature. A school district is
purely the creation of the legislature, with such authority
as may be conveyed to it.
School districts have identities separate and apart
from private corporations, from municipal corporations, or
from other units of government, such as townships or counties,
even though the territory of the districts may be co**extensive
with other units of government, or lie within territorial
limits of other governmental units.
School districts under statutory provisions or
judicial decree are generally considered to be corporations
or bodies politic. While they are not held to be corporations
in the usual sense, they have been considered to be quasi-
corporations, or quasi-municipal corporations.
These general legal principles have been confirmed in
Maine through a series of judicial opinions dating back to
I8I4.3. In Whitmore v. Hogan^ the Court held that the statute
of 1821, to provide for the education of youth, made each
^
Whitmore v. Hogan , 22 Me. (9 Shop.) 561*. (l8i*.3)*
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scliool district a "body corporate." An 181).9 decision^ held
that the statute of 1824 made the selectmen, tovm clerk
and
treasurer, of every town in the state, a body corporate,
and
trustee of the ministerial and school funds, with power
to con-
vey lands belonging to those funds. It was stated
in an 1865
decision that "School districts are quasi-corporations."
In
the McSary case of 1960,*^ the court held that
the legislature
has the authority to create quasi-municipal
corporations for
educational purposes separate and distinct from
municipalities.
Finally, an Attorney General ruling in 1959
stated that A
school administrative district is a quasi
-municipal corpora-
tion sat up for the limited purpose of
providing education for
the children of two or more municipalities,
therefore, it
c
agoncy of tlio State #
The concept of education, as
a state function, is of
extreme importance in governing
the relation of the local
school district to the local
municipal corporation. A school
district and a town may comprise
exactly the same territory but
they are usually distinct
legal entities, each with its
own
peculiar functions to perform.
The leading case in Maine on
this point is Kellei v.
Brunswick. The facts of this
case
follow. The Town of Brunswick
needed a new hi^ school but.
2warren v. T„v.„^^tants of
Stetson, 30 Me. (17 Shep.)
564 (1843 )• , --
3 . . n,,t. Ko. 6 in.pres^ V- ^na Ins^ ..
54 Me. 5oTTIH55T:“^ ^ 2d 747 (i960).
l^McGary v. Barrows, 15&
Me. 2i>0,
5 .«.^.„^nev General Report (1959-60),
p. 7.
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due to existing indebtedness, was constitutionally prohibited
from borrowing the necessary funds under the five per centum
limit. The town officials sou^t and were granted, from
the Legislature of 1935> a special act creating the Brunswick
School District. The essential part of the act reads as
follows;
. .
.
[T]he inhabitants and territory within the
town of Brunswick are hereby created a body politic
and corporate under the name of Brunswick School
District for the purpose of acquiring property within
said town for school purposes; erecting, enlarging,
repairing, equipping and maintaining on said property
a school building; and for the purpose of maintaining
a secondary school, with the right to lease or let
said property to said town; all for the benefit of the
inhabitants of said town , . • when the money shall
have been repaid, and every indebtedness of the dis-
trict discharged, the property is to be transferred to
the town. The trustees shall then cease to function,
the district itself becomes legally defunct, and all of
the duties, management, care and maintenance shall revert
to the school board of the town of Brunswick.
°
Ten individual taxpayers and inhabitants of the town
instituted a suit against the district, and its trustees, to
test the validity of the act. Their contentions • were that;
1. The act did not incorporate a district separate
from the town; that the district must depend on
the town, not only for pupils but for teachers;
2. The act had no other purpose than to permit
accomplishing, indirectly, what, because of the
five per centum limit, the town of Brunswick
could not do directly;
3. The town was undertaking to purchase a
school
building and to pay for it on the installment
plan; and
^Kelley v. Brunswick School Dist^ . , 13k- Me. 1^7
A
703 (1936).
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I4.. Under the act the town would become obligated to
raise money by taxation to pay a present debt
which it could not lawfully incur.
The Court dismissed the case and declared the act to
be valid and the district legal. In writing the opinion,
several statements were made which reinforce the doctrine of
education as a state function and the separate legal entity
of a school district. Excerpts from the opinion follow:
. .
.
[T]owns must provide funds for the support
of public schools within their limits, but it does not
follow that the legislature can do no more for the
same general purpose. . .
. [M]unicipal corporations
organized for different purposes may include the same
territory, as a city and a county, or a school dis-
trict. Two authorities cannot exercise power in the
same area, over the same subject, at the same time.
But the identity of territory, putting one municipal
corporation, full or quasi, where another is, is
immaterial, if the units are for distinct and different
purposes
.
A school district is a public agency or trustee
established to carry out the policy of the State to
educate its youth. The Legislature may change such
agencies, and control, and direct what shall be done
with school property. V/hen the district is at an
end, the town shall, in succession, take the property
impressed with the duty of carrying on the trust. The
property held by school districts for public use is
subject to such disposition in the promotion of the
objects for which it is held, as the supreme legis-
lative power may see fit to make. , . , [Sjchool property
is public property, the property of the incorporated _
district and not of the taxpayers residing within it,'
Lest there be any doubt in the minds of the citizens
concerning the ultimate authority of the legislatxire in
creating school districts independent of municipal districts,
the Court concluded its opinion with the following;
"^Ibid.
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. • . [T]he courts may not, absent express consti-
tutional limitations, entirely deny the power of the
Legislature to create, wholly or partly, in town or city
limits, different public corporate bodies, and to make
clear that their debts are to be regarded as those of
independent corporations. The Maine Legislature, with
regard to incorporating corporations purely public, is
of virtually unlimited power.
^
A school district is a quasi-municipal corporation
created for the exclusive purpose of carrying into effect
locally a state purpose; the city is a municipal corporation
created to direct and control local affairs. Since education
by its very nature is a state and not essentially a local
concern, it is not to be regarded as a municipal function. It
follows, therefore, that a town or city has no authority,
growing out of its nature as a corporation, to control in any
way the policies of the local school system. This rule of
strict construction applies to home-rule charters of cities,
that is to say charters which make cities self-governing and
free from legislative interference with respect to matters of
9
local and internal interest.
In a Bangor case in 1938, an attempt was made by tax-
payers to force the city council to submit its general
appro-
priation reaolve to the electorate for acceptance or rejection.
Among other things, certain items in the budget for
the public
schools were being questioned. In denying the action,
the
8 Ibid.
’^Leo 0. Garber and Neirton Edwards, The
in our Governmental Structure (Danville, Illinois:
The i
state "Printers and Publishers , 1962), p. H*
court said, in part:
• • • [T]he legislature defines, in minimum require-
ment, what amount of money must be raised and expended
by a city for common schools; the public school system
is of statewide concern and the State at large is equally
concerned with the city regarding education.
Finally, a case in Augusta settled in 1959, once again
reaffirmed the position of the courts in the matter of who has
jurisdiction over public education in the state. The city
council had appropriated funds for the transportation of
private school pupils within the city. This action was
challenged by thirteen taxpayers* on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional to spend public moneys in support of private
and secular schools. While the implications of this and other
points in the case are more appropriately considered elsewhere
in this study, the following excerpt is pertinent to the
present discussion. It is as follows:
. , . In enacting the laws pertaining to education,
the legislature intended that no municipality should
regulate by ordinance or order any subjects which would
affect or influence general education unless permitted
to do so by an express delegation of power and, in the
absence of express authority from the legislature in the
city charter or in a statute, the Augusta city council
has no authority under its police power to enact an
ordinance providing for the transportation of pupils to
or from private schools, . , (Italics mine)
Thus, there is little doubt that the authority and
power of Maine school districts are those provided by statute
^^Burkett v. Youngs, et al,, of the City Council of
Bangor
, 135 Me, 459 (193^T
•
^^Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta , 155 Me.
151, 153 k. 2d ^ (19?9r
or implied by same. The powers of a school district are sub-
ject completely to the control of the legislature, which may
increase, abrogate, or modify the authority of a school dis-
trict.
The basio authority for sohool districta reads in
part as follows:
An administrative unit as referred to in this Title
shall include all municipal or quasi-municipal corpora-
tions responsible for operating public schools.
Every administrative unit shall raise and expend,
annually, for the support of public schools therein,
. . . not less than 80jzf for each inhabitant, according
to the census by which Representatives to the Legislature
were last apportioned, under penalty of forfeiting not
less than twice nor more than I4. times the amount of its
deficiency. All moneys provided by towns or other
administrative units or apportioned by the State for the
support of public schools shall be expended for the
maintenance of public schools established and controlled
by the administrative units by which said moneys are
provided. . .
Creation, alteration and dissolution . The procedure
for organizing school districts, altering the boundaries, or
dissolving districts is largely regulated by statutory pro-
visions. The formation or change of school districts is a
governmental function and the legislature has full power to
create or change school districts at its pleasure, without the
request or assent, or even against the will of the affected
district, its board of education, or its inhabitants.
In Knapp v. Swift River Valley Community School Pis*
trict,^^ it was hold that the creation and dissolution
of
^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (I96I4.), 0. 103»
**
13Knapp V. Swift River Valley Community School
Dlstrl^,
152 Me. 350, 129 A. 2d 790 (1957).
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community school districts is solely within the legislature’s
power, and a town can withdraw from such a district only in
compliance with the statute requiring authorization of such
withdrawal by special act of the legislature. In Blackstqne.
V, Rollins , the court held that the legislature may validate,
reconstitute, and establish school districts despite failure
of strict compliance with statutory provisions relating to
procedure. In the McGary case^^ cited earlier, it was held
that there is no requirement under the state constitution for
submission of the question of formation of school administrative
districts to popular vote of the municipalities.
Perhaps in no other area of school administration has
the local governmental unit so vehemently opposed
the doctrine
of state control as in that of establishing
school districts.
The State of Maine has had its day in court
on this subject
as have other jurisdictions. It is interesting to
note, how-
ever, that except for the Kellex case reviewed
earlier, all of
the court cases relative to school
districts have occurred
under the old school district law of 1831.
or after the Sinclair
Act of 1957. The school union supervisory
legislation of 1897
permitting towns to unite for the purposes
of employing a
superintendent, permissive at first, and
made mandatory in
1918. has continued xmscathed
and unchallenged in the courts
( 1961 ).
iVackstone v. Rollins . 157 Me. 85. 170 A.
2d
l5McGary V. Barrows . l56 Me. 250.
163 A. 2d 7W (I960)
to the present time. The system has apparently served the needs
of Maine very well over the years.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the
Sinclair statutes and judicial interpretations of same are of
sufficient import to the future of Maine's public school system
to be treated in depth, in a separate chapter on school dis-
trict reorganization. Earlier court cases involving legis-
lation now repealed or amended will not here be reviewed.
The interested reader is referred to the following cases:
Deane v . Washburn , 1? Me. 100 (l8l<.0); Smyth v, Titcomb , 3I Me.
272 ( 1850 ); Call V. Chadbourne , I4.6 Me. 206 (18$8); Jackson v.
Stearns
,
i;8 Me. 5^8 (i860); Allen v. Archer , U-9 Me. (I86I);
and School Dist. No. 1 in Gorham v. Peering , 91 Me. 5l6, 1^0 A.
Ski (1898).
School Committees
The powers and duties conferred by statute upon school
districts are exercised by their legally constituted officers.
These officers are always members of a board or committee and
have no legal standing except when acting as part of such a
board. In Maine, these officers are members of groups
known
as school committees or boards of school directors.
Members of such boards represent the state. They
act
in the performance of a state function, and
they are state
officers. School committee members are not
municipal officers
even though they may have been elected locally
or appointed by
Vkk
the mayor and/or city council.
School committees are agencies of the state, created
by it to carry out its educational policies in local communities.
They possess no inherent powers nor are any powers conferred
upon them by the local community. Whatever authority a school
committee may possess is authority which has been delegated to
it by the state.^^
A school committee is a legal entity and must act as
such; action taken by board members acting separately (in-
cluding the chairman) is not the action of the committee and
is without legal force. Rules and regulations adopted by
school committees in legally constituted sessions, however,
have the binding force of law within the local school district.
The authority of school committees, when acting within
statutory and constitutional bounds is very broad in matters
pertaining to the local district which they represent. The
duties of school committees and school directors are spelled
out in Chapter 1$, Section i4.73* A partial list of these duties
is as follows:
"1, The management of schools and the custody and care,
including repairs and insurance on school buildings,
of all property in their administrative units;
”2. Direct the general course of instruction and approve
a uniform course of instruction and approve a uniform
system of textbooks, and perform such other functions
as may be specified by law;
^^Barth v. School District of Philadelphia , 393
557, 11^3 aT2cT909 (195^) .
”3* After investigation, due notice of hearing, and
hearing thereon, they shall dismiss any teacher,
although having the requisite certificate, who
proves unfit to teach or whose services they deem
unprofitable to the school;
"I;.. Expel any obstinately disobedient and disorderly
scholar, after a proper investigation of his be-
havior, if found necessary for the peace and use-
fulness of the school; and restore him on satis-
factory evidence of his repentance and amendment;
Determine what description of scholars shall attend
each school, classify them and transfer them from
school to school where more than one school is kept
at the same time.”^»
Additional duties and responsibilities of school com-
mittees appear throughout the statutes on education. In-
terestingly enough, some of the most important statutory
authority of school committees appears in Chapter 7» Section
l6l under the powers and duties of superintendents. In this
section, it is noted that the school committee must vote to
purchase all materials and supplies; approve all vouchers for
school expenditures; determine the amount of time spent by
the superintendent in supervising each of the schools; approve
all nominations for teaching positions; determine salaries and
qualifications of teachers ; provide for a hearing, when re-
quested, for dismissed teachers, or teachers serving on a
continuing contract iidiose contract has been terminated; and
determine when changes in local conditions warrant the elimina-
tion of a teaching position.
A recent publication lists the duties and functions of
^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (1961;.), o. 1$,
sec. 14-73*
1^6
school committees in detail for the interested reader. It
is noteworthy that the powers of school committees have rarely
been challenged in the Maine courts. Most of the questions which
have arisen center around Jurisdiction concerning pupils or
teachers. Those questions are discussed in succeeding chapters
of this study.
Miscellaneous questions concerning school committees
have arisen over the years relative to; membership; legal
meetings; a legal quomim; eligibility for membership; salary
of school committee members; records; removal of members;
and
vacancies. The only such question to reach the Maine Supremo
Judicial Court concerned the legality of a school
committee
meeting. In Elaemore v. Hancock, two questions
pertinent to
the present discussion were raised: (1) Must each
member of
a school committee be personally notified of
a meeting? and
(2) Is a meeting of the school committee
valid when one member
is not present because he is out of town?
In answer to the
first question, the Court held that there
must be an official
notice of meetings of school committees; a
verbal message of
a meeting, loft at a member's house
is sufficient, whether or
not the member is at home. In response
to the second question,
the court held that a school committee
meeting is not invalid
because one member does not attend as
a result of being out of
town.
l8„aino school Board Quarterly, y.tles
and FuncU^
.r aehool Boards (Orono, Maine, April, iWTh
~
l^Elsemore v. Tnb.bltants of the
Town of Hanco^,
137 Me. 2iv3 (19W*
The other questions cited above have been referred to
the Attorney General's office and the opinions rendered, until
reversed by court decisions or subsequent opinions from the
same office, should serve as guidelines for Maine school
officials* The opinions are as follows;
"1. A selectman or plantation assessor may not at the
same time hold the office of school consnittee
member. These offices are incompatible since
selectmen must approve the bills of the school
committee. 20
"2. The official records of a school committee are
in the nature of public documents and should be
open to inspection by citizens for reasonable
purposes and during reasonable times.2^
There is no express provision in the laws for the
removal of a member of a school ' committee. Lacking
such express provision, the removal must be governed
by the Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 5» which provides
for the impeachment of civil officers for misdemeanor
in office, and further provides that every person
holding any office may be removed by the Governor
with the advice of the Council on the address of
both branches of the Legislature. 22
"1^.. A vacancy may be declared to exist on a school
committee when a member has resigned, died, or when
he has been absent for more than ninety days . ”23
Superintendents of Schools
It was recognized almost from the beginning of the
pu.Llic school system in Maine that an executive officer of
some kind was needed to implement the local policies of the
^^Attorney General Report (1961-62), p. 914.*
2lA-ttorney General Report (1952), p* 156*
22Ibid . , p. 155*
23]^ttorney General Report (1950), P» 152.
school committee. The original statute of 1821 set up a
system of dual control between the school committee and an
official known as the school agent. The incompatibility of
the two offices could have been predicted from the wording of
the statutes. The duties of the Committee, on the one hand,
included the examination of the school masters and mistresses
who proposed to teach school within the town or plantation,
and it was further provided that they be empowered to dismiss
any school master or mistress who should be found incapable
or ui.fit to teach. The school agent, on the other hand, was
to be chosen for each school district to share with the Com-
mittee in the control of schools. The agent *s duties as stated
were to "hire the school masters and mistresses and to provide
the necessary fuel and utensils for the schools. It took
only five years from the date of enactment of this legislation
for litigation to reach the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court. In
a case already cited, it was held that the authority
to hire
a school master was vested in the school agent
and not the
25
school committee.
This system of dual control persisted until 1893
despite the repeated attempts to abolish the
system. As early
as l81^6, Mr. William G. Crosby, first
secretary of the State
Board of Education, wrote in his annual
report that, in his
21^Maine, Public Laws (1821), c. 67, sec. 7.
25noor V. Mewfield . 1; Mo. Ui Oreonl.) 1*1;
(1826).
opinion, the majority of the school agents were incompetent,
neglectful and uninterested in the work of the office. He
felt that the agents were more interested in the prestige,
profit and local prominence that they might gain than in pro-
viding good schools. He commented at considerable length on
the favoritism shown local teachers, the employment of in-
competent persons as teachers and the petty quarrels sind small
politics ^ich were constantly in evidence, and ho finally
became caustic in his remarks relating to the failure or re-
fusal of district agents to cooperate with the superintending
school committee.
The records reveal a continuing state of unrest and
controversy, resulting in a large number of Supreme Judicial
Court cases, until the repeal of the district system in 1893-
In 1897 , the act of 1893 which provided that the school
committee might, if the town so voted, elect a superintendent
of schools, was amended, and thereafter this office was man-
datory. This official, the replacement for the school agent,
is recognized legally and professionally as the chief school
official of the local school system. This position continues
in Maine today as it does in virtually all of the states al-
though the title may vary from one jurisdiction to another.
The necessary professional competence of such a person
was recognized and ably described in 1896 by Mr. W. W. Stetson,
^^William G. Crosby, Second Report of the Board oX
Education (Augusta, Me.; State Board ol^ Education, lo4o)»
p. 16^
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the State Supei*intendent of Public Schools. These same general
qualifications are sought in candidates for the post today.
Mr. Stetson’s comments were as follows:
To superintend schools intelligently, one needs
scholarship, professional training, and experience in
the work of the school room. He needs to know the
subjects studied, the methods used in giving instruction
and to be familiar with the history, science and art of
education.
He must not only be familiar with the facts taught
in textbooks, but he must also be a student of science,
art, literature, history, and economy. He must know what
the world has done, what it is doing, what it is capable
of doing. He must know men, things, means. He must be
strong of mind, rugged of body, rich in personality. His
work must be his absorbing vocation. To this ho must
give his entire time and devote his best thought. He must
study schools; he must study children. One cannot do and
be all these things unless he has an aptitude for the
work, has prepared for it and gives his whole time to
it. 27
Maine Superintendents have clearly defined powers and
duties spelled out in the statutes in addition to whatever
authority may be delegated to them by the school committee.
A partial list of these duties as written into the law follows;
"1. He shall bo, ex officio, secretary of the school
committee or board of directors and of any school
building committee chosen by the administrative
unit and shall perform such duties not enumerated
as said committees or board shall direct;
”2. He shall keep a permanent record of all its votes,
orders and proceedings. He shall place orders for
materials and supplies purchased by vote of the
committee or directors and shall be its agent in
keeping all financial records and accounts;
”3. He shall examine the schools and inquire
regulations and the discipline thereof and the pro-
- ficiency of the pupils, for which purposes he shall
Common
W, Stetson, Report of the Si^
Schools (Augusta, Me.: State Boar<
)erintendent of
I of Education, 1896),
T3V
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visit each school at least the miniuiuin number of
times each term which the joint committee may
designate* He shall make a written report annually
bho condition of the schools for the past year,
with a statement of the condition of school
buildings, the proficiency made by the pupils and
the success attending the modes of instruction and
government thereof, and transmit a copy to the com-
missioner;
He shall keep a faithful and accurate account of
school finances, and he shall report at least once
a term in writing to each of the several- committees
or directors, including in such report a statement
of the condition of the schools, a financial state-
ment and a statement of the condition of school
buildings and outbuildings in the matter of repair,
cleanliness and sanitary arrangement;
”5 * He shall nominate all teachers subject to such
regulations governing salaries and the qualifications
of teachers as the school committee or school
directors shall make, and upon the approval of
nominations by said committee or directors, he
may employ teachers so nominated and approved for
such terms as he may deem proper, subject to the
approval of the school committee or directors. . . .
In case the superintendent of schools and the super-
intending school committee or school directors fail
- to legally elect a teacher, the commissioner shall
. have authority to appoint a substitute teacher who
shall serve until such election is made;
”6*- He shall direct and supervise the work of all teachers
”7* He shall select textbooks, supplies and apparatus
subject to the approval of the school committee or
school directors and shall make all purchases of the
same under such regulations as the school committee
or school directors shall adopt;
”8. He shall see to it that all necessary apparatus and
supplies are seasonably distributed to each school
and accurately accounted for and economically used;
”9* He shall enforce or cause to be enforced all regula-
tions of the school committee or school directors;
"10* He shall devote hia entire time to superintendence
in the towns oou^rising the union or School
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Administrative District. II
28
There is lack of agreement, around the country, con-
cerning the legal status of a superintendent of schools within
the educational hierarchy. The status of school committee
members as state agents or state officers has been well
established. The status of superintendents is not so clear.
Some courts have held that a city superintendent is
a public
officer or a state officer, and that his powers
and duties
relate entirely to the administration of the
public school
system which is a function of the state government
Other
opinions hold that a city superintendent is an
employee of
the board. In County Court of Summer Coun^
v. Nioelx, the
Court said tiie following i
It is difficult to. see how one who
stands in
nrcunies a public office is. ^
position
'^^%g?J^®At^presentrat least, it
sovereignty of the state? A p sovereignty of the
Ttfte ^rLJefat^rrL-ectio^ education, is
delegated to the board of education,
3
The Maine superintendent has
been classified as a
public officer. His position is
established by law and his
duties are legally defined. The
landmark case in Maine on
28„ai„e, Revised Statutes Annotated
(1961^), c. 7,
sec. l6l.
^^Edwards, op. cit . , p. H5*
- 10 ^oiirt Of Summers County v. Hiceli,
121 W. Va
767, 6 S.E. (2d'i W'p;
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this point is Benson v. Inhabitants of Town of Newfield
. This
case concerned the illegal dismissal of a teacher and will be
reported in detail in a later chapter. Of interest here is a
quote from the opinion which reads as follows;
• . . The superintendent of schools is a public
officer and his acts in that capacity, so long as in line
with the performance of his official duties, are pre-
sumed to have been done in accordance with law, for every
person holding office or tinist is presumed to perform his
duties without its violation. 31
With respect to the retirement system, however, a
superintendent is considered to be a state employee or teacher.
In a question was directed to the Attorney General as
follows: ”Is there any provision in the law to prevent or
bar the position of superintendent of schools from being con-
sidered that of a state en^^loyee?” Attorney General Frost
replied as follows: "The only applicable statute is Section 1,
Chapter 60, R.S. ISMi-y as amended. Under this section of the
law, for the purposes of retirement only, 'en^loyees' of the
State of Maine participate in the Maine State Retirement System.
Employees include teachers, and teachers are defined to include
the superintendent employed in' any day school within the State."-*
School superintendents are elected by school committees,
school directors, or in the case of a school union by a joint
union committee for terms of not more than five years. Super-
intendents are not eligible for continuing contracts or tenure
- 3lBen3on v. Inhabitants of Town of Newfield , 13^ Me.
23, 1 A. 2d 227“(193B7^
^
^^Attorney General Report (1954)* P* 21^.9*
Sk
status as are teachers. School committees or school directors
may, by a majority vote of their full membership, after due
notice and Investigation, discharge a superintendent for cause
before the expiration of his elected term. The superintendent
has the right of appeal of such a dismissal to the commissioner
for a public hearing.
The legality of contracts between a school committee
and the superintendent of schools was considered in a Lewiston
case in 1910. Mr. Arthur J. Collins was superintendent in
Lewiston in 1907-08. In April, 1909, he was reelected to the
position for the next year at a salary of $2,000. In August,
1909, the Lewiston School Committee and Mr. Collins executed
the following contract;
This Agreement, entered into by and between the
Lewiston School Board, party of the first part, and
Arthur J. Collins, party of the second part, is an
agreement of contract to specify and set forth more
fully the election, duties, privileges, tenure of
office, and salary of the said party of the second part
as superintendent of schools as previously voted by the
said Lewiston School Board,
The parties to this contract agree that the election
of the party of the second part as superintendent of
schools by the party of the first part at the regular
meeting of the School Board, April 5,
natural school year August, 1909, to July, 1910,
that the duties, privileges, and responsibilities sl^all
be the same as during the past two years, ^e party of
the first part agrees that a salary of two thousand
dollars ($2000.) shall be paid to the party of
second part in ten (10) equal monthly payments; but
in case the said party of the second part is
discharge
_^
dLmi.aed. superceded by another, or in any other manner
d Anrlved” of his ol‘fi^e , or interfered with in the P®r_^
foLanoe of hia dutlSI, all of the M'cond
<-.v,n thousand dollars then
pg-Pt: 5.hril immediately b^We^ and payable. (Italic
mine)
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In consideration of the payment of salary and
expenses as above set forth, the party of the second
part agrees to faithfully perform the duties and
obligations as superintendent of the Lewiston Public
Schools .33
Mr. Collins entered upon the performance of his duties
under his appointment and continued his services until
September 6, 1909, when he was summarily dismissed by the
school committee. The special law in the Lewiston City
Charter under which the committee acted read in part as
follows
:
Section 2. The superintending school committee of
said city of Lewiston, may exercise all the powers con-
ferred, and shall discharge all the duties imposed,
by law, on superintending school committees; and they
may also appoint a superintendent of schools and truant
officers, for such term and with such compensation as
the superintending school committee of said City of
Lewiston may determine. Such superintendent may be
removed at the pleasure of said committee, and any
vacancy shall be filled by their appointment.
Mr. Collins, in seeking to recover his year’s salary,
contended that, under his contract, having been ready at
all
times to perform his part of the agreement, he was
entitled
to recover his full salary.
The Coxirt ruled otherwise. Justice Spear’s
opinion
follows:
After conferring the power to contract the
statute contains this express provision:
intondent may be removed their
"^^'tntment S^^Srclausf^on^trs upon tL committee
salary autltority to dismiss a superintendent
at any
33collins V. r.itv of Lewiston , 107 Mo.
220, 77 A
831+ (1910).
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state of his services. It does not require the pre-
ferment of any charge or proffer of any reasons, but
permits action "at the pleasure of said committee.'
The plaintiff’s employment was for the "natural" school
year" without any further agreement. The written con-
tract, would, therefore, seem to have been executed for
the sole purpose of defeating the express provision of
the statute. j < <
The contract, as construed by the plaintiff, is in
direct conflict with the statute, and completely in-
hibits its intended operation. The defendant contends
that the contract was ultra vires and that the committee
could not thus deprive themselves or their pccessors of
the right to exercise an authority, which might at any
moment assume the form of a duty, clearly imposed upon
them by statute. ^ ^
This contention must prevail. When a contract con-
flicts with a statute, the former must yield. Otherwl-e,
statutes could be modified or repeale^d without even
the
approving caress of the referendum.
The implications of this case are clear.
Contracts
negotiated between school committees and school
personnel
cannot contradict the statutes either at the
state level or
those contained in city charters granted
by the legislature.
By mutual consent, a contract
between a superintendent
and a school committee may be altered.
Attorney General Cowan
ruled in 19l|.3 that "Upon mutual
agreement between a joint
ohool committee and a superintendent
of schools, the terms
f a contract can be changed
to provide for (a) an increase in
;alary for the remainder of the
contract and/or (b) a le^then-
.ng of the period of the contract
as originally drawn.
The last case to reach the
oourts concerning the
powers and duties of the
superintendent of schools occurred
^
^Ibid e
35tfctorney General Report (^3). P- ^8
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in In Inhabitants of Town of Farmington v. William P.
36
—
an action was brought by the inhabitants of the town
of Farmington to recover town moneys alleged to have been
illegally received and disbursed by William P. Miner, the
superintendent of schools. Specifically, the four allegations
were: (1) that it is the duty of the superintendent to make
personally the annual school canvass and census, and the
employment of another person for that purpose at the expense
of the town was unauthorized; (2) that the reimbursement for
expenses incurred in attending a superintendents' convention
was not a proper charge against the state school funds nor
money raised by the town for the support of the common schools,
nor money which the town is required to appropriate; ( 3 ) that
it was an unlawful expenditure of public moneys to provide
for an allowance for the use of the superintendent's auto-
mobile in the performance of his official duties; and
(1^) the superintendent had no authority to hire and pay the
rent for an office for his and the school committee's use.
On all four points the Court ruled in favor of the
defendant, Mr. Miner. In rendering the opinion, the Court
made several observations which have important implications
for the practicing school superintendents in Maine today.
Excerpts from this opinion are here quoted:
^^Inhabitants of Town of Farmington v. Miner , 133 Me.
162, 175 A. 219 U93it-) *
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. . . The School census is the basis of a large
annual apportionment of state school funds to the
several towns and cities. All superintendents of
schools in the state
^
union or otherwise, and regard-
less of the school population under their supervision,
are required to certify bhese returns annually in order
that the apportionment of state funds may be made as
provided by law. In this provision, we find a legis-
lative recognition of the well-known fact that in
larger cities and towns, and in some of the school
unions, it is entirely impractical, if not impossible,
for the superintendent of schools to personally canvass
the school population and attend to their other neces-
sary supervisory duties, and, whenever it is necessary,
they may employ other persons at the expense of the
town to make the preliminary canvass for the annual
school census. . , .
. . . The first item in the account annexed is for
money which the defendant Miner drew as reimbursement
for expenses incurred in attending a superintendent's
convention. His bill for this disbiirsemcnt was approved
in advance by the school committee and paid from the
treasury of the town on the order of the municipal
officers. It does not appear in the case stated from
what appropriations this money was drawn. It came to
the superintendent in an order from the treasurer which
included other items approved by the school committee
and certified by the superintendent. It is true that it
was not a proper charge against the state school funds
nor money raised by the town for the support of the
common schools. It always has been, however, and still
is within the power of the municipalities to raise such
amounts in addition to the required appropriations as
they may deem proper. . . . [T]he progress and advance-
ment of our educational system demands trained super-
intendents, educated, experienced and in touch with
modern school methods and practices, and it is now
generally recognized that the conventions of super-
intendents, as well as teachers, have a real educational
value and tend to promote the efficiency of those
attending. Under the broad powers given towns to raise
money for school purposes by our laws, we cannot lay
down the rule that the payment of the expenses of a
superintendent to a convention is an illegal expenditure
. .
.
When he was first elected superintendent, the
loint committee of the towns apportioned his salary and
added a travel allowance which they were not authorized
to grant. However, each year during the first term of
the superintendent's appointment, the school committee
of Farmington approved this change and the municipal
officers recogniLd its propriety by drawing orders on
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the treasury for its payment. Under the statutes then
in forcoj the town was not compelleci to make this pay-
ment. It had a right to do so, however, if it saw fit.
It was not in itself an unlawful expenditure of public
moneys....
. . . In Section 5 of Chapter 206 of the Private and
Special Laws of 1891, the Act expressly provided that a
suitable and convenient room shall be furnished by the
town for the superintendent’s office and the meetings
of the school committee, wherein shall be kept their
records
. . . even if the superintendent of schools and
the school committee did not have authority to hire and
pay the rent of this office without the consent of
municipal officers, the supplemental approving and
ratifying action of the municipal officers binds the
town. 3
•
The dual control of school committee and school agent
under the old district system was largely eliminated in the
legislation providing for superintendents of schools in 1897.
It is interesting to note that in at least one area, the
employment of teachers, a balance of power still exists. The
superintendent has the sole authority to nominate teachers
while the school ' committee has the sole authority to approve
or reject the nominations of the superintendent. While this
balance of power in regard to the selection of teachers has
been generally satisfactory, there have been instances where
the supjrintendent could not or would not nominate the can-
didate favored by the school committee, nor would the com-
mittee approve the nominee of the superintendent. This
awkward situation was partially remedied by a statute passed
in 1913, and still in effect today, which provides that when
the superintendent and the committee cannot agree and legally
37 Ibid
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elect a teacher, the Conimisaioner of Education has the authority
to appoint a substitute teacher to serve until such election is
duly accomplished.^®
Summary
This chapter has traced the delegation of authority
for the operation of the public schools from the state to the
local level. While the authority to create, alter or dissolve
school districts is clearly a matter for the legislature to
decide, the maintenance and operation of these districts is
delegated almost entirely to the local level.
The legislature has provided for the election of
school officers to manage the public schools. While chosen
by the local electorate, these officers, known as school com-
mittee members or school directors, are agents of the state
and are responsible to the state, rather than the local dis-
trict, for the performance of their duties.
The powers and duties of these local district officers
have been reviewed in some detail. Rules and regulations
passed by these officers in a legally constituted meeting
have the force and power of law at the local level, unless
contrary to state statutes.
With the phenomenal growth of the public school
system it became evident that these officers, laymen in the
3®Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (I96I4.), c. 7 ,
sec. 161, par.
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field of education for the most part, needed professional
assistance in carrying out their mandate from the legis-
lature. As a consequence the legislature provided for a
chief local school administrator known as the superintendent
of schools. While employed locally by the district officers
and serving at their discretion, the school superintendent in
Maine holds a unique position in the administrative structure
of public education. His powers and duties are clearly de-
fined by the statutes and he is considered by the courts to
be a public official. By law, he serves as the secretary,
ex officio, of the local school committee and of any school
building committee chosen by the administrative unit which
he serves. His many duties and responsibilities, as well as
his privileges, sots him apart from all other en^loyees of
the local school district.
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CHAPTER IV
SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION
Introduction
As a result of the early delegation to localities of
the power to structure educational administration, a tradition
of local control has developed over the years, based more on
sentiment and political expediency than on efficiency and
economy of operation. Despite exceptions, the history of
school district consolidation around the country has been for
the most part one of cajoling and wooing rather than one of
state exercise of powers generally recognized to be in the
states' domain. The interplay of heavy state commitment to
the financial support of education and the equally great degree
of local attachment to the schools has led to a constant con-
flict which has created a variety of statutes on redistricting.
One author, after reviewing court decisions on school district
reorganization in the United States, had the following to say
on the subject:
The litigation of local quarrels concerning the neces-
sary and inevitable reorganization of school districts
makes up one of the moat voluminous and most arid chapters
in American law. • . .
No one should suppose that these cases have any great
intrinsic importance. Their significance is chiefly in
their triviality—and in the powerful argument thereby
tacitly made for legislative intelligence and courage.
The need is for state legislatures to accept their
responsibility as law-making representatives of the people,
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to sweep aside the. incomparably tangled jungle of
thousands of outmoded districts encumbered with the
legal debris of a century, and give their states a
county-unit system or something closely akin to it.^
The nation's school districts come in all sizes and
shapes and present some interesting contrasts. Alaska's School
District One, geographically the nation's largest, contains all
the schools of the forty-ninth state except those of twenty
towns and villages. Hawaii is actually one large statewide
district. But most school districts are town and township
units, controlled by an elected board of education. In 1932 »
there were 127 fi(-22 school districts in the United States, By
1961, reorganization efforts had whittled the number to
36,880 and by 1965 to 26,983.^
Despite the reduction in numbers of districts, half of
the nation's school districts in the late 1960's had fewer than
ten teachers, and in the early 1960's there were more than
3
9,000 elementary schools with only one teacher.
School district reorganization in New England has, in
general, been even slower than in other sections of the country.
In a 1962 report,^ the breakdown for reorganized districts of
^M. M, Chambers, "Court Decisions on Reorganization,"
Nation's Schools , (January, 1914-9 ).
^David L. Peterson, "School Districts: New England
c^tvTe." Maine Law Review (Portland, Maine: University of Maine
llVooi oFLaw, 1%U)TpT U9 . A National Study Group has su^
gosted 10,000 as the maximum number of school districts
necos
fary in the country. See President's Commission on
National
Goals, Goals for Americans (I960 ),
3 "Education in Surging Numbers," The Reader's Pi
ge s^..
Family Reference Series, These United States (Pleasantville
,
N, Y, : The Reader's Digest Association, 19o8 ), p. IOI4..
^John Hodgen, "Regionalization in Massachusetts: A
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the six states was as follows: Now Hampshire- -one 9-12 dis-
trict, six 1-12 districts, total (7); Rhode Island—two 7-12
districts, total (2); Connecticut—seven 7-12 districts, one
9-12 district, total (8); Maine—twenty-two K-12 districts,
total (22); Vermont—four 7-12 distriots; two 9-12 districts,
total (6); and Massachusetts--ei^teen 9-12 districts, twenty-
two 7-12 districts, two K-6 districts, one K-12 district, total
( 14.3 ). More recent figures will be included in a later section
as a basis for comparison, but the statistics suggest that the
solution to the problem has been something less than spectacular.
Major Problems in Redistricting
There are numerous problems in consolidating school
districts in the United States. Typical of these are the
traditions of local control, finance, geography, urban problems,
ethnic problems and lack of state leadership. These problems
have been widely reported in the literature and will not be
discussed here. Redistricting problems peculiar to Maine,
however, will be included as a backdrop to the succeeding
sections on redistricting legislation and the litigation that
has arisen as a result of it.
Geography . Maine ranks 39th in size among the states
Progress Report," Focus (Boston, Mass.: Massachusetts School
Building Assistance Commission, 1962), pp. 4l“4b«,
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and yet has a total population of less than a million people or
969,265 as of the I960 census. The population density is only
twenty-nine persons per square mile.^
Other interesting features about Maine's geography in-
clude the following: the highly indented coast, if unraveled
into a straight line, would stretch from New York to Arizona
and off this coast are many islands inhabited year-round; one
county, Aroostook, is larger than Connecticut and Rhode Island
combined; and within Maine's borders lie 17,000,000 acres of
forests, more than 2,000 lakes and 5,000 rivers.
These facts point up one of the major problems in
forming larger school districts, namely transportation. In
fact, one small hamlet, Estcourt, located in the extreme north-
west tip of the state, has no road leading to any other section
of the state I The pupils walk across a bridge to the Province
of Quebec where they attend school on a tuition basis.
Finance . While finance is a nationwide problem in
education, Maine has extremes in economic differences between
districts which would be difficult to match anywhere. One
commonly used yardstick in school finance is the amount of
assessed valuation per student in average daily attendance.
One report states that Maine has a range in local valuation per
pupil from $1,727 to $620,000.^ These inequities cause
^Maine Register, State Year-Book and Legislative Manual,
Vol. XCVIII (Portland: Fred L. Tower Co., 1967), P« 9o.
^Charles S. Benson, The Cheerm Prospect; A Statem^
on the Future of American Education tBoaton; Hougnion
Mifflin
Company, lVhJ>), p, lii>»
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resentment among taxpayers and tend to keep the richer districts
from joining with their less fortunate neighbors. This problem
has occurred in Maine where school districts, within whose
limits are located large paper mills, have been reluctant to
form larger districts with neighboring towns without such in-
dustry. Also, school districts along the coastal areas, where
real estate valuation is higher than inland, have been reluctant
to join with their "inland" neighbors.
Local Control . The history of local control of educa-
tion in Maine has been traced in previous chapters. It will
be remembered that the original district system which provided
for several school districts with their own school committees
within one town or township existed for approximately three-
quarters of a century before local control was finally vested
in the town or city itself with one general school committee.
Shortly after this important change, towns were authorized
to
join together into school unions for the purpose of employing
a Joint superintendent of schools, althou^ local
control of
education was still vested in the school committee
of each
member town.
This type of control is still one of the
more common
ones and the newer concept of several
towns Joining together
to form a school administrative district
to be controlled by a
board of directors representing the several
towns is still not
popular in some areas*
Tradition. One other impediment to
reorganization
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which cannot be underestimated is tradition. Local citizens
have a considerable amount of pride in their own school system,
and in their high school in particular. It seems to matter
little, in the minds of many residents, how small or inadequate
the schools may be. Many of the voters graduated from these
schools and have a strong seinitimental attachment to them. Many
such schools have had at least one outstanding athletic team
that has won statewide publicity and recognition for the school
and the town. To many people, the loss of the local high school
through consolidation means loss of identity, as well as con-
trol. One high school with a total enrollment of eleven
pupils, located on an island, recently won the statewide
basketball championship. The school's team brought much
glory and publicity to the island as well as the school. Con-
sider the reluctance with which the voters will decide to close
the school and send their pupils to the mainland to a con-
solidated school, when such a time to vote eventually arrives.
The problem of overcoming local sentiment and tradition
is
obviously of no small concern to those pushing
consolidation.
Legislation
tv school Districts . The adequacy of the town
aa the administrative unit for school
purposes has been ques-
tioned repeatedly, but the most serious
challenges have come
since the end of World War II. Maine, aa
all other states,
has felt the pressures of the postwar
baby boom, the increased
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demands from the public for quality education as well as the
need for more diversified programs to meet the needs of all
pupils. Along with the need for increased services, expanded
programs and additional school plant facilities have been the
ever-increasing costs of education as reflected in higher
salaries for teachers, increased costs of books and supplies
and higher costs of school construction.
In keeping with the trend in other states to form
larger administrative units to share costs and to keep duplica-
tion to a minimum, Maine passed its first legislation in 19li.7
.
7
Known as the Community School District Law, it permits two or
more towns to Join together in a Community School District to
operate Joint schools. The primary intent in this legislation
seems to have been to encourage towns to Join together as one
administrative unit for secondary education although it is
possible to form Community Schools at the elementary level.
These districts are operated by two boards, one known as the
board of trustees, and the other as the community school com-
mittee. The duties of the former read as follows:
of the affairs of said district, except election
of teachers who shall serve in said school or schools and
the fixing of their salaries, the courses of study, the
terms of school and other matters pertaining to the
education of pupils, which matters shall be
by a community school committee, shall be managed by
said
board of trustees.
°
*7 Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated (195i^)»
sec. 121.
®Ibid.
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The community school committee has all the powers and
duties with respect to the community school as are conferred
9
by the general statutes to superintending school committees.
It is interesting to note that the construction, care and
maintenance of buildings are the responsibility of one board
under this legislation while the actual operation of the
schools is under another.
This legislation is pemissive and carries with it no
financial inducements for towns to form Community School Dis-
tricts other than the local opportunity to share costs in the
construction and operation of schools. Except for the earlier
union legislation which permits two or more towns to share in
the cost of a superintendent and other supervisory personnel,
this represents the first time that local districts were
encouraged to share costs in the maintenance of their
schools.
The Community School District idea never really
caught
on, however. At its peak there were eight
districts in opera-
tion. As of 1968, Just two remain in operation.
While blazing
the trail for larger school administrative
units, the legis-
lation seems not to have met the needs of
the majority of the
people and has been reinforced by newer
legislation, first
enacted in 1957, commonly called the
Sinclair Act.
Before discussing this latest
reorganization statute
it is appropriate to review the
one case to reach the Maine
. supreme Judicial Court relative to
the formation of Community
^Ibid., sec. 3^1*
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School Districts. Opinions from the decision have implications
for the more recently organized school administrative districts
and have been, in fact, frequently referred to in later decisions.
In Knapp v. Swift River Valley Community School Pi strict , the
facts of the case are interesting. On March 5» 1956, the Town
of Roxbury voted: to join with the Town of Byron to form the
Swift River Valley Community School District; to authorize the
District to acquire and hold property of a value not in excess
of $1^.0,000; and to authorize the District to borrow money and
issue its bonds and notes in an amount not in excess at any
time of $36,000. On March 19, 1956, like votes were passed at
the town meeting of Byron.
The trustees of the District were subsequently appointed
by the municipal officers of each town. On March 21, 1956, the
trustees filed their return with the Secretary of State as re-
quited by statute and the Secretary issued a certificate on
March 23 that the District "had been duly organized
as a politic
' and corporate entity." On March 26 the District
borrowed
$5,000 from a bank.
We come now to the action of the Town of
Byron from
which th® litigation arose. On April 6 at a
special tcwn
meeting, the Town of Byron voted against the
very propositions
it had voted for on March 19. That is,
Byron voted: - (1) against
joining with Roxbury to form the school district; (2)
against
lOxnapp V. Hwift River Valiev Coicmunity
School pistri^,
152 Me. 350, 129 A. 2d 790 119!?/
)•
71
authorizing the District to acquire and hold property; and
(3) against authorizing the District to borrow money. In brief,
the Town of Byron did a complete turnabout on April 6 from its
action of March 19.
The plaintiffs, ten taxable inhabitants of the Town of
Byron brou^t suit to enjoin the defendants, the trustees of
the newly formed Community School District, from borrowing or
expending funds since, by their contention, the action of Byron
in voting against the District on April 6 destroyed the Dis-
trict. The ”ten taxable inhabitants” statute under which the
action was brought reads in part as follows:
When counties, cities, towns, school districts,
village or other public corporations, for a purpose not
authorized by law, vote to pledge their credit or to
raise money by taxation or to exempt property therefrom
or to pay money from their treasury, or if any of their
officers or agents attempt to pay out such money for
such purpose, the court shall have equity jurisdiction
on petition or application of not less than 10 taxable
inhabitants thereof, briefly setting forth the cause of
complaint
The defendants contended that the "ten taxable in-
habitants” statute did not apply and that the Town of Byron’s
withdrawal from the District was not legal. With this the
Court agreed. Justice Williamson said in part;
. . .
[W]e are not inclined to seek subtle differences
in the meanings of words. The plain fact is that if the
plaintiffs are correct, Byron has destroyed The Swift
River Valley Community School District. Roxbury had no
part in the Byron vote whether we call it a vote to
dissolve the District or to suspend its activities. If
^^Ibid.
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the right of the District to do business depends from
day to day upon the votes of town meetings first
granting, then taking away, and perhaps again granting
rights, it is apparent that a District, duly organized,
would not be worthy of the name of a quasi -municipal
corporation with rights and powers, duties and obliga-
tions of its own.
Of particular significance to school officials is the
following excerpt:
... The control over a district to be exercised by
a member town is limited by the terms of the statute.
Each town selects trustees and members of a school com-
mittee, who then serve the district, not the town .
Their authority is determined by the Statutes reTating
to community school districts and not by the will of
the town.
The district is a creature of legislative action.
Its creation and likewise its dissolution are solely
within the power of the Legislature . The Legislature
has made full, complete, and readily understandable
provisions for withdrawal of a town from a community
school district. Withdrawal requires not only action
by the town, but action by the Legislature as well.
(Italics mine)
Withdrawal from a Community School District is still
permissible under existing law but the town in question must
vote to withdraw by a two-thirds vote and then receive
authorization by special act of the legislature. No withdrawal
is allowed while there is indebtedness outstanding. It is
appropriate to point out at this time that withdrawal from
a school administrative district, the newer type district
authorized by the Sinclair Act, was permitted under the
original Act of 1957 but this act was amended in 1961
to pro-
hibit withdrawal.’-^ Dissolution of a school
administrative
^^Ibid .
^3ibid .
’^Peterson, op. cit ., p* 168.
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district is still possible and will be discussed in the section
to follow.
School administrative districts . After approximately
ten years of experience with the Comniunity School District
legislation and its relative lack of success in creating
larger administrative units, new legislation was passed in the
form of Legislative Document 1637, "An Act Relating to Educa-
tional Aid and to Clarify the Procedure of Reorganization of
15
School Administrative Units," in 1957. Commonly called the
Sinclair Act, after its sponsor, this is perhaps the most
significant piece of legislation relating to education to be
passed in Maine since the demise of the school district system
in 1893.
Unlike previous legislation pertaining to school dis-
tricts, the Sinclair Act provides certain financial rewards
for the formulation of school administrative districts from
the state. This one factor, more than any other, seems to be
the key to success in school district reorganization in Maine,
as elsewhere. Under this legislation, school administrative
districts are entitled to a 10 percent reimbursement bonus
from the state for their annual operating costs. They
are
also entitled to state reimbursement for school
construction
costs of from 18 to 66 percent depending upon the
combined
valuation of the district.
The intent of the legislature in passing
this legislation
^^Maine, Revised Statutes (1957), c. 9, sec.
211
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is clearly stated in Section 211:
It is declared to be the policy of the State to
encourage the development of school administrative
units of sufficient size to provide a more equalized
educational opportunity for pupils, to establish
satisfactory school programs and to achieve a greater
uniformity of school tax rates among the School Admin-
istrative units and a more effective use of the
public funds expended for the support of public
schools. do
While the formation of school administrative districts
is completely voluntary and requires an affirmative vote of
all of the participating towns, it was evidently the intent
of the legislature to include all towns and school administra-
tive units under a minimum size within a reasonable time.
Section 212 reads in part as follows:
. . . The State Board of Education shall, after a
master plan for school administrative district organi-
zation is presented to the 103rd Legislature, as ordered
in Senate Paper 453 of the 102nd Legislature and accepted
by the 103rd Legislature as presented with modifications,
approve the formation of School Administrative Districts
only in accordance with the plan adopted. It further is
the intent of the Legislature that all municipalities
with fewer than $00 resident high school pupils and not
in School Administrative Districts shall, within a reason-
able time after adoption of the master plan for school
administrative district organization, join into School
Administrative Districts in accordance with the master
plan. ^7
A master plan was presented to the 103i*d Legislature but was
not accepted and that part of Section 212 quoted above has
been repealed.^® Evidently a master plan for the entire state,
^^ Ibid .
^7 Ibid
. ,
sec. 212.
iQj^ermit S. Nickerson, "Report of Legislation Enacted
by the 103rd Legislature Relating to Education” (Augusta,
jjaine : State Department of Education, 19^7 )» P» 22.
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mandatory for the smaller districts, is a major step which the
legislature is not yet ready to take.
As might be expected, the legal implications and con-
stitutionality of this new major legislation in the field of
education were soon to be challenged. The remainder of this
section will be devoted to a review of the cases to reach the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court on the Sinclair Act.
The first questions to be raised were propounded by
the State Senate in an order dated January 13» 1958 and answered
in an Opinion of the Justices on January II4., 1958, in what
would appear to the layman to be a remarkably speedy response
in comparison with the usual speed with which the wheels of
justice turn.
It might be noted at this point that official opinions
from the Justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, like
those from the Attorney General's office, carry considerable
weight and influence but do not constitute the law. Nor is any
court of law necessarily bound by these opinions. No loss an
authority than Justice Cornish pointed out in 1912 that "It is
true that the opinions of Justices given at the request of
either Branch of the Legislature or of the Executive, do not
have the binding force of decisions in adjudicated cases, yet ,
they carry weight in proportion to the reasons upon which
they
are based.
^^Opinion of the Justices , 153 Me. 1|.69, li;5 A. 2d 250
^^Sawyer v. Gilmore , 109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912).
(1958).
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The complete text of the Opinion is included in Appendix
A. For purposes of the present discussion it is sufficient to
quote the major points on the constitutionality of the legis-
lation as follows:
. . .
The Legislature did not violate the Constitution
in delegating authority to the State Board of Education and
the School District Commission to carry out the provisions
-- of the Act.
A School Administrative District organized under the
Act is a "body politic and corporate." It is a quasi-
municipal corporation of the familiar pattern of school,
water, recreational, and sewerage districts. The indebted-
ness of a School Administrative District thus is not the
indebtedness of such municipalities.
The limitation on municipal indebtedness applies to
cities and towns and not to other entities, or, as here,
a School Administrative District.
Municipalities providing for their public school
system by the medium of School Administrative Districts
will nevertheless thereby be making suitable provision
fop the support and maintenance of public schools, and by
ppoportional contributions to the expense incurred
by such Districts will be in compliance with both the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. The Legislature,
by making provision therefore, will have satisfied the
mandatory constitutional requirements imposed upon it.
As for home rule, municipal plebiscites fulfill such
requirements. The creation of a body politic and cor-
porate is not the granting of a franchise or license
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. The
proposed Act contains no grant of any franchise or license
but does no more than to provide mechanics by means of
which municipalities may initiate voluntary action to form
School Administrative Districts. ^ ^ ^
The Act proposed observes the requirements of the
ConsStutio/for equal taxation by adopting the state
valuation.
The following oases include questions of
procedure as
well as constitutionality. In reviewing these
oases it is
interesting to speculate as to whether these
procedural questions
^^noinion of the Justices . 153 «e- 469. 145 A.
2d 250
(1958).
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were raised in the interests of judicial nicety or as stumbling
blocks to preserve local control as long as possible.
The first case to reach the Supreme Judicial Court was
22McGary v, Barrows in I960. This was indeed a landmark case
and has been referred to repeatedly in subsequent litigation.
An action for a declaratory Judgement was brought by ten tax-
payers and residents of Farmington designed to test the con-
stitutionality of the statutes under which School Administrative
District No. 9, comprising the Towns of Farmington, Chesterville
,
and Industry, was organized.
Specifically, the taxpayers argued that: (1) the Act
violated Article VIII of the State Constitution in that towns
thereby escape an obligation to support and maintain public
schools, and are also deprived of the responsibility for the
operation and control of schools within their jurisdiction;
(2) there was an unlawful delegation to the School District
Commission in violation of the constitutional provisions re-
lating to the separation of powers under the State Con-
stitution; (3) the section which empowered the Commission,
without notice, hearing, or right of appeal, to issue a
certificate of organization, deprived them of property without
due process; and (Ij.) that the Act impaired the obligation of
contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S.
Constitution, and Article I, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution.
The Court held for the defendant School Administrative
^^McGary v. Barrows , 1^6 Me. 2^0 (I960).
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District No. 9. Excerpts from the decision which answer the
allegations above in the order in which they are stated follow:
Municipalities providing for their public school system
by the medium of School Administrative Districts will
nevertheless thereby be making suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of public schools, and by their
proportional contributions to the expense incurred by such
Districts will be in compliance with both the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
. . . The School District Commission is an administra-
tive agency designed by the Legislature to administer the
Sinclair Act and thus to make effective the declaration of
policy. . . . The Commission exists "for the purpose of
promoting, developing and adjusting a state plan for the
creation of efficient School Administrative Districts
throughout the State and for the purpose of approving
applications for the organization of School Administrative
Districts ."
The desirability and practical need of some such
agency, whether it is a board, commission or officer to
administer the Act is apparent. The Legislature cannot
be expected to investigate each situation throughout the
State relating to the new school policy and to make the
findings required to meet the standard set by the Legis-
lature. . . . That the Legislature has the power to under-
take this task and the right to exercise this power at any
time or in any case, does not deny the authority of the
Legislature to place important responsibilities in admin-
istration upon any agency such as the School District Com-
mission. . . . The Commission does not make law. It
administers the established law.
A school district, being an auxiliary of the state for
purposes of education, the legislature may provide for its
creation, control, and regulation, without violating the
due process guaranty, with respect to the property ri^ s
of the district or of property owners therein. • • • * .
school district is a public agency or trustee
established
to carry out the policy of the State to ®
The Legislature may change such agencies, and
control
direct what shall be done with f
school property is public property, the property
incorporated district and not of the taxpayers
residing
within it.
‘ in' voting upon’the'question of’ the formation
of the
the district to assume full responsibility
or amor
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the following listed indebtedness now outstanding in the
^nicipalities and school districts comprising the SchoolAdministrative District under consideration."
The intention of the Legislature is clear, namely, that
sinking funds and other moneys dedicated for payment ofparticular indebtedness assumed by the School Admin-istrative District be used for such purposes and none
other. We cannot, however, anticipate issues, con-
stitutional or otherwise, which might arise in the
application of this provision of the statute to a
particular set of facts. No given situation is presented
on the record for our consideration . 23
These rather strongly worded statements from the Court,
once again reinforce the concept of education as a state function
and responsibility. They also confirm the authority of the
legislature to create, alter, or dissolve local school districts
for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Article VIII
of the Constitution. Another important legal implication
arising from this case is the firm conviction that in joining
school administrative districts, towns while losing local con-
trol in part, are fulfilling their obligation to provide for
public schools. Finally, the Court leaves little doubt that
school districts are but auxiliary arms of the state and that
the legislature may provide whatever machinery or agencies
as are necessary for the creation, control, and regulation of
such districts.
A second case reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
from Aroostook County in 1961.^^ This litigation was concerned
almost entirely with the mechanics of proper organizational
i
23Ibid .
Blackstone v. Rollins
,
157 Me. 8$ (1961).
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procedure
.
Ten residents and taxpayers of the Town of Perhara, one
of six towns comprising School Administrative District No. 2,
brought an action to declare the acts of the directors of this
District to be null and void, and to seek a declaratory judgement
that the District did not exist since it was illegally organized.
The Town of Perham had voted to withdraw from the District. The
taxpayers made the following allegations in their suit: (1) that
the Town of Perham was not a member of the District because the
District was not in existence at the time when the Town of
Perham voted to withdraw from the District; (2) that the
directors did not properly organize; (3) that the vote by the
Town of Washburn to assume its proportionate share of the
indebtedness of the District was not in conformity with the
law and invalid; ([;.) that the District, not having been properly
organized, made the acts of the directors null and void; and
(5) that the operating budget was invalid since it was
allegedly approved at an illegal meeting because no voting list
was used to secure the majority vote necessary.
Due to certain irregularities in the manner of pleading
by the plaintiffs, not all of the above points were considered.
The taxpayers’ appeal was denied, however, by the Court, Once
again, the Court ruled that actions of school authorities, taken
,
in good faith, need not necessarily adhere to the technical
accuracy of a Judicial tribunal in matters of organization and
procedure. Justice Dubord declared in part that:
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^ ^
lifiving b© 0 n decidsd in th© McGary cqsg as
well as in several other decisions of thl's court that the
Legislature may create school districts without even
- referring the matter to the people of the communities
involved, it inevitably follows that the Legislature may
validate, reconstitute and establish a school district,
the original organization of which may be clouded with
^ilure of strict compliance with statutory provision^
relating to procedure
. In the case of a school admin-
istrative district, organized under the Sinclair Act,
such legislative act of validation precludes successful
attack against all acts relating to organization occurring
prior to the date of the certificate of organization issued
by the Main© School District Commission. 25 (Italics mine)
In considering the legality of the operating budget. Justice
Dubord said the following which is important for school directors
operating today’s Districts to note:
If a budget for the operation of the school admin-
istrative district is not approved prior to April 1st in
any given year, the budget as submitted by the school
directors for operational expenses, reserve fund and
capital outlay purposes shall be automatically considered
the budget approved for operational expenses in the
ensuing year.^°
It should be emphasized that while a majority vote is needed
for the approval of the budget for a school administrative dis-
trict, it is a majority vote of the district voters, not the
member towns. Thus, while the budget is considered separately
by each member town at its own town meeting, a negative vote
by any one town will not defeat the budget unless the aggregate
vote in all towns fails to be a majority vote.
In the early days of the Sinclair Act, several other
attempts were made by member towns either to withdraw from
^^Ibid .
^^Ibid.
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newly X^ormed school administrative districts, to dissolve them,
or to prove their creation to be illegal, through court actions.
A review of these cases would add no new guidelines to those
already presented. The interested reader is referred to:
V. Elwell
,
156 Me. 505 (I960); Peavy v. Nickerson
. 158
Me. [|.01 (1962); and School Administrative District No. 3 v.
Maine School District Commission
. 158 Me, 420 (1962).
The ability of individual towns to withdraw from a
school administrative district constitutes one of the key prob-
lems of encouraging voluntary reorganization. The basic problem
is deciding between the extremes of legislation so final that
no one will Join, or so loose that a dissatisfied town can dis-
rupt the new district at will. As pointed out earlier, with-
drawal from a Community School District is still possible,
but withdrawal from a school administrative district is not.
Dissolution of a school administrative district in
Maine must be done with the approval of the State Board of
Education which is in a position to protect the rights of
creditors. Under the law, dissolution is illegal if there is
outstanding indebtedness in the District. The petition to
dissolve must carry a two-thirds majority vote of the petitioning
member towns and then a majority vote of all of the voters in
the District member towns. Only one attempt to dissolve a
District has thus far been tried in Maine, in School Administra-
27
tive District No. 3 » failed.
^*^
School Administrative District No. 3 v Maine School
District Commission, 13^ Me. 420 (1962).
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A number of rather specific questions of concern only
to tfie local officials at the time have been answered by the
Attorney General but are not of sufficiently general interest
to be included here. The reader is referred to "Attorney
General Findings Related to Education. "28 one question of
general interest was raised in 196[|., however, inquiring as to
whether the State Board of Education has the authority to
refuse to permit the formation of a school administrative
district. The Attorney General answered as follows: "According
to general law, the State Board of Education may disapprove
the applications submitted by local school committees .
"
2^
Current Progress
While it is not the primary purpose of this study to
consider legislation or judicial decisions which affect the
administration of the public schools in any state other than
Maine, it is of value in some instances to review what is
happening in other jurisdictions with similar problems. Such
is the case with school district reorganization.
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, progress
in school district reorganization around the country has been
slow and painful. Some states have been more arbitrary and
courageous in exercising their authority and responsibility
than others. The literature on this subject is voluminous
2®state School Boards Association, Attorney Generals
Findings Related to Education (Orono, Maine: State School
Boards Association, 1966 ) , pp. 32 -35 *
2^Attorney General Report (I96I4.), p. 214.9*
and readily available to the interested reader and will not
here be reported. It might be of interest, however, to cite
two examples of what can bo done on a statewide basis in re-
districting with strong legislative support. The Nevada
Legislature, in 1956, summarily abolished all of the 222 school
districts in the state and reorganized them into 17,^^
Mississippi’s 1953 reorganization law withhold state aid from
districts not organized to the state’s satisfaction which re-
sulted in a reduction in the number of districts from over
3,000 to less than 150 by 1961.^^
Of more interest to Maine school officials is the
current status in New England. In attempting to compare
statistics from state to state, the reader should be warned
that^ two major problems exist, that of semantics and the
lack of uniformity in reporting facts on an annual basis, since
some states define a year as a calendar year while others use
the federal fiscal year (July 1 through June 30) as their basis
for reporting figures.
The first of these problems can best be explained by
listing a few of the titles by which school districts are
described in New England. School districts, depending upon
the state in question, include the following: school unions; ,
school supervisory unions; community school districts; school
administrative districts; school districts; union districts;
^^Peterson, op. cit. , p. ll|.7
•
^^Ibid., p. 11^.8.
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regional school districts; regional vocational school districts;
reorganized school districts; and cooperative school districts.
The lack of uniformity in defining the various grade
levels included in these districts presents yet another prob-
lem. Without boring the reader with all of the possible com-
binations, suffice it to say that any combination of two or
more consecutive grade levels from kindergarten through grade
twelve may constitute a school and/or a school district de-
pending upon the state. There is, as a matter of fact, one
interstate school district in New England which includes pupils
from grades 7-12 from New Hampshire and Vermont. Adding to this
the inherent confusion in describing schools as primary, inter-
mediate, elementary, middle, grammar, junior high, high school,
and secondary, one must conclude that in comparing statistics
from state to state, or even from district to district within
one state, it- is difficult, even for the professionals, to
arrive' at meaningful conclusions.
Despite the obvious difficulties in state-to-state
comparisons, the following figures are included to provide the
reader with some type of index of progress during the past six
years. The figures for 1962 were included earlier in
the
chapter. For the convenience of the reader these same
figures
as well as the current figures for 1968 are
reported in the
table below.
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REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN NEW ENGLAND
State 1962^ 1968^ Increas
Connecticut 8 11 3
Massachusetts 43 51 8
Maine 22 61 39
New Hampshire 7 21 14
Rhode Island 2 3 1
Vermont 6 16 10
^Hodgen, op, cit
. , pp,
^Based on interviews with officials of the State
Departments of Education of the New England States, April 8,
1968 .
Since it is not apparent from the figures above, it
should be noted that only two states, Maine and New Hampshire,
are redistricting from K-12. Twenty of New Hampshire’s
twenty-one districts are K-12 or 1-12 and all sixty-one of
Maine’s districts are K-12.
Admittedly, these figures are somewhat misleading in
that they do not reflect the total number of school districts
in each of the states. There has been, as a matter of fact,
an increase in the number of school districts in Massachusetts
during the past few years. This is due to the fact that new
regional districts have been superimposed over existing ones
without dissolving the latter. In interviewing the officials
^^Ibid., p. 150 .
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rroni the six New England states, however, an attempt was made
to obtain the number of reorganized districts whore two or more
existing districts were merged to form a larger administrative
unit. But, as pointed out earlier, it is next to impossible to
obtain meaningful statistioa from state to state so that direct
comparisons can be made. It is unmistakably clear in Maine,
however, that the number of school administrative units is
decreasing and that larger, more efficient districts are being
organized from K-12 at a reasonably fast rate in comparison
with the other New England states.
Summary
It has been pointed out in previous chapters of this
study that education is basically a state function. This
authority, for the most part, has been delegated to local
school districts. Local control of education is a cherished
tradition in the United States but the balance between effi-
ciency of operation and preservation of local control has be-
come increasingly difficult to maintain. Education has be-
come such a huge and expensive enterprise that the small
administrative unit is beset with almost insurmountable
obstacles, not the least of which is that of financing the
educational program that society demands today.
The consolidation of school districts has been a slow
and painful process everywhere. There is perhaps no other
governmental function wherein the average voter is so closely
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affected. Sentiment for local control is strong. To many,
the public schools offer the last opportunity for the exercise
of such control. Indeed, many school bond issues are defeated,
not because the voters are against new schools, but because
this is one of the few remaining areas where the voter can
impede the trend of ever-higher taxes, by a direct negative
vote.
While consolidation has been slow, it has been steady,
as reflected by the figures quoted earlier. Maine has gone
through four major phases of school district reorganization:
the original school district system in which towns maintained
several school districts, each with their own school com-
mittee; the supervisory union district in which two or more
towns combine for the purposes of employing a professional
school superintendent; the community school district in which
two or more towns combine for the purpose of constructing and
operating a school; and finally, the school administrative
district in which two or more towns combine to operate and
maintain a complete program from K-12 under a board of school
directors representing the member towns.
Despite the numerous problems in reorganization pointed
out earlier, Maine has a commendable record in this field. In
the ten years that the Sinclair legislation has been in effect,
some sixty-one districts have been formed and are in operation.
The number of school administrative districts now outnumbers
the supervisory unions which have been so popular in Maine since
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the turn of the century.
This process of reorganization has not been easy as
evidenced by the number of court cases on the subject. More
litigation has been precipitated by the Sinclair Act than by
any other single piece of legislation in Maine's educational
history.
The legal principles seem clear, however. It is the
expressed intent of the legislature to include eventually all
school administrative units, except the very largest, in a
school administrative district. While the first master plan
for redistricting the entire state was defeated, there is no
reason to doubt that the legislature will eventually adopt
such a plan.
Meanwhile, a number of factors are working to encourage
the formation of school administrative districts. As a result
of legislation passed by the 103rd Legislature, Maine's
elementary schools must, for the first time, be approved and
accredited. Also, for the first time, Maine's private schools
must meet certain standards including standard certification «
of teachers. The state subsidy foundation program is being
reviewed in an attempt to equalize state aid among the towns,
depending upon local valuation. These factors, and others,
all suggest that school district reorganization in Maine, which
has already made a major breakthrough, will be accelerated in
the future.
^^Nickerson, op . cit
.
,
p. 27
•
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CHAPTER V
LIABILITY OP SCHOOL DISTRICTS, SCHOOL OFFICERS
TEACHERS, AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
Introduc t ion
Litigation in connection with injuries to school
pupils is almost nonexistent in Maine. Only one case has
reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in this field. This
makes the general subject of no less concern to the Maine
school official, however. This chapter will concern itself
with the general laws of negligence and the implications of
court decisions from other jurisdictions which can serve as
guidelines for Maine school officials.
All school personnel are in potential danger spots
that may leave them open to court actions alleging negligence
insofar as pupil injuries are concerned. This is, of course,
truer for teachers than for others because of the particular
subjects they teach or activities with which they are connected.
Accidents to pupils may take place anywhere on the
school premises, the school playground, the corridors and
stairways of school buildings, or the regular classroom;
injuries may occur during athletic activities, in gymnasiums,
science laboratories or shop classes, or during field trips.
School administrators and school bus drivers are often concerned
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with injuries pupils sustain in school transportation, whether
furnished by district-owned buses, or by privately contracted
buses. All school employees face the possibility of being
sued by injured pupils, or their parents, for alleged negli-
gence. It is in order, therefore, to consider briefly the law
of negligence as it applies to public schools.^
Liability for negligence in connection with personal
injury is known as tort liability. A tort is a legal wrong by
one person against another. Torts typically include injuries
to the person or property of another, but may also involve
damage to less tangible interests such as reputation, privacy
or freedom from other forma of "nuisance." Torts are generally
divided between intentional and negligent wrongs. Among the
intentional torts--those in which the wrongdoer deliberately
and knowingly injures his victim--are assault, battery, and
some cases Involving defamation of character such as libel
and slander. Negligent torts include injury or damage arising
out of carelessness or recklessness without any deliberate
attempt or design to do harm to an individual.
Negligence
Negligence defined . Personal liability of school per-
sonnel for damages to pupils injured because of their own
^Material for this section has been adapted from, "Who
is Liable for Pupil Injuries," National Education Association,
A Report Prepared by The NEA Research Division (Washington:
National Commission on Safety Education, National Education
Association, 1963)»
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negligent conduct is Judged by the same general legal prin-
ciples that impose liability on private individuals whose
negligence harms others. Because of the relationship that
members of the school staff have to pupils, referred to as
2
—
P‘-j-P^Q_P^^ddtis
, there is a legal duty to exercise care to
prevent injuries to them.
The evolution of the law of negligence has resulted in
the development of a group of elements necessary to the success-
ful maintenance of a suit based on negligence. These elements
are, generally, as follows;
"(1) Duty to conform to a standard of behavior which
will not subject others to an unreasonable risk
of injury.
"(2) Breach of that duty--failure to exercise due care.
•"(3) A sufficiently close casual connection between the
conduct or behavior and the resulting injury.
”(4) Damage or injury resulting to the rights or interests
or another. "3
What kind of conduct constitutes negligence in the eyes
of the law to make a school employee legally responsible for
damages? Negligence is any conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm. The standard of conduct is measured
against what a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have
^In place of the parent; charged with some of the
parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities. Robert L.
Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School Law (New York;
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965) » P« 33*^?*
^Howard C. Leibee, Tort Liability For Injuries to
Pupils (Ann Arbor, Michiganl Campus Publishers, 1965), P. o.
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done in the same or similar circumstances. As one court de-
fined it, a teacher may be charged only with reasonable care
such as a parent of ordinary prudence would exercise under
comparable circumstances. Whether the particular facts of a
case involve negligence on the part of the teacher is a question
the jury decides.
In general, negligent conduct is one of two types,
action which a reasonable man would have realized involved an
unreasonable risk of injury to others, or failure to do an act
which is necessary to protect or assist another and which one
is under a duty to do. Hegligence in each case is determined
by the particular circumstances involved. In order to estab-
lish negligence, it must be shown that the conduct complained
of is the "legal" or, as it is otherwise known, the "proximate
cause" of the injury.
Pure accidents
. Not all injuries suffered by pupils
are due to negligence. Some injuries are caused by misadventure
or pure accident; that is to say, no individual is legally at
fault. The accident occurs without negligence. It could not
have been avoided under the circumstances by the exercise of
reasonable precautions.
The line of demarcation between a pure accident and an
injury caused by negligence is sometimes difficult to draw.
For example, a pupil cut herself when she fell off a chair she
^Ohman v. Board of Education of City of Now York. 300
N.Y. 306 , ^^0 N.E. r2dl 4'/!;
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was standing on to water a plant. Although the teacher permitted
the child to use a milk bottle to water the plant and allowed
her to climb upon a chair to do so, the teacher was not held
liable. The court said the teacher could not have been expected
to foresee that the child would fall off the chair or that the
milk bottle would break and cut her.^
Test of foreseeability
. As already stated, the standard
of care the law expects one to exercise to protect others from
unreasonable risk of harm is that which a reasonable and prudent
man wo\ Id employ in the circumstances. The test of determining
whether one's conduct was proper or negligent is that of
"foreseeability." In situations where a reasonable and prudent
person could have foreseen the harmful consequences of his
action or inaction, an individual who disregards the fore-
seeable consequences is liable for negligent conduct. If the
accident or event is one that a person of ordinary prudence in
the reasonable exercise of care would anticipate, failure to
take the necessary precautionary steps is negligence. Thus,
a teacher could not reasonably foresee the latent danger that
a paper bag would contain a broken soda bottle and that the
pupil whom she asked to pick up the bag would cut herself.^
But a school district was held liable for injuries suffered by
a nine-year-old girl when an old upright piano set on casters
^Gaincott v. Davis , 28l Mich. 5l5» 275 N.W. 229 (1937).
^West V. Board of Education of City of New York, 187
N.Y.S. ( 2d y 88 (1959)^
~
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which she and other children were moving tipped over. Per-
mission had been granted to use the schoolroom where the
accident occurred. The piano, a top-heavy instrument, had
been placed with its keyboard side against a wall, with Just
enough space for a small child to squeeze through. The court
said it was foreseeable that some child or group of children
would want to use the piano and would try to move it. Con-
sequently, reasonable minds could conclude that it was negli-
gent for anyone to leave the piano in such a position where it
might overturn if moved.*^
Contributory negligence . Although pupil injuries may
be found to be due to the teacher's negligent conduct, there
may be available to the teacher one or more defenses to re-
lieve him of liability. Among these is the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Reasonable self-protection is expected
of all sane persons. The law defines contributory negligence
83 conduct on the part of the injured person that falls helow
the standard to which he should conform for his own protection
and which is a legally contributing cause, cooperating
with
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about
the harm
the injured person complains of. Minors are not held to the
same degree of care for self-protection as are
adults. The
standard required of a child depends upon his
intelligence and
maturity as an individual and the degree of
care which the
average child of his age would be expected
to exercise.
TKidwell V. Whitman
County,
38 Wash. Wl. 535 P.“(2d) UOb UVbv).
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Assumption of risk
. A teacher may sometimes raise the
defense of assumption of risk in order to exonerate himself of
liability for negligence in a pupil injury action. Assumption
of risk is a legal doctrine which presupposes that despite a
relation or situation known to be dangerous
^
a person appre-
ciating the danger involved voluntarily chooses to enter upon
and remain within the area of risk. Pupils engaging in certain
school activities, like athletics, assume the normal risks
involved. A high school freshman in a compulsory physical
education class fell and broke his arm when he made a leap-
frog Jump over a gymnasium horse. The teacher had instructed
this pupil and the others in class on how to use the horse,
had demonstrated the Jump, had warned them of possible dangers,
and had told them not to try to Jump if they did not think they
could do it. Since the pupil knew of the danger involved and
assumed the risk, the teacher, was not held liable for the
injury.^
Responsibility for Injuries to Pupils
School districts . The great majority of states still
cling to the archaic doctrine that "the King can do no
wrong"--the King being the state or a corporate subdivision
thereof, including school districts. Under this doctrine,
school districts are immune from tort liability for injuries
^Sayers v. Ranger , 16 N.J. 22, 83 A. (2d) 775 (i95i)»
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suffered to pupils. This Immunity applies to their own negll-
gent acts, as well as to the negligent acts of their officers
and employees, or for injuries arising from dangerous or
improper care and maintenance of school buildings and grounds,
defective applianoee, or unsafe operation of the school trans-
portation system.
However, the courts and/or the legislatures in a number
of states have attempted to resolve or partially resolve the
problem by: (1) abolishing the immunity of school districts;
(2) enacting legislation which permits districts to purchase
liability insurance; (3) enacting legislation which permits
districts to purchase liability insurance protecting employees
of the districts during scope of employment; (i^.) enacting "save
harmless* statutes; and (^) legislating methods of recovery
other than common tort law. The following states have abolished
governmental immunity of school districts: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Illinois > Minnesota, Washington and
9Wisconsin.
The reasoning behind this change in policy from a
judicial point of view is well expressed by Justice Traynor
as follows:
Policy changes in judicial views of charitable
immunity afford an appropriate analogy for illustrating
the reasons that the doctrine of governmental immunity
should no longer be applied to school districts. Charity
immunity was justified in order to protect the assets of
a charitable institution normally to be used for public
9Leibee, op. cit ., p. 27*
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scrStinv'
the doctrine has recently received Judicial
gcver™?nt;i-i,;„^L'ty.
^rort^rt^li'aMlUy'^!):
, a a
shift has been realized not only because of T»Anp+-ir»n +-«
sidera??of awareness of another con-ration--insurance. Wherever there is widely heldinsurance, tort liability no longer merely shifts a lossfrom one individual to another but it tends to distributethe loss according to the principles of insurance, andthe person nominally liable is often only a conduit throughwhom this process of distribution starts to flow.
. , .
^
Instance makes it possible to protect a charitable in-
stitution's or municipality’s assets at a minimum cost,
and at the same time permit recovery where an injury hasbeen suffered. 10 ^
School districts in Maine currently enjoy governmental
immunity under the common law principle. While there are no
court cases so stating, the Attorney General’s office has sup-
ported this theory on at least two occasions. Those opinions
were given as follows
:
Municipalities are not liable for injuries occurring to
persons when those persons are availing themselves of the
governmental functions of a municipality.
,
Carrying on a
school is such a function.
I do not suppose there can be much doubt of the propo-
sition that a municipality is not responsible in damages
for carrying out its public duties. The driver of the
bus, or the private person for whom he was working would,
however, be responsible for carelessness resulting in
injury to a passenger. The general principle is estab-
lished by an almost uniform course of decisions, that
a public officer, when acting in good faith is never to
be held liable for an error of judgment in a matter
ccTimitted to his determination. All he undertakes to do
is to discharge his duty to the best of his ability and
^
^Myers v. Drozda , 180 Neb. 183» li^-1 N.W. 2d 852 (1986).
^^Attorney General Report (1941), P» 43*
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integrity. That he may err in hie judgments, or that he
may decide differently from what some other person maythi^ would be just, is no part of his official under-
taking.
While there seems to be little doubt of the governmental
immunity enjoyed by municipalities or school districts in Maine
at this time from tort liability, it should be noted that under
the statutes, a transporter (including district-owned school
buses) must procure bodily injury and property damage liability
insurance in order to secure registration plates. Since the
courts have generally held that it is illegal for a school
district to purchase insurance against an impossible con-
tingency, this particular statute seems to contradict the
general legal principle of governmental immunity in Maine.
On the other hand, a 19^3 opinion from the Attorney
General's office stated the following:
The State is not authorized to expend subsidy to
administrative units upon the cost of liability in-
surance acquired by the units for the protection of
teachers. Ih
Professional employees . School administrators, like
teachers, are liable under general principles of tort law for
their own personal acts of negligence or wrongdoing. Where
their duties call for promulgation of rules and regulations
for adequate supervision, failure to do so may be cause for a
^^Attorney General Report (1930), p. I4.O.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (196i|.), Title 29,
Sec. 832 .
^
^Attorney General Report (I963), p. 129.
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charge of negligence. Thus, an acting principal was held to be
negligent when a pupil was injured on being struck by a bicycle
ridden by another pupil. The negligence was based on lack of
proper supervision of young children on school grounds and
failure to adopt rules and regulations for their safety.
Liability is not usually imposed on an administrator
for wrongful or negligent acts of a subordinate. No employer-
employee relation exists between the administrator and the
subordinate employee, even though the administrator may hire
teachers and other school employees and supervise their
activities. The school board is the employer. However, the
administrator would be liable for the negligence of his sub-
ordinate if he employed the subordinate knowing him to be in-
competent, or if the administrator directed the subordinate
employee to do some act which was in itself dangerous to pupil
safety and resulted in pupil injury.
Schoolteachers . The relationship between pupils and
teacher is much closer than between pupils and administrator.
It has been said that the responsibility for preventing pupils
from injuring each other rests upon the teacher in charge
rather than upon either the administrator or the school com-
mittee; and that the responsibility of the school committee
and the administrators ends when competent teachers are
selected, the responsibility thereafter resting upon the
l5selleck v. Board of Education , 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 3^8
( 1949 ).
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4. , 16teachers concerned. Even when a teacher has been given
authority to conduct some activity which results in pupil in-
jury
,
the administrator who gave permission is not legally
responsible if the classroom teacher was competent, and the
administrator ascertained that the teacher would be present
17during the activity.
Injuries are sometimes inflicted on one pupil by
another or on the playground or in the classroom while the
teacher is present. Or this may occur during unsupervised
moments while the teacher is attending to duties elsewhere.
Under what circumstances will the teacher's lack of super-
vision constitute negligence? The answer can be stated only
in general terms. When the pupil conduct causing the harm is
of the kind that the teacher, in the exercise of reasonable
care, can neither control nor anticipate, it is unlikely that
a charge of negligence will prevail.
Thus, in a recent New York case the court dismissed
a suit against a teacher charged with negligence because a
pupil sustained a serious eye injury as a result of a thrown
snowball on the school playground. There was a school ruling
against throwing snowballs on school property and the teacher
had warned her class several times about the rule. The injured
pupil was on her way to school when the accident occurred.
^^National Education Association, The Teacher's Day in
Court: Review of 1965, A Report Prepared by the NEA Research
Divis: on (Washington: National Education Association, 1966),
P , 1^0 , Or'
^'DeOooyer v, Harkne as , 70 S,D, 26, 13 N.W. (2d) 815
(19Uli).
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The lawyer for the defendant teacher argued that the
time between lunch and the beginning of afternoon classes is
not a recreation period in the same sense that a school recess
is. It would be unreasonable, he claimed, to expect teachers
to supervise students at a time when they are not officially
in school. To do so would demand that teachers stand outside
in the cold watching students at every moment that they were
on school property. Such a requirement would be in excess of
the normal standard care parents themselves might exercise in
supervising their own children.
The lawyer for the plaintiff pupil argued, on the con-
trary,, that authorities must accept this responsibility. As
long as there is snow on the ground, there are bound to be
some children who will throw snowballs. The fact that the
school authorities had passed a rule forbidding snowball-
throwing on school grounds indicated that they recognized the
danger of this activity and that it was their responsibility
to prevent it. Such a rule could have no effect unless it
were constantly enforced. Moreover, he argued, as long as
the school knew that students regularly returned to play in
the school yard after they had finished lunch until the time
afternoon classes began, that period was as much a recreation
period, requiring supervision, as any other recess during the
school day. Therefore, he concluded, the school authorities
must accept responsibility for the accident.
The court in dismissing the case said it would con-
stitute "an undue burden on the school" to expect "teachers
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to en.rorce the rule against throwing snowballs by standing
outside in the cold to watch to see that children do not violate
the rule as they come into school." Active intervention of
teachers could be expected only when notice of a "special
danger'* existed. There was no evidence of such special danger
here •
For how long can a teacher leave a classroom unsuper-
vised without being considered negligent? Absence for a few
minutes is not likely to be interpreted as negligent lack
of supervision, especially if the teacher's absence was con-
nected with the performance of duty. It has been held that
the temporary absence of a teacher from the classroom did not
render the teacher, the school principal, or the school board
liable to a pupil who was struck in the eye by a pencil thrown
by a classmate.
Student teachers . The law of negligence as it pertains
to student or practice teachers is very vague. Until just
recently in Maine, the student teacher had no legal status in
the classroom and it was presumed that her immediate super-
visor, the supervising teacher in whose charge she had been
placed, would be held responsible for her acts.
Due to a new policy ruling by the State Board of
Education, student teachers from the teacher-training
^®Lawes v. Board of Education of New York , 266 NYS 2nd
36I4. (1965).
^^Ohman v. Board of Education of City of New York,
300 N.Y. 306, 90 N.E. (2d) 474 ( 19^)^
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institutions in Maine are now classified as substitute teachers
under the sixty-day permit rule and can presumably be held
responsible for injuries occurring to pupils as a result of
their own negligence. This new policy has not yet been tested
in the courts, nor has the Attorney General been asked to
rule on the legality of the policy.
~ r employees . The pupil can always seek redress
from the individual personally responsible for negligently
causing him injury, be he a teacher, an administrator, a bus
driver, or any other school employee. The same general prin-
ciples of law apply to cafeteria workers, custodial workers,
and any and all other employees of the school district.
As might be expected, the great majority of court
cases involving negligence on the part of other school employees
has centered around school bus drivers. There are no Maine
court cases of record on this point. Your attention is
directed, however, to the Attorney General's opinion quoted
earlier in this chapter which stated that a bus driver can
be held responsible for negligence resulting in injury to a
passenger.
Litigation
The only case to reach the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
concerning negligence was Brooks v. Jacobs in 19l;3.^^ In this
20
Brooks V. Jacobs
, 139 Me. 371, 31 A. 2d (19i^-3).
los
case the plaintiff, a twenty-year
-old Madison High School
aenior, was seriously injured when a temporary staging, from
which he was clearing snow, collapsed and threw him to the
ground. He had sought and had been granted permission from
the defendant, an industrial arts teacher, to shovel off the
Staging.
The instructor was in charge of constructing a new
shop building for use by the school. Several shop classes
were helping with the work on a voluntary basis and with
their parents' permission. The school committee had authorized
the construction of the building and authorized the employment
of the^boys in the shop classes, there being no compensation
for the work, but such work to count for credit in the manual
training course.
This was an action to recover for injuries to the
plaintiff alleged to be due to negligence on the part of the
defendant. The plaintiff argued that the defendant, in taking •
on and having full charge of the erection of the building,
assumed the duty to use due care and proper precaution to
prevent injuries to his pupils used in such work. He argued
further that the instructor was negligent in failing to provide
a suitable and safe staging, in failing to have the staging
properly constructed, and in failing to cause it to be properly
maintained. Finally, it was argued that the instructor should
have been able to foresee the possibility of the staging col-
lapsing with the extra weight of the snow.
106
The defendant's main defense was that the construction
of the building was under the control and direction of the
school committee and the superintendent, who had obtained a
number of teachers besides himself, who, with their own classes
had assisted in the construction of the building. He claimed
to have no authority over those in the other classes and also
claimed no personal act of negligence.
In finding for the plaintiff (the high school senior).
Judge Hudson made a number of observations which still serve
as guidelines in Maine in the area of negligence. Excerpts
from the opinion follow;
The relationship of teachers to their pupils has been
stated to be in the nature of in loco parentis
. We find
no Maine case directly so holding, but language in
Patterson v. Nutter
, 78 Mo. 509, 7 A. 273, so denotes, as
therein it is said; "He is placed in charge some times
of large numbers of children. ... He must govern
. . .
and control. . . In the Patterson case, supra,
is cited State v. Pendergrass
, 2 D. & B. (N.C.), 365, in
which this statement is made; "The teacher is the sub-
stitute of the parent. ..."
. . . But apart from the teacher-pupil relationship,
there is a common-law obligation that every person must
so act or use that which he controls as not to injure
another.
The plaintiff's claim is that the superintending
school committee put the defendant with his consent in
full charge of the erection of this building with the
ri^t to make use of his pupils in that work unless they
objected, over whom he had control and direction, and so
as a matter of law he was duty bound "to use due care and
proper precaution" so that no negligent act of his, either
of commission or omission, should proximately result in
injury to them.
Whether the defendant in fact took on the erection of
this building and had full charge thereof was a question of
fact for the jury. If he did, we think that he assumed the
d’’ty as stated in the plaintiff's contention, with the
result of liability if he failed in the discharge of that
duty either by misfeasance or nonfeasance, provided such
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failure were the proximate cause of the injuries receivedby the plaintiff,
... I am requested to say that the fact that thedefendant was a manual -training schoolteacher cannot
shield him from the consequences of his own negligence.
That is what is requested. I say he has a responsibility;
a limited responsibility. He is responsible for his own
acts; not the act of others.
Current Status Around the Country
Until recent years, only three Jurisdictions, California,
New York City, and Washington had abolished governmental immunity
of school districts from tort liability. In March of 1959,
the Supreme Court of Illinois rendered one of the most important
decisions of the present century in this field in holding that
the doctrine of governmental immunity was abrogated in the
state. In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District
,
the court said in part:
, .
.
[T]he whole doctrine of government immunity from
tort rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost in-
credible that in this modern age of comparative socio-
logical enlightment and in a republic the medieval
absolutism of "the King can do no wrong" should exist.
The revolutiona^ war was fought to abolish the divine
right of Kings.
A highly significant fact in this case is that governmental
immunity was abolished by judicial decisibn--not legislation--
a point which many state supreme courts had previously stated
was a matter for the legislature only. Since March of 1959,
the states of Arizona, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have
^^Ibld .
^^Molitor V. Kaneland Community Unit School District ,
18 111. 11, 163^.E. 2d 89 119591*.
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abolished the doctrine.
Current practice in the several states can be classified
roughly into six categories as follows: ( 1 ) states in which
governmental immunity of school districts has been abolished,
of which there are eight; (2) gtatee in which school districts
may purchase liability insurance to protect the districts
against claims arising from negligent acts for which the dis-
tricts are responsible at least to the extent of the policy,
of which there are sixteen; ( 3 ) states in which school districts
may purchase liability insurance protecting their employees
against claims arising out of employees' negligence, of which
there are fourteen; (4 ) states in which school districts "save
harmless" their employees from claims arising out of the em-
ployees' negligence by paying claims awarded against the
employee, of which there are seven; ( 5 ) states which have
legislated a method of recovery other than common tort law
action, of which there are three; and ( 6 ) states in which
state education associations have purchased liability
insurance protecting members for negligent acts committed
during the scope of their employment, of which there are at
least seventeen. Maine is currently classified in group six
23
or the last category described above.
Summary
It appears to be generally accepted that the rule of
23
Leibee, op. cit ., pp. 27-31*
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immunity of school districts, school committees, boards of
directors, or other agencies in charge of public schools
ordinarily does not extend to their agents or employees, or
other persons under contract with such public bodies, in the
absence of a statute providing otherwise. Therefore, the rule
has been applied or recognized that teachers in a public school,
school bus drivers, and other school employees are personally
liable for their own negligence.
If a school employee fails to exercise the duty of
care expected of reasonably prudent persons in the same or
similar situations, that person is said to be negligent; and
if such negligence is the direct and proximate cause of
injuries sustained by pupils to whom such an employee owes a
duty of care, that employee is personally responsible for
damages.
In determining personal liability, there are generally
three main questions involved, namely: (1) Did the school
employee owe a duty of care towards the injured? (2) Was
there a failure on the part of the employee to observe such
duty? (3) Was such failure the direct and proximate cause
of any resulting injury?
In the determination of whether or not a school
employee is normally prudent, the courts will examine the
following factors: (1) Did the employee exercise reasonable
and adequate supervision for the safety and welfare of the
pupils? (2) Did the employee foresee, or should the employee
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have foreseen the possibility of the ohild-s being injured?
(3) Did the employee point out to the pupil the possible hazards
that he might encounter in a particular activity or class, as
well as inform him of the necessary safety rules?
Approximately ten years ago the State Department of
Education issued a policy statement on the general subject of
liability. There appears to have been no changes, either
through legislative action or Judicial action since that time
which would materially change its content and meaning. A
copy of this statement is included in Appendix B.
«
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CHAPTER VI
SCHOOL FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
Introduction
A recurrent theme throughout this study has been that
of the supremacy of the state in educational matters. This
obviously applies in the field of school finance. The state
may delegate the authority to finance schools to the local
level while at the same time assisting local districts by
distributing funds collected on a statewide basis.
In Maine, the legislature, through Article VIII of
the Constitution is required to see to it that the local
districts finance their public schools. The pertinent part
of the Article reads as follows:
. . . The legislature are authorized and it shall be
their duty to require the several towns to make
suitable provision, at their own expense, for the
support and maintenance of public schools.^
It was recognized very early in Maine's history that
local support alone was not enough to finance education
adequately, especially in the poorer districts. As a result,
state funds from various sources were authorized to be dis-
tributed to all districts.
Local school committees or school directors have the
^Maine, Constitution, Art. VIII.
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authority to determine the amount of money to be raised for
school purposes, subject to the voters’ approval, Ecid so long
as they act within the scope of their statutory authority, have
the right to determine how the money will be spent.
In cities operating under a charter from the state,
the city council has the authority to fix the total amount of
the school budget. This does not necessarily mean that the
council may direct an itemized expenditure of the gross amount
authorized; the school committee may usually spend the funds
approved in any manner and for any purpose permitted by law.
Taxation
The authority of the legislature to impose a general
tELX upon the property of the state for school purposes is
nowhere better expressed than in an Opinion of the Justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in 1872.^ A declaratory
judgement from the Court was sought by the legislature on the
constitutionality of establishing a school mill fund through
a general tax on property for the support of public schools.
Excerpts from this Opinion have been widely quoted for per-
suasive argument in virtually all related cases which have
followed. Major portions of the Opinion follow:
By the constitution of this state, art. I4., 3»
sec 1 . the legislature has "full power to make and
establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the
defense of the people of this state, n
this constitution, nor to that of the United States.
^Opinions of Justices , 68 Me. 582 (1872).
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f
the libertie3 of the People. Srite ve^^ l^n^I^r u"would seem that the "general diffusion 7e eduf^tioA"to be regarded as especially a "benefit" to the people
ffw? legislature has "full power" over the
*
subject matter of schools and of education to make allreasonable laws in reference thereto for the "benefit^
of this state." The power existing, itseasonable exercise, having due regard to the severalprovisions of the constitution, is subject only tolegislative discretion. ^
taxation "for the defense and benefit of
only by the good sense and sound
of the legislature. If unwisely exercised, theremedy is with the people. It is not for the ludicialdepartment to determine where legitimate taxation ends,
and spoliation by excessive taxation begins.
^
Education being of benefit to the people, and taxationbeing incidential and essential to its successful promotion,the mill tax, being for educational purposes, must be
regarded as constitutional.
. . .
By article 8, "to promote this important object
education--"the legislature are authorized, and it shallbe their duty to require the several towns to make suit-
able provision, at their own expense, for the support
and maintenance of public schools." But this article
is mandatory, not prohibitory.
It imposes duties upon the legislature. It is
affirmative, not negative in its character. The legis-
lature cannot avoid the discharge of this duty. It
cannot constitutionally absolve the towns from making
at their own expense suitable provision for this primary
and indispensable foundation of all good government.
The legislature are by proper enactments to require the
towns to make suitable provision for the support of
public schools, and the towns are, at their own expense,
to comply with those enactments. Neither can escape from
the performance of their several and respective obligations.
But what is making "suitable provision" by the towns,
"at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of
public schools?" By whom is the amount for that purpose
to be fixed? Not by the towns; for, if left to them, there
would be no uniform and definite rule. The "suitable
provision" in such case would be a variable quantity,
an indefinite and contingent provision, dependent upon
the varying wealth of the respective towns and upon the
fluctuating views of their voters. It is manifest that
a general law upon the subject is required. Accordingly,
from the first institution of the government to the present
day, the general control of schools, and the determination
of what shall be a suitable provision by the towns for
nii
theii- support, has been fixed by legislative
• • •
A "suitable uroviaion” rm 10+-
xt- J.a lox- tne oenerit or the whole peo'All the property in the state is assessed therefore
according to its valuation. All contribute thereto inproportion to their means. It is a tax for a public
purpose, not one, by which one individual is taxed for
the special and peculiar benefit of another.
In relation to the question proposed, we answer that
the legislature has authority under the constitution to
assess a general tax upon the property of the state for
the purpose of distribution under "An act to establish
th,3 school mill fund for the support of common schools,"
approved February 27, 1872.3
The Legislatur.e of 1909 created an additional source
of revenue by imposing a further state tax of one and one-half
mills on the dollar upon all of the property in the cities,
towns, plantations and unorganized townships of the State.
This was known as the Common School Fund.
At this time the public schools were receiving financial
aid from two separate sources, state aid and direct municipal
taxation. The state aid itself was derived from four sources:
(1) income from the "Permanent School Fund," a fund created by
the sale of wild lands appropriated by the state in former years
for the support of schools; (2) income from the state tax on
savings banks and trust companies; (3) from the School Mill
3lbid.
, pp. 582-586.
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Tax, so called, derived from assessing all the property in the
state situated in cities, towns, plantations and unorganized
townships; and (Ij.) the newly-enacted Common School Fund with
moneys derived from the same source as the School Mill Tax,
At the local level, municipalities are compelled by
the legislature to assist in the maintenance of public schools
by taxation. The amount thus required has varied from time to
time. There have been many court cases involving local taxation
for school purposes in the early history of Maine in connection
with the original school district system but these are now of
interest only to the historian.^ The statute of 1909 creating
the Common School Fund was almost immediately challenged and
resulted in the only court case of record in recent Maine
history on the subject of taxation. For that reason this
case. Sawyer v. Gilmore settled in 1910 will be reviewed here
in some detail.
The statute passed by the legislature read in part as
follows
:
Sec. 1. A tax of one and a half mills on a dollar
shall annually be assessed upon all of the ^
the state according to the valuation thereof and
shall
be known as the tax for the support of common
schools.
Sec. 2. This tax shall be assessed and
collected in
^ee t»nts of School Pi st. No. 1
m Gr^i^ v.
_
^ ..... V TT^»rton v. Inhabitants
Bailey, 12 Me. (3 ^ MAQQ^~~~ TS'»lFr;r v. School Dist.
Si
—TiAc;n^« T Ander v. School Dist. in SmithlieiQ,
No. 10 > ^3 Me. 261 (1874)
•
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the same manner as other state taxes and shall paid into
the State Treasury and designated as the common school
fund.
Sec. 3. One third of this fund shall be distributed
by the treasurer of the state on the first day of January,
annually, to the several cities, towns and plantations
according to the number of scholars therein, as the same
shall appear from the official returns made to the state
superintendent of public schools for the preceding year,
and the remaining two thirds of said fund shall be dis-
tributed by the treasurer of the state on the first day
of January, annually, to the several cities, towns and
plantations, according to the valuation thereof as the
same shall be fixed by the state assessors for the preceding
year.
Sec. 6. Sums received by any city, town or plantation
from the distribution provided by section three shall be
deemed to be raised by such city, town or plantation within
the meaning of revise^ statutes, chapter fifteen, section
thirteen, as amended.
b
A Mr, Sawyer, the plaintiff in this case, and a resident
of Mattamiscontis
,
an unorganized township in the County of
Penobscot, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant
State Treasurer from collecting the new tax. He challenged
the constitutionality of the Common School Fund legislation
on a number of points. His main arguments were that: (1) the
act imposed an unequal burden upon the unorganized townships
of the state because the fund was created by the taxation of
all the property in townships, towns, cities and plantations,
yet no provision was made for the distribution of such funds
to townships. In other words, while four subdivisions of the
state were made to contribute to the fund, only three were
permitted to share in the financial benefits; (2) the method
of distribution was unconstitutional because it was made,
not
^Sawyer v, Gilmore , 109 Me. 169 » 83 A. 673 (1912).
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according to the number of scholars, as was the case with the
school mill fund, but one-third according to the number of
scholars and two-thirds according to valuation, thus benefitting
the cities, and richer towns more than the poorer; (3) the
act was unconstitutional on the grounds that section 6 per
mitted sums received from the state under this act to be
deemed moneys raised by municipalities for school purposes
thus relieving some towns from the necessity of raising the
80/ per capita under the 1872 statute; (1;) while the act re-
quired towns to raise a uniform amount per capita, the require-
ment varied all the way along the line, from nothing up to
eighty cents depending upon the state reimbursement and thus
an un-uniforra rate was established; and (5) that the act
violated section 8 of Article IX of the State Constitution,
which reads: "All taxes upon real or personal estate assessed
by authority of this State shall be apportioned and assessed
equally according to the Just value thereof"; and the four-
teenth amendment of the Federal Constitution, which declares
that "No State shall deny to any person within its Jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
The Court, in holding for the defendant, categorically
disallowed each of the allegations. Once again, the Judiciary
reinforced the doctrine of state supremacy in matters of public
education. Pertinent quotes from the decision follow:
The first objection was that this act imposed an
unequal burden of taxation upon the unorganized townships
of the state. . . . [T]his objection is without legal
foundation. The legislature has the right under the
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constitution to iinpose an equal rate of taxation upon
all the property in the state, including the property
in unorganized townships, for the purpose of distributing
the proceeds thereof among the cities, towns and planta-
tions for common school purposes, and the mere fact that
the tax is assessed upon the property in four municipal
subdivisions and distributed among three, is not in itself
fatal.
. . . The fundamental question is this, is the
purpose for which the tax is assessed a public purpose,
not whether any portion of it may find its way back again
to the pocket of the taxpayer or to the direct advantage
of himself or family. Were the latter the test, the
childless man would be exempt from the support of schools
and the sane and well from the support of hospitals. In
order that taxation may be equal and uniform in the
constitutional sense, it is not necessary that the benefits
arising therefrom should be enjoyed by all the people in
equal degree nor that each one of the people should
participate in each particular benefit. Laws must be
general in their character and the benefits must affect
different people differently.
This is the legal and constitutional answer to the
plaintiff's claim of inequality but in this connection it
should not be overlooked that the legislature has in fact
made wise and generous provision for the education of
children in the unorganized townships, more generous in
fact than in the case of children in incorporated places.
• • •
It was thus established that it is constitutional to
tax one subdivision of government to aid another subdivision
of government as long as the purpose is for the common good
of the state. In answering the question of inequality of
distrioution the Court said:
The plaintiff further attacked the method of dis-
tribution as being unconstitutional because it is made,
not according to the number of scholars, as is the school
mill fund, but one-third according to the number of
scholars and two-thirds according to valuation . . . but
that result is not the test of constitutionality. In-
equality of assessment is necessarily fatal, inequality
of distribution is not, provided the purpose be the
public welfare. . . . The method of distributing the
proceeds of such a tax rests in the wise discretion and
sound judgment of the Legislature* Such distribution
might be according to population, or according to the
number of scholars of school age, or according to school
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attendance, or accordinc to
another. The Constitution preserlh^’ °nregard to this matter and it is notsay that one method should be adontoH fanother. We are not to sub 3titute*^oo P^«P®>'®noe toof a coordinate branch of Judgment for thatits constitutionar?Si?s. 8°''®'’"“®"* working within
The legal principle was here established that while
the assessment and collection of funds must be equitable, the
method of distribution may be determined in any manner which
best provides for the common welfare. Thus, the legislature
may, if it so desires, distribute a larger percentage of funds
to the poorer districts. This is not now the case in Maine
but a new method of state aid now under consideration would
do Just that. This proposal will be described later, m
answer to the third allegation the Court said:
jnie constitutionality of this act is assailed onanother ground in that Section 6 permits sums receivedfrom the_ state under this distribution "to be deemed
,
to be raised by the municipalities within the meaningol Ch. 15, Sec. 13, as amended," thereby re-from raising by municipal taxation for
eacrUabUanl.
1^ respect this common school fund act of 1909,
school mill act of 1872. The act of
^
afford such relief because the towns are3 ill required to raise their eighty cents per capitatax, and the amount received by the towns from the milllund IS additional thereto. But the act of 1909 permitsthe amounts apportioned thereunder by the State to the
several towns to be applied towards the per capita tax,
so that under this act some towns are wholly and others,partially relieved from such taxation. This it is
claimed, contravenes Art. VIII of the State Constitution.
What is the fair construction of this clause? Whatforce has it as a part of the organic law of the State?
A legislative act is to be held constitutional unless a
positive restriction or limitation or prohibition can be
found in the Constitution which renders it invalid. No
such limitation or prohibition in regard to the maintenance
of the common schools can be found.
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This part of the opinion is now of historical interest
only. School costs have risen to the extent that state aid
accounts for far less than the actual local expenditures per
pupil. In answering the fourth allegation of an un-uniform
tax the Court said:
It IS an historical fact that in the early days thetowns had frequently neglected to make such pLvision andtherefore the framers of the Constitution left no room todoubt that the Legislature should have the power to re-quire them to do their duty to the end that the children
and youth of the State should be properly educated. Butthe provision is nothing more than mandatory,
T
second place the extent of the requirementis left wholly to the discretion of the Legislature, be-
cause their duty is to require the several towns to make
suitable provision. Who is to determine what is suit-
able?^ Clearly the Legislature itself. "Suitable" is an
elastic and varying term, dependent upon the necessities
of changing times. What the Legislature might deem to
be suitable and therefore necessary under some conditions,
they might deem unnecessary under others. The amount which
the towns ought to raise would depend largely upon the
amounts available to them from other sources, and as these
other sources increase the local sources can properly
diminish.
Towns are mere agencies of the State. They are purely
creatures of the Legislature and their powers and duties
are within its control. Hence it lies in the power of
the Legislature not merely to pass laws applicable to all
towns but it may direct its attention to the need of a
particular town and compel such town to raise money by
taxation. ... In the light therefore, of these decisions
and in view of the language of the Constitution and of the
first legislative act passed in accordance therewith, we
have no hesitation in saying that although the Act of
1909 may relieve a few towns from any local taxation
whatever for public schools, that is a matter which may
be considered by the Legislature in the performance of
their duty but does not of itself, in the absence of any
restrictive constitutional provision, render the act
unconstitutional and void. . . •
The legal principle is here again established that the
legislature may require towns to raise any amount deemed neces-
sary for the support of schools and can, in fact, require a
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single town to make more of an effort by way of taxation than
another. In anawering the final allegation of violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said:
c
allegation which charged a violation of theFourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution can bo
answered in a single word. "The provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall deny to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws was not intended to prevent a state from adjustingits system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways,”
Our conclusion therefore is that Chap. 17? of the Pub.
Laws of 1909 ,, violates neither the State nor the Federal
Constitution.^
Thus, in this landmark case the Court reaffirmed the
concepts established in the 1&72 Opinion of the Justices
,
namely, that the legislature has the authority to require towns
to impose taxes to make "suitable” provision for public schools;
that the legislature may establish a statewide tax to supplement
the local taxes for school purposes; that such taxes, if applied
uniformly throughout the state, are not illegal because some
towns are relieved of part or all of their local taxes; and
that the legislature may direct its attention to a single
town and compel it to raise money by taxation to meet the
"suitable provision" clause.
In concluding this section on taxation, a word on the
current status might be in order. In Maine, as in most states,
the local share of educational funds is raised through the
property tax. There is general agreement that this method is
inadequate or at least promotes unequal educational opportunities
^Ibid.
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for the youth of Maine. The "wealthy" towns of Maine have
13 percent of the state's valuation and only 5 percent of its
children. Figures on individual towns present some striking
contrasts. Baileyville in 1966 had $73 » 000 in fair market
value for every school child; Wiscasset had $75,000. In con-
trast Beals Island had $5,800 and Gorham had $12,000.® To
compound the inequity, the state pays a minimum of 20 percent
of the cost of the foundation program in every community in
the state, regardless of how much taxable property lies within
its borders.
A new plan is now under study which would eliminate
these inequities. Under this plan, the state would set a mill
rate to be raised for education and then make up the difference
between the yield of this tax and the foundation program. As
an example, if the levy was ten mills and wealthy town X
could satisfy the foundation program with only six mills, the
surplus four mills would go into the state fund to aid poor
town Y.
Gifts and Bequests
Chapter II3 , Sec. 1285 of the Revised Statutes of 195^4-
reads in part as follows:
. . .
Administrative units shall receive in trust and
*^"$
4. Million for Education?" The Maine Teacher
(May, 1968 ), p. 14..
o
Ibid., p. 15 .
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faithfully expend gifts and bequests made to aid in themaintenance of free high schools, and shall receive aidin such cases to the same extent and on the same con-
such schools had been established andmaintained by taxation.^
Chapter 103, Section 851 reads in part as follows:
. .
.
^ery administrative unit shall raise and expend,annually, for the support of public schools therein,
^
exclusive of the income of any corporate school fund, or
of any grant from the revenue or fund from the State, or
of any voluntary donation, devise or bequest, or anyforfeiture accruing to the use of the schools, not lessthan 80^ for each inhabitant
Two cases have reached Maine’s highest court on the
question of gifts and bequests. The first occurred in Piper
V. Moulton in l88l.^^ Mr. Elisha Piper, a resident of
Parsonsfield, in York County, willed the major portion of his
estate to the Town of Parsonsfield for educational purposes.
The will provided that a school fund be set up for the support
of a high school in Parsonsfield, provided that the town would
build such a school.
The will was contested by the plaintiffs, who in-
cidentally, included Mr. Piper’s wife, on the basis that the
Town of Parsonsfield had no authority to support or aid in
supporting a high school. As pointed out in the will, no
part of the bequest was to be used for the construction of a
school. The town, not having a high school, would be forced
therefore to build one in order to benefit from the bequest.
9
Maine, Revised Statutes (1954) » T13> sec, 85l»
^°Ibid.
^^Piper V. Moulton
,
72 Me. l55 (l88l).
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In settling the question of whether the Town of
Parsonsfield had the right to accept the school fund and build
and support a free high school, the Court said the following:
A trust for the support of schools or of a particular
uublic utiliti^
school, or for any purpose of generalp Uity is a valid trust. So towns can holdproperty in trust for purposes within the general scopeof their corporate existence. ... It is provided inthe will, that the school house for the Piper free hich
school shall be built and maintained by the inhabitants
of Parsonsfield. It is objected that they cannot legally
raise money for the purpose of erecting such school house,
or to pay the town treasurer and committee for their care
of the bequest made to the town.
By R.S., c. 11, sec. 5> amended by statute 1878»
c. 20, every city, town and plantation shall raise and
expend annually, for the support of schools therein, a
sum of money exclusive of the income of any corporate
school fund, or of any grant, or from the revenue or
funds from the state, or of any voluntary donation,
devise or bequest.
. . .
The minimum tax only is established. It may be
increased for educational purposes to any extent that may
be deemed advisable. No limitation is placed upon the
sum to be raised but the good judgment of the inhabitants
raising it.
That a city or town may receive money by devise or
bequest, is fully recognized by this section. The gift
becomes the property of the town, to be used for the
purposes for which it was given. . . .
The town has accepted the gift. It is bound to
furnish the requisite buildings . There must be a reason-
able time for that purpose. When executors or trustees
are to pay a legacy to a corporation on conditions pre-
cedent, and no time is stated in the will, five years
from its probate is allowed for their performance.
A second and much more recent case involving a bequest
reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 19^2, The results
of this action have particular implications for some of the
^^Ibid.
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.on
smaller schools in Maine currently considering consolidati,
under the Sinclair Act,
Trust Company; v. LaFleur .^^ the facts are
briefly as follows. A Mr. William Appleyard. late of Guilford
died on March 19, 195Q leaving a will duly probated in the
County of Piscataquis. The residue of his estate amounting to
approximately $20,000 was left in trust with the plaintiff,
Guilford Trust Company, under the following conditions: that
the trust be used for the sole benefit of Guilford High School;
and that the funds not be used in any way to save the Town of
Guilford anything by way of taxes that would normally be raised
for the support of the high school were the trust not created.
In June, 191f9, prior to Mr. Appleyard 's death and with
his knowledge, the Towns of Guilford, Sangerville, Abbott and
Parkman formed a Community School District known as the
Piscataquis Community School District. The Town of Guilford
executed a lease of its high school building to the newly
formed District and the possession of the building was delivered
to the Trustees of the District and accepted by them. The
curriculum and other matters pertaining to the education of
scholars were under the control of the Community School District
Committee with representatives of each of the member towns
while the responsibility for the physical maintenance and
operation of the building were under a Board of Trustees.
13Guilford Trust Company v. Alexander A. LaPleur.
148 Me. 16^(1952).
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It will be recalled from Chapter IV that under the
Community School District legislation (still in effect) there
are two distinct groups with differing responsibilities in
such districts y the trustees being responsible for all of
the affairs of the district, except election of teachers, the
courses of study, the terms of school and other matters per-
taining to education, which matters shall be controlled by a
community school committee.
The defendant in this case, a Mrs. Iva A. Maginnis,
sole heir-at-law, maintained that the will was null and void
and that the residue of Mr, Appleyard's estate rightfully
belonged to her. Her lawyer based his arguments on the
following points: (1) that because Guilford High School
ceased to exist before the death of Mr, Appleyard, the trust
for benefit of Guilford High School lapsed; (2) that the
intended bequest was a specific and restricted charitable
bequest and not a general public charitable request for general
educational purposes and could not have been applied cy pres^^
for the benefit of any public educational charity other than
the Guilford High School; and (3) that at the date of
Mr, Appleyard's death that Guilford High School was not an
^^Cy pres means "The equitable doctrine that if a^
charitable trust cannot be enforced according to its exact
tenor, the trustee may petition to have it enforced in some
approximately similar way that will carry out the general
purpose of the charity," Max Radin, Radin Law Dictionary
(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc,, 19o5)» P*
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existing entity and the grade school at that ti„e was under
the control and an integral part of the Piscataquis Co».unity
Sohool District for benefit of scholars in four different towns.
in finding for the plaintiff and dismissing the appeal
the Court said in part:
school district and not alone but with threfotherr"^''^
therefore a gi« ?or &iro?the high school scholars must be lost^ The ^
High^sLoT" attenkng thl GuiUordh gh Soho l would be benefitted by this gift mn=tthe heir, lose it because they now attLf th^
of Piscataquis Community Sohool District ®
sohool
nfflefli’ High Sohool we may weil’assume was the
^
secondary sohool of Guilfori The communUT
Tt ?
now the official secondary sohool of GuilfLd
Ld^it*ii^th?^°°^h”^i“*w*i?® taxpayers of Guilford support
the right to att:Sd?
The intent of Mr. Appleyard to enlarge ’and* broaden*facilities for the youth of Guilford in a highschool seems clear. He carefully provided that the incomeshould not be used to relieve the town of its normal burdenof expense for educational purposes.
i^^rae
We have no weight to the fact that the new high schoolIS physically located in the buildings formerly occupiedGuilford High School. There is nothing in the will
of Mr. Appleyard to indicate that his gift was limited to
an institution at a particular location. The point is thatthe present high school, wherever located, is in fact andlaw the official secondary school of Guilford, and it is
this school, whatever its name, which the testator had in
mind in naming the Guilford High School.
We need not on the narrow ground here urged by the
heir deprive the testator of his right to give, or the
youth of Guilford of their right to enjoy, the increased
educational advantages made available through his
generosity. To say that the gift must fail because of
the change of name and the extension of the area supporting
the school would, in our view, give undue weight to a
relatively unimportant matter. (Italics mine)
1*5
^Guilford Trust Company v. Alexander A. LaFleur. lij.8
Me. 162 (1^527: ^
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Indebtedness
The authority of a municipality or a achool district
to incur indebtedness for the repair, alteration or construc'-
txon of school buildings is well established. i„ „any state
the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred by school
districts is limited by constitutional provision or statutory
enactment. Such is the case in Maine. Prom time to time,
8
especially when two or more towns unite for school purposes,
questions have arisen as to whether the indebtedness of the
achool union or district is that of the separate towns combined
or independent of the towns.
Although there are no court cases of record on this
particular point in Maine, a recent and authoritative opinion
was rendered by the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court in
1958.
They said in effect that, ( 1 ) a school administrative
district is separate and distinct from the municipalities
participating in its creation and that the indebtedness,
therefore, of a school administrative district is not the
indebtedness of the municipalities included; and ( 2 ) that the
limits of indebtedness of a school administrative district are
not the same as those of cities and towns; the limitation on
municipal indebtedness applies to cities and towns and not to
^^See Kellogg v. School Diet. No. 10
. 13 Okl. 285, 7k P*
110 ( 1903 ); Hettinger v. School Board of City of Pittsburgh
,
266
Pa. St. 67 > 109 A. 782 (1920) ; Board of Public Instruction for
Bay County v. Barefoot
,
l^l PIa7 522, 193 So. 823 (1939); and
Kelly V. Brunswick
, 13ii Me. 187 A. 703 (1936).
Opinion of the Justices
, 153 Me. 469 , 145 A. 2d 250 (1958).
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other entities, or, as here. a school administrative district.
School Budgets
The desirability of some form of budgetary procedure
for public schools has long been recognized. There has never
been dissent from the premise that school expenditures can be
made more effectively when available funds are apportioned
among the various items necessary for the efficient conduct
of the school system.
As mxght be expected, the question of final responsi-
bility in the approval of the annual school budget has resulted
in much litigation around the country. School committees in
Maine, unlike some jurisdictions, are fiscally dependent upon
the wishes of the taxpayers. Pinal approval of the school
budget rests not with the Committee but with the voters of
the towns, or of the several towns in a district, or with the
city council under the charter system.
Strangely enough, there are no recorded cases in Maine
challenging this authority. On the other hand, this has been
a subject of considerable controversy in other states. There
have been three court cases in Maine which have incidentally
touched on the question of the authority of establishing the
1 o
-^°Paul R. Mort et al
. ,
Public School Finance (New York;
McGraw-Hill Company, I960 ) , p . 3^3^
19See Board of Education of Town of Stamford v. Board
of Finance of ^wn of Stamford
, 12? Conn. 3ii.5. 16 A. (2d) 601
(1<^40); and Lynch v. City of Fall River, 336 Mass. ^58. Ih7
N.E. (2d) l52irT958).
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school budget. While it ie recognized that the final authority
rests with the voters, it is appropriate to include summaries
of these cases at this point, m the first of these cases,
Burket t V. Youngs
,
a
taxpayer and voter of the City of
Bangor attempted to force the city council to refer, by refer-
endum, for the local electorates' acceptance or rejection, the
general appropriation resolve which included the school budget.
In denying the right of referendum the Court said in part:
defines, in minimum requirement.What amount of money must be raised and expended by a city
or common schools.
. . . Some of the appropriations are,
under state law, obligatory on the city: for illustration,
coimon schools
. . . the public school system is of state-
wide concern. The state at large is equally concerned
with the city regarding education, the support of the
poor, the construction and maintenance of highways, the
assessment and collection of taxes, and other matters.
Here again, is established the legal principle that the
public schools are a state function and of statewide concern.
Therefore, no individual city or town can refuse to raise the
minimum amount for education established by the legislature.
The second case questioned the authority of a city
council to fix the total minimum expenditures of the school
committee. While the decision in this superior court action
is not necessarily binding upon the Supreme Judicial Court,
should a similar case reach its docket, there is no good reason
to suppose that a similar line of reasoning would not be used.
The implications of this very recent decision (1965) are of
^^Burkett v. Youngs et al., of the City Council of
Bangor
, 135 Me. i|.59 ( 193^^T
•
^^Ibid.
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sufficient import to Maine school authorities that the entire
text of the case is included in Appendix C. For this reason,
oi^ly the basic findings of the case will be here reported.
The basic controversy centered around the legislative
intent as to the meaning of the language, "management, care
and conduct" of the public schools as vested in the school
committee by statute. Does this give the school committee
the right to establish the annual operating budget or must
the school committee exercise its authority within the limits
of the total school appropriation as set by the city council
under its charter?
22
In City of Auburn v. John B. Annett , Justice Sullivan
concluded that the Auburn City Council had the final authority
to fix the total maximum expenditures of the Auburn School
Committee.
In school administrative districts the legislature
has given to the directors the duty and power of preparing the
school budget but that budget must be approved by the majority
of voters of the district at separate meetings of member towns.
There is a further proviso that the budget becomes automatically
approved as of April 1 in any given year absent any majority
veto of the aggregate voters. As pointed out in Chapter IV,
this means that no one member town, by a negative vote, can
veto the district budget unless the aggregate vote fails to
^^Citv of Auburn v. John B. Annett (Superior Court,
April 29, 1965).
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sustain a two-thirds majority of all of the voters in all
of the member towns.
This point was considered in the third and final case
on school budgets in this section. In a case already reviewed,
V. Rollins
,
the plaintiff, among other things, alleged
that a meeting called by the directors on February 16, 1959,
to review the operational budget was illegal since no voting
list was used. This was not a meeting to approve the budget
but rather an "open hearing" on the budget prior to considera-
tion by the voters of each member town as required under the
Sinclair Act. In sustaining the legality of the meeting as
well as the budget, Justice Dubord commented as follows:
If a budget for the operation of the school admin-
istrative district is not approved prior to April 1st
in any given year, the bixdget as submitted by the
school directors for operational expenses, reserve fund
and capital outlay purposes shall be automatically con-
sidered the budget approved for operational expenses in
the ensuing year. . .
.
(T]his being true, even though
there might have been a failure to comply strictly with
the provisions of sec. Ill, the budget submitted by the
school directors, in any event, automatically became the
budget for the -ensuing year, by force of the provisions
of sec. lll-L."^^
Summary
The concept of state supremacy in matters pertaining
to public education has been reinforced repeatedly in this
study. This chapter has pointed out this plenary power in
still another area, that of school finance.
^
^Blackstone v. Rollins
,
157 Me. 85 » 170 A. 2d 1^.05
( 1961 ).
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The courts have consistently upheld the authority of
the legislature to impose tax programs on a statewide basis
for the support of public school education, if uniformly
applied, even though local municipalities or school districts
may not necessarily receive the same proportionate amount in
return. The courts have further upheld the premise that local
municipalities must provide, by taxation, at least a minimum
amount in the support and maintenance of public schools. If
local municipalities choose to raise more . than the prescribed
minimum, they are free to do so under Maine's Constitution.
Furthermore, the legislature has the constitutional right to
provide financial aid to a single municipality in addition to
the minimum support program, if, in its judgment, the common
good of the state is being served.
It has been held that towns or school districts have
the right to accept gifts and bequests for the benefit of
local schools. Such benefits are not considered to be
nullified by virtue of the fact that the specific school
mentioned in the will merges with another school as long as
the students for whom the original bequest was intended con-
tinue to profit from the benefits of the gift.
School administrative units, as quasi -municipal cor-
porations, have the legal authority to incur
indebtedness up
to 12-1/2 percent of the total valuation of all
the par-
tioipating towns for operation, maintenance and
capital outlay
purposes. This indebtedness is not that of
the town or towns
131^
involved in the school district. but that or the school admin
istrative unit.
In general, school budgets must be approved annually by
the voters in independent school systems, by the city council
in cities under the charter system, by each member town under
the school supervisory union system, or by a majority vote of
the aggregate voters in the member towns of a school admin-
istrative district. In the latter case, the budget proposed
by the directors becomes the official budget if not acted upon
by April 1 of the year involved.
While Maine school districts do not enjoy fiscal
autonomy, the privilege of the voters at a town meeting of a
member town of a school administrative district, to increase,
decrease or otherwise modify a school budget as been removed.
A negative vote on the total operating budget of a school
administrative district by any one member town will not nullify
the budget except where the negative vote is a majority vote
oi* all the votes cast in all of the member towns.
Failure of voters to approve a school budget which
meets minimum state requirements results in a penalty from
the state through the medium of reduced state aid under the
state foundation program. Except in a few instances in the
very early history of Maine, no town has chosen to ignore the
statutes concerning minimum local support for public schools.
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CHAPTER VII
SCHOOL PROPERTY
Introduction
School administrative units or their directors have
no contract or vested rights in school property. School
property, including buildings, grounds and' equipment, is the
property of the state, and not of the local district, despite
the fact that the property may have been paid for solely from
funds raised by levies or bond issues at the local district
level. School districts hold the property in trust for the
state
,
Since the legal ownership is in the state, the legis-
lature may control or dispose of such property, with or with-
out the consent of the district or its inhabitants. This
concept of the legal nature of school buildings and other
property is sometimes difficult for the patrons of local
school districts to comprehend. They may be inclined to look
upon the property as "their" property, since it was financed
with "their" money. Thus, despite the fact that school
buildings are constructed for school purposes, various groups
often seek the use of school buildings for other than school
purposes
.
The ownership of school property is ordinarily in the
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state or the public, although a school committee may hold the
naked legal title as trustee for the public. Such property
is not to be considered as the private property of the school
district by which it is held or wherein it is located. Gen-
erally, school committees or directors are given control of
school property and it may not be used for illegal purposes.
Authority to Hold Property
The landmark case in Maine concerning the authority to
hold property is the Kelley case which was discussed in a pre-
vious chapter. The Court held that:
A school district is a public agency or trustee
established to carry out the state's policy to educate
Its youth, and the Legislature may change such agencies,
and control and direct what should be done with the
school property.
1
It will be recalled that in this case the legislature authorized
the Brunswick School District to borrow money for the purpose
of erecting a high school' and that, after the loan had been
repaid by the district, the property would revert to the
school committee of the local school system. The Court also
said that, "School property is public property, the property
of the incorporated district and not of the taxpayers residing
within it. "2
In an earlier case, the Court held that the authorities
^Kelley v. Brunswick School District, 13 ii. Me. I4.II4.,
107 A. 703 (1936).
^Ibid.
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of a school district may acquire additional lands adjoining
the schoolhouse lot, when necessary for the purpose of an ex-
3
tension which has been duly voted. In the Piper case reviewed
in Chapter VI, it was held that a town may accept a trust for
school purposes. The Court said in part:
A trust for the support of schools or of a particular
school as a high school, or for any purpose of general
public utility is a valid trust. So towns can hold
property within the general scope of their corporate
existence
Sale or Disposition of Property
As early as 1843 > It was held that school districts
may make sale of their old schoolhouses which become unfit
for the use of the district.^ Again in 1865 it was noted by
the Court that school districts have the authority to sell
and dispose of any schoolhouse or other property, if neces-
sary, and that the school district is the judge of the neces-
sity.^ There are no recent Maine cases on this point but in
1947 the Attorney General ruled that a school committee
has no
authority to lease school property for interests outside educa
7
tional activities.
^Cousens v. School Dist. No. 4 » ^7 Me. 280 (l877)»
^iper V. Moulton , 72 Me. 155 (l88l).
^Whitmore v. Hogen , 22 Me. (9 Shep. ) 5^4 U8i4-3)-
^School Dist. No. 6 in Dresden v. Aetna Ins.^Co.
,
54 Me . 505
*^
Attorney General Report (1947)» P* 23*
Construction of School Buildings
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A school committee unquestionably has the legal right
to construct buildings to be used for purposes of instruction.
In Maine, as in moat other states, a state building authority
known as the "Maine School Building Authority" has been estab-
lished to assist local districts for school construction pur-
poses. Its stated purpose is as follows:
^
A general diffusion of the advantages of educationbeing essential to the preservation of the rights and
people; to aid in the provision of public
state, the "Maine School BuildingAuthority, as heretofore created, is authorized and
empowered to construct, acquire, alter or improve public
school buildings and to issue revenue bonds of the
authority, payable from rentals to finance such buildings
and when paid for by said rentals to convey them to thelessee towns or other administrative units.®
Thus, new schools, or alterations to existing schools, are
financed through revenue bonds by the Authority who "owns"
the property and rents the property to the local district
until paid for. At this time the title is turned over to the
district to be held in trust for the state.
A municipality has no authority to construct a school-
/
house without the express recommendation and approval of the
school committee. In Lund v. City of Auburn ,^ the Court held
that the City Council of Auburn, under its charter, had no
authority to erect a schoolhouse until the plans therefore were
o
°Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (1954) > Tit. 20,
c. 503 » sec. 3502.
^Lund V. City of Auburn , 110 Me. 2i4.l1 85 A. 893 (1913) •
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approved by the school committee of the City.
Furthermore, school construction plans must be approved
by state authorities. In Maine this includes the State Depart-
ment of Education and the Bureau of Health. It was held by the
Court in 1916 that the superintending school committee and the
superintendent of schools cannot bind a town for building a
new schoolhouse, contrary to the statutory requirements of
approval by state authorities of proposed plans of school
buildings
.
Control and Use
Generally
,
the use of school buildings or property for
purposes other than the conduct of the school is largely
regulated by statute. The modern view is that school authori-
ties may permit the use of school buildings for other than
school purposes provided there is no interference with the
primary use of the buildings for school purposes. The minority
view is that the use of school property should be restricted
entirely to school purposes on the ground that money raised by
taxation for one purpose cannot be used even indirectly for
any other purpose.
Although, as we have seen above, school buildings are
l^Morse v. Inhabitants of Town of Montville, 115 Me.
kSk, 99 a.“53B~(19i6T:
^^Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School
Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965) » p. 76.
j
Iko
the property of the state, their management and control are
left to the discretion of local boards. The boards are in a
better position than anyone else to determine what, if any,
use should be made of the school buildings outside of school
hours and the conditions and restrictions which should be
placed upon that use.
Local school committees are clothed with wide dis-
cretion in determining what non-school use shall be made of
the school buildings within their districts. Maine has had
no cases reach its highest court on this matter to serve as a
guideline for school officials.
-.The general rule in other
jurisdictions has been well stated by the Supreme Court of
Wyoming, however, and is here included. That court has held
that so long as the proper maintenance and conduct of the
school is not interfered with, or in any wise hampered, and
so long as school district property is not defaced or destroyed,
the law vests a generous amount of discretion in the school
12board. It is perhaps accurate to say that there is a strong
judicial disposition to approve wide community use of school
buildings.
Maine has no statutes regulating the control of school
buildings by outside groups and, as stated above, has had no
litigation on the subject. Attorney General opinions have
been sought on several occasions, however, concerning the
^^Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and
Public Education (Brooklyn; The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1959}, p. 23%
j
llt-1
legality of permitting religious groups to use school facilities
for religious training outside of school hours. Attorney General
Cowan said in 1943 that:
or t
school committee in any municipality
cannot lawfully permit the use of a public^
school building by any group for any particular type oftraining. Such, I believe, was the intention
of the framers of the State Constitution; and such, Ibelieve, has been the intention of our legislature in allthe enactments that it has made since the foundation of
our government.
In 1947 the Attorney General’s office ruled that subsection one
of section 473 » giving the management and care of the schools
to the school committee, does not include the right to lease
school property to outside parties. Again in 1950, Attorney
Parris ruled that, in his opinion, it was illegal for a high
school to allow the use of its auditorium for Seventh Day
Adventist meetings.^^
School buildings, being public property, and among
the largest and sturdiest buildings in most municipalities,
are often designated as public shelters in the event of an
emergency. An interesting question arose in I963 as to who
would have jurisdiction over public school buildings in the
event of a national or state disaster. Attorney General Benoit
stated his opinion as follows:
^^Attorney General Report (1943)» P* 70.
^
^Attorney General Report (1947), p. 23.
^^Attorney General Report ( 1950 ) , P • 200
.
)
Ik2
JS; S%r.;r“ “Sexist for the purpose of preventing such cLnfrfo ? ^
emergen’
Governor of our State executes the”^in the Maine Civil Defensend Public Safety Act, responsibility for manaffement
, school buildings rests with superintending schoolccnmittees and school directors. Acts in preparationfor emergencies by civil defense officials do^ot includethe exercise of control over school facilities. lo
Thus it would appear that while Civil Defense officials might
be granted control of public school buildings during an emer-
gency by a directive from the Governor, these officials, in
preparing for emergencies, may not assume control of school
facilities for the purpose of equipping storerooms, altering
basements, etc., unless such authority is granted by the
school committee. '
School Sites
Location
. Ordinarily, the location of school sites
is left to the discretion of the board of education. Since
this decision is generally left to the judgement of the board
of education, the courts will not intervene with action taken
by the board unless such action is clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary. Thus it was held in Jordan v. Haskell that,
”.
. . The location of a school house lot is not invalid,
merely because the bounds of the location, by mistake in some
^
^Attorney General Report (1963), p. 11^.
way, overlaps upon a public road. "I? m Marble v. McKennev
.
the Court held that, "Money raised for the erection of a
schoolhouse upon a lot other than the one legally designated
by the municipal officers of a town is deemed to be raised for
an illegal purpose."^® In an earlier decision involving the
same parties, Jordan v. Sch. Dist, No, 8 in Cape Elizabeth , the
Court stated: "When the location has been legally designated,
municipal oTriccPs, upon th.e land of a certain personi
a jury, on petition of the owner, cannot change the location
to the land of another or to that of the district
.
Finally, an Attorney General’s ruling in 1951 held
that school district trustees have no authority to select a
location and build a schoolhouse without the approval of the
superintending school committee of the town and the State
Board of Health.
Eminent domain . The courts have consistently upheld
the legal right to acquire property by eminent domain. Such
taking is for the public use. The extent of the land that
may be taken is not limited to the amount needed for a school
building or buildings and may include such other amount as is
necessary for reasonable use by the school, including land for
a playground and athletic fields.
Jordan v. Haskell , 63 Me. 189 {l87i|-)*
^^Marble v. MeKenney , 60 Me. 332 (1872).
^^Jordan v. Haskell , 63 Me. 189 (l87i+) 1 P*
^
^Attorney General Report (1951) »P« 39.
Court ruled:
In Goodwin v. in 1872
, the
When a location for the
schoolhouse and necessary buUdin^rh^r “designated, and the owner therfo?®reruLs®toasks an unreasonable price for it in ^
municipal officers, tLy may lav outlot, not exceeding fort^sqLre rod!
® ®®‘^°°lhouse
damages-^! s, and appraise the
The right of land-taking for school purposes was confirmed
by the court again in 1877 in C^sens v. Inhabitants of
District Ko.
,
If in Lyman . An excerpt from this decision follows
.
:
. Where the warrant for the meeting of a schonldistrict regularly called and holden, anS^the !o?!!passed at that meeting, taken as a whole, unmistakably
land
district has designated a certain lot of ••adjoining the one occupied by their existing school
lot^for°th®
connection with it as a schoolhousee erection of a new schoolhouse, and the owner
iLfuliv^^o
refuses to sell the same, the selectmen maylawfully lay it out for a schoolhouse lot and appraisethe damages therefor . 22
Legislative intent in eminent domain proceedings has
been clearly spelled out in two very recent companion cases
involving School Administrative District No. 17 in Norway.
In the first of these cases, a complaint was brought to seek
a declaratory judgement interpreting certain sections of the
Sinclair Act relative to eminent domain procedure. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff, owner of the land chosen as the site for
the new administrative district school, alleged that the land
could not properly be taken by eminent domain since the two
towns involved, Norway and Paris, had not voted approval of
^^Goodwin v. Nye
,
60 Me. [|.02 (1872).
^^Cousens v. School Dist. No. k , 67 Me. 280 (1877),
p. 283 .
145
such taking; and that the school directors, not the "municipal
officers" of the town, had laid out the parcel of land in question
and thus violated the law. The pertinent part of the statute
reads as follows;
... When a location for the erection or removalof a schoolhouse and requisite buildings has been legallydesignated by vote of the town at any town meeting calledfor that purpose or by the school direct ors of a schooladmini strat i ve district
, and the owner thereof refuses tosell, or in the opinion of the municipal officers, asksan unreasonable price for it
. . . they may lay out a
schoolhouse lot and playgrounds, not exceeding 25 acresfor any one project, and appraise the damages as is pro-
vided for laying out town ways, and on payment or tender
of such damages
. . . the administrative unit designating
It may take such lot to be held and used for the purposes
aforesaid, ^3 (Italics mine)
In School Administrative District No. 17 v. Robert S. Orre .^^
the Court interpreted this section to mean that the functions
nndinarily performed by either selectmen or school committees
of towns are now to be performed by the school directors of a
school administrative district. The words "municipal officers"
as used in the statute include school directors. Thus, the
Court hold that it is the duty and responsibility of the
school directors to lay out the proposed lot and appraise
damages for the taking thereof if the plaintiff- refused to
sell
.
In the companion case settled just six months later,
the facts were these. The plaintiff, Oxford County Agricultural
^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (1957), c. 364,
sec. 5.
^
^School Administrative District No. 17 v. Robert S .
Orre, et al., 160 Me. 45 (i9b5^»
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Society, and owner of the proposed lot', contended that the
defendant. School Administrative District No. 1?, could not
legally take their land by eminent domain since the property
was being used by the Society for a "public use" to promote
agriculture, etc., and furthermore, that the location of the
lot had not been approved by the voters of the District.
In finding for the defendant the Court said the follow-
ing;
*
*
.
*
.
Justice below correctly found that while
the activities of the Society benefit the public in some
degree, tliey fall short of constituting "public uses" in
the technical sense which would exempt its property from
eminent domain processes.
The promotion of agricultural products at a fair
which lasts but a few days in each year, although
highly desirable, can hardly be said to lift any appre-
ciable burden from the shoulders of the taxpayers.
. . .
We conclude, as did the Justice below, that the property
of the Society is not immune from condemnation by
the District. 25
In dismissing the second allegation. Justice Webber said,
".
. .By its express terms Sec. 3^62 provides that the location
of schools begins with a vote at a town meeting in the case of
a town and with a vote of the directors in the case of a
district.
Contracts
Approval of plans . Plans and specifications for
^^Oxford County Agricultural Society v. School Admin-
istrative District No. 177 Ifal Me. 33V (l9^o)
.
Ibid.
11^7
construction of a schoolhouse must either be furnished by the
State Department of Education or approved by the Commissioner
of Education and the State Bureau of Health. In Morse v.
^h^
_
bitants
_
of Montville a question arose as to whether a school
committee could contract for the construction of a schoolhouse
before the plans and specifications had been approved. The
Court answered in the negative, saying;
Plans or specifications must either be furnished by
the State or submitted to the State Superintendent of
P^^iic Schools and the State Board of Health for approval;if this is not the case, all parties who did business
with them in furnishing material or labor for the erecting
of the schoolhouse dealt with them at their peril. 27
Once plana are approved, contractors are obligated to
follow them. In a very early decision in 181;0 it was held
that a contractor could not recover of the district the value
of materials for a school since the contract was not followed.
Neither may a city, under its charter rights, erect a school-
house unless the plans have been approved by the school com-
mittee. In Lund v. City of Auburn cited earlier, the Court
said in effect that the city council is in no sense a school
committee and can perform none of that body's functions,
29
except by legislative grant.
Architectural services . The authority to construct a
Morse v. Inhabitants of Town of Montville , 115 Me.
kSk. 99 A.T3H”(1916), p.
^^Hill V. School Dist. No. 2 in Millburn , 17 Me. (5
Shep. ) 316 (iai4.0).
^^Lund V. City of Auburn , 110 Me. 2i;l, 85 A. 893
(1913),
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school building carries with it by implication the authority
to retain and compensate an architect. The architect ordinarily
is retained through the execution of contract of employment
between the school board and the architect, which sets forth
his responsibilities as well as his compensation. In an Old
Town case in 1931 a school committee had engaged an architect
to design a school and submit estimates of its cost. The city
subsequently voted not to build the school and the architect
sought to recover his fee. The Court held in Bunker v. City
of Old Town that, "there is no principle or authority of law,
statutory or otherwise, on which an architectural firm could
recover from a municipality for plans and estimates never used
30but returned."
Summary
Maine school committees or school directors are
responsible for the management of the schools and the custody
and care, including repairs and insurance on school buildings
and all school property in their administrative units. The
property itself, however, is owned by the state. Local dis-
tricts hold the title to the property, once paid for, in trust
for the state. The legislature may control or dispose of such
property, with or without the consent of the district or its
inhabitants.
' School Committees or directors have the right to construct
t
3*^Bunker v. City of 01<^ Towni I30 Me. 510 » 153 A. U41
(1931).
school buildings with or without the aid of the Maine School
Building Authority and to take land for a school site by
eminent domain if necessary. The state authorities must
approve the building plans, however.
The control and use of school buildings is left almost
entirely to the local board. In the event of an emergency
declared by the Governor the control and use of school buildings
would be turned over to the appropriate civil defense agencies.
While it is common practice in Maine to permit community
use of school buildings for a wide range of activities, a series
of opinions from the Attorney General's office have consistently
held that school buildings may not be used for sectarian pur-
poses by religious groups.
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CHAPTER VIII
PUPILS
Introduction
Questions of a legal nature affecting pupils have been
very similar throughout the nation. Typical of these are
problems of admission, exclusion, attendance, classification,
residence, tuition, transportation, curriculum, pupil control,
moral instruction, and liability for injury.
Many of these questions have not as yet been contested
in the Maine courts. Consequently for answers to these
questions, school administrators of the state must rely on
opinions from the Attorney General's office and court decisions
rendered in other states for guidance in interpreting the
Maine statutes.
Attendance
Maine, like each of the other states, has a compulsory
attendance law. The essential elements of the statute read
as follows:
Every child between the 7th and l?th anniversaries
of his birth shall attend some public day school during
the time such school is in session, and an absence there-
from of 1/2 day or more shall be deemed a violation of
this requirement. . • . Such attendance shall not be
required if the child obtains equivalent instruction,
for a like period of time, in a private school in which
the course of study and method of instruction have been
151
approved by the commissioner,!
The validity of this enactment has never been tested
in the Maine courts. One may safely assume, however, that the
law would be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. In an historic decision in our neighboring state
of New Hampshire, it was held that. "Education is so essential
to the general welfare
. . . that the state may require chil-
dren to attend a public, private, or parochial school. "2
In other jurisdictions, the courts are in disagreement
as to whether home instruction by the parents or by a tutor is
the equivalent of regular school education and meets the com-
pulsory attendance requirements.^ This point has not been
raised in Maine but the Attorney General ruled in 1961}. that a
correspondence course unapproved by the district directors
and the Commissioner is not the equivalent of school attendance
and does not satisfy the requirements of compulsory attendance.^
Exclusion
There are many provisions in the Maine statutes for the
exclusion of pupils. These include contagion, filth and
disease, physical or mental unfitness, habitual truancy and
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (196ii) t c, 105,
sec. 911.
^State V. Jackson
, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).
^Robert R, Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public
Education (2d ed. rev.; Brooklyn; The Foundation Press, Inc.,
W^),'p. 507.
^Attorney General Report (1964)> P> 100.
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disorderly conduct.
Maine's attendance law carries the following provision:
• • • The school coniinittee or school directors may
exclude from the public schools any child whose physical
or mental condition makes it inexpedient for him to
attend.^
The extent to which a child of school age must be
handicapped in order to be excluded has never been defined by
the statutes or by judicial opinion. Presumably this decision
is left with local school authorities. The authority to
exclude handicapped pupils from the public schools does not
absolve the local school officials from the responsibility of
providing education at public expense, however. A recent
Attorney General opinion states in part:
Every administrative unit is responsible for appro-
priating sufficient funds to provide at least the same
per capita expenditure for the education of handicapped
or exceptional children as is provided for the education
of normal children.®
Exclusion from school on the basis of disorderly con-
duct is spelled out in Chapter 15, section paragraph 5
under duties of school committees as follows:
Expel any obstinately disobedient and disorderly
scholar, after a proper investigation of his behavior,
if found necessary for the peace and usefulness of the
school; and restore him on satisfactory evidence of his
repentance and amendment .
'
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated ( 1961;), c. 105 ,
sec. 911 •
^Attorney General Report (1964) > P» li^-5*
Maine. Revised Statutes, Annotated (1964) i l5>
sec. 473» par. 5*
"
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A distinction should be made between temporary exclusion
commonly known as suspension and permanent exclusion generally
known as expulsion. It is well established that teachers,
principals, and superintendents have the legal right to remove
temporarily a pupil from a classroom or from school if his
conduct is disrupting the routine of the school. The suspension
may be for an hour, a day, or for several days. In general,
suspension seldom exceeds two weeks or ten school days since a
longer suspension would give the pupil the status of a non-
student. While there have been no Maine cases challenging
the authority of school officials to suspend pupils, a
Wisconsin case settled the issue in that state and the judicial
thinking in the case has been widely upheld elsewhere. In
State V, Burton
, Justice Lyon said in part;
The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his
school, and for the progress, conduct and deportment of
his pupils. It is his imperative duty to maintain good
order, and to require of his pupils a faithful performance
of their duties* If he fails to do so, he is unfit for
his position. To enable him to discharge these duties
effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce
prompt obedience to his lawful commands. For this reason,
the law gives him the power, in proper cases, to inflict
corporal punishment upon refractory pupils. But there are
cases of mis-conduct for which such punishment is an in-
adequate remedy. If the offender is incorrigible, sus-
pension or expulsion is the only adequate remedy . . .
the conduct of the recusant pupil may be such that his
presence in the school for a day or an hour may be
disastrous to the discipline of the school, and even
to the morals of other pupils. In such a case, it seems
absolutely essential to the welfare of the school that
the teacher should have the power to suspend the offender
at once from the privileges of the school.
^
8
State V. Burton, 45 Wis. l$Ot 30 Am. Rep. ?06 (1878).
permanently
As earlier noted, the legal right to exclude
or expel a pupil rests with the school committee or school
directors. This responsibility may not be delegated to others.
The legislative intent of the meaning of a ’’proper investiga-
tion” was explained in^ v. Small . ^ ^^,^3 ^33^
concerned itself with the legality of expelling a pupil from a
school in a school district whore his parents were nonresidents,
a second allegation of the school authorities was that of dis-
orderly conduct. The defendant pupil claimed that a proper
investigation of his behavior was not made. In commenting on
this point Justice Deasy said:
. . . The committee have large powers. They may
exclude pupils for sanitary reasons, or because mentally
defective
. . . they exercise quasi
-judicial powers. If
they act in good faith they are not liable in damages
even if clearly wrong. After proper investigation they
may expel a pupil. No appeal is provided for. If they
act in good faith after proper investigation their de-
cision is final. But before expelling a pupil they must
make such investigation. This duty cannot be wholly
delegated to others.
In the instant case the respondents received from
certain teachers a written complaint about the conduct
of the pupil. Upon this the respondents evidently relied
in excluding the pupil and refusing reinstatement. A
complaint by teachers is a sufficient reason for an
investigation, but it is not an investigation, or at all
events not such V proper investigation as the statute
contemplates . (Italics mine)
A 191|.6 opinion by Attorney General Farris defines both
investigation and repentance. His opinion reads in part as
follows
:
^Shaw v. Small , I2I4. Me. 3^, 125 A. l\96 (I92I4.).
10Ibid.
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^ committee received written statementsfrom those who were present upon the action of this boywhich caused his expulsion, in my opinion, that would
^
be a proper investigation of his behavior, under the
signed a statementthat he was sorry for the trouble he had caused and theschool board restored him and he graduated from hivh
school indicated that the case is now closed, as theboy 8 letter of repentance and amendment, in my opinion,is equivalent to a plea of confession and avoidance in
a civil case.-*--^
Two additional Attorney General opinions support the principle
that the school committee or directors make the final judgement
in expulsion cases. In 19 I4.I, Attorney General Cowan said,
"The committee may enforce obedience to all regulations within
the scope of their authority. If they may select a book they
may require the use of the book selected. ... It is for the
committee to determine what misconduct requires expulsion.
Earlier, in 1929, Attorney General Fogg said:
If, after a proper investigation, the committee is
satisfied that it is necessary for the peace and useful-
ness of the school that the student be expelled, they
have the power to expel him, and if they act in good
faith they are not liable in damages, even though the
court should subsequently find that they were clearly
wrong. 13 .
It has been held in other jurisdictions that a child
may be suspended or expelled for disrespect toward school
authorities; for immorality; for drinking; for smoking; the
use of cosmetics contrary to school regulations; irregular
or tardy attendance at school; refusal to obey when told to
^^Attorney General Report (1946), P* 89.
^^Attorney General Report (1941) » P« 5l«
^^Attorney General Report (1929), p. 40.
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read from a school book; refusal to submit to the examination
of the school physician on the grounds of conscientious
objections; refusal to give the name of a pupil who has been
guilty of a breach of rules when he knows the name of the
pupil; making a speech in a school meeting criticizing the ‘
board of education; being drxink on Christmas Day; publishing
in a newspaper a satirical poem reflecting on school policy;
failure to maintain a required scholastic standing, althou^
there is substantial authority to the contrary; failure to
pay for school property willfully or maliciously destroyed;
and for general failure to obey the school rules or orders
reasonably issued by any teacher or administrator.^^
In view of the aforesaid, there is no question as to
the right of a school committee to expel a pupil under specific
conditions. In our changing social scene, especially in the
area of civil rights, it behooves school officials to act with
renewed caution in this area. School committees should be
careful to follow the prescribed procedures which include a
proper investigation. In the future, this may well include a
hearing by the pupil or his parents in which they may be repre-
15
sented by counsel.
Concerning the proper procedure to follow in the event
that law enforcement officers attempt to interrogate a pupil
^^lamilton, op. cit ., p. 5H4-*
^^In re Gault i 99 Ariz. l8l, 3®? U.S. 1 (1967).
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while at school, a 1961 Attorney General's opinion offers the
following guideline:
If a law enforcement officer requests an opportunityto question a student who is a minor and accused of a
^
crime, the safest course would be to inform the parentimmediately and ask the officer to defer until theparent’s arrival.
The right of pupils to attend school is not subject
to the whims and caprices of the school authorities, however.
It has been stated frequently that only reasonable rules may
be enforced. If pupils are suspended or expelled for the
violation of an unreasonable rule
,
or where school authorities
act maliciously, in bad faith, or arbitrarily, an injury is
committed in which the pupil may seek remedy for wrongful
expulsion. An action in mandamus to reinstate the pupil may
be brought or a suit in damages. In the latter case, if a
parent has incurred tuition expenses for his child's attendance
at another school directly resulting from wrongful expulsion
or suspension, an action to recover may be brought in his own
name.
The courts will rarely substitute their judgement for
that of a school committee in such cases. As one authority
on the subject has said:
. . .
Indeed it would be difficult to procure able
teacher and board personnel if they were constantly faced
with the possibility of having to answer in damages for^
mistakes which they might make in good faith. The public
has no right to expect of its school personnel more than
good faith efforts to carry on the educational work of
the district. 17
^^Attorney General Report (1961), p. 101.
^7ibld ., p. 520.
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Residence of Pupils
Establishing the legal residence of pupils for school
purposes is a problem in Maine as elsewhere. Courts around
the country are in general agreement that the domicile of the
child for school purposes is the domicile of the parents.^^
In Maine y legal residence is defined as the administrative
unit where the father maintains a home for his family.
The ownership of a house and the maintaining of a home
are not synonymous. Thus in 1963 the Attorney General stated
that the ownership of a summer home in a town where the family
resides each summer and on which the parents pay taxes is not
sufficient for town tuition privileges. It has been held in
Maine that the school residence of pupils whose parents reside
on a U.S. government reservation or military reservation is
the same as the town or school district in which the installa-
tion is located.
Only one case involving legal residence has reached
22
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. This was Shaw v. Small
referred to earlier in this chapter* The litigation centered
iQ^
Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing
^pils ("School Law Casebook Series No. Danville : The
Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1962), p. 3.
19
Attorney General Report (1956), p* 69.
^
^Attorney General Report (1963), p. 59.
21
'‘
‘Attorney General Report ( 1957 ) , P • 26
.
^^Shaw V, Small
,
124 Me. 38 , 125 A. 496 (1924).
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around the meaning of the word "guardian" as used in chapter 16.
section 30 of the Revised Statutes. This section provides
that every child shall have the right to attend the public
schools in the town in which his parents or guardian has a
legal residence. Joseph A. Arsenault, the boy Involved in
the case, was thirteen years of age and a ward of the state.
By due court proceedings he had been placed in custody of the
State Board of Children's Guardians and this Board placed the
boy in the care of a Mrs. VIhalen, a resident of Yarmouth,
with whom in that town the boy lived despite the fact that
the boy's parents were not separated and lived in another town.
The facts of the case indicate that the boy was a
disciplinary problem and, failing to expel legally the boy on
disorderly conduct charges, the school officials attempted to
expel him on the basis that his parents did not reside in the
school district whore he was attending school. The Court ordered
the reinstatement of the boy to the public schools of Yarmouth.
Excerpts from the opinion follow:
. . . The word guardian when used in statutes
ordinarily si^iifLes the guardian appointed by the Probate
Court, but the word does not necessarily mean Probate
Guardian. It may be used in its broader sense as "a
person who legally has the care of the person or property
or both of another, incompetent to act for himself." The
care and the custody of the boy was given to Mrs. Whalen
by the State. She has the right to his custody as against
the boy's parents and against all comers except the State
itself. She stands toward the boy in loco parentis. In
the sense in which the word is used in H.S.. Chap. 16,
Sec. 30, she is the guardian of the child. ^3
^3ibid.
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The legislature has since revised the original statute
and clarified the meaning of residence, it reads as follows;
... ^ery person between the ages of 5 and 21 shallhave the right to attend as a full-time stuin?, or withthe consent of the school committee or board of directorsas a part-time student, the public schools in the
which his parent or guardian has
;
Residence as used in this section shall meanthe administrative unit where the father maintains a homefamily. If the parents are separated, residency
considered to be the administrative unit where
her home^^^^^^^*^^
custody of the child maintains his or
Attendance at a school in a district where a pupil’s parents
or guardian do not reside is not- permissible unless tuition
charges are made. In 1950 » the Attorney General's office
ruled that
:
If a child residing with a grandmother who stands
in loco parentis attends high school in another town
by reason of there being no high school in the town of the
child’s residence, the town of the child's residence is
liable for tuition notwithstanding that the grandmother
has not been appointed the guardian of the child. 25
The Attorney General's office offered another opinion
in 1961 as follows:
It is clear that when a town maintains an elementary
school, the only basis for allowing a pupil to attend a
school in another town and payment of tuition by the
sending town is upon a finding of the school committee
that the pupil lives remote from the public school in
his own town, except that with approval of the school
committee a parent may send his child to another town,
but the parent must pay the tuition and not the sending
town.^°
^^Maine, Revised Statutes (195i^')» c* IO3 , sec, 859.
^
^Attorney General Report (1950)» P« I6I.
^^Attorney General Report (1961), p. 49.
161
Tuition
Generally, children may attend school in districts in
which they are nonresident if the home district does not main-
tain free public schools, and the town pays a tuition charge
to the receiving district. Maine, being a large and sparsely
populated state has many unorganized townships, islands, and
remote areas where free public schools cannot be maintained.
It is also interesting that there are twenty-eight private
academies in the state which depend entirely on tuition students
for operation. This means that Maine has an \musually large
number of tuition pupils attending schools in districts in
which they do not reside.
Another interesting fact about tuition pupils in Maine
is that at least one town contracts for the secondary schooling
of its pupils with a parochial school. V/hile it has not been
challenged in the courts, it is interesting to speculate as
i
to whether or not this would be held to be a church- state con-
flict in which public tax moneys are being spent to support
1
I
a sectarian school.
Three cases, all involving the payment of tuition,
have reached Maine’s highest court. Not surprisingly, all in-
volved private schools. In the earlier statutes on tuition,
i a pupil could not be accepted at a school as a
tuition pupil
without a certificate of qualification from the school
committee
i of the sending town stating that the pupil was
qualified to
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attend. In Goodwin v. Charleston
.
a
boy who lived in
Charleston, which did not maintain a high school, applied and
was accepted at Higgins Classical Institute as a tuition pupil.
He did not request nor did the private school seek a certificate
’
of qualification from the local school committee. After
attending the school for a year, the Institute requested the
tuition payment from the town of Charleston. The town refused
to pay whereupon the boy's father paid the amount due. This
action was brought by the father to recover from the town the
amount of the tuition. The action was denied. Justice
Whitehouse said in part;
• • • The only question now presented for determination
is whether this action brought in the name of the pupil
himself by his next friend, can be maintained to recover
from the town the amount of the tuition voluntarily paid
to the Institute by his father, and our conclusion is
that the situation disclosed by the evidence constitutes
no- legal basis for the plaintiff's action.
Apparently the case was settled on the single point that the
boy had failed to get a certificate of qualification from the .
local school committee.
In a very similar case settled just a year later the
Court was asked to determine who has the right to recover
tuition from a sending town, the parent or guardian of the
pupil, or the school which the pupil attends. Ricker Classical
Institute in Houlton brought action to recover tuition for
^"^Goodwin V. Inhabitants of Charleston , 100 Me. 51^9 » 62 A.
606 ( 1905 ).
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three pupils attending from the town of Mapleton. For reasons
not readily apparent in the facts of the case, the town of
Mapleton had refused to pay the tuition charges due. The
defendant town maintained that the parents were responsible
for the payment of tuition and they in turn could collect from
the town. The Court upheld Ricker Classical Institute, the
plaintiff in the case. Justice Whitehouse said in part:
... It is the opinion of the court that this con-
tention cannot be sustained. It would seem to be the
more reasonable and natural construction of the statute
to hold that the legislature intended to establish the
relation of debtor and creditor between the town and the
school, and to require the town to pay the tuition
directly to the school that rendered the service.
Under the revised statutes now in effect, school admin-
istrative units not maintaining approved secondary schools are
authorized to contract with neighboring districts for the
secondary schooling of the qualified youth of its district.
Under Section 1291 > however, any youth whose parent or
guardian maintains a home for his family in any administrative
unit which fails to maintain an approved secondary school or
fails to contract for such schooling on a tuition basis may
attend any approved secondary school in the state to which he
may gain entrance. The town is responsible for the tuition
of the pupil.
^^Ricker Classical Institute v. Inhabitants of
Mapleton
,
101 Me. 553 > A* (l906 )
.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated (196i4.), Title 20,
c. 113 > soo* 1289.
1614
.
Tho only other tuition case on record considered the
right of pupils to attend a secondary school ot^ than those
whach had been contracted for by the sending town, m Maine
central Institute v. Inja^ts of Palmyra .31
^he facts of
the case were as follows. The town of Palmyra which had no
high school contracted for the schooling of its secondary
students with the adjoining town of Newport and with the trustees
of Hartland Academy in the adjoining town of Hartland. Pour
students from Palmyra, nevertheless, elected to attend Maine
Central Institute in the adjoining town of Pittsfield. In an
action by Maine Central Institute to recover tuition from the
town of Palmyra the plaintiff based its right to recover on
Section 93 which reads in part as follows: "Any youth who
resides with a parent or guardian in any town which does not
support and maintain a standard secondary school may attend
any approved secondary school to which he may gain entrance.
The defendant town of Palmyra contended that under the statute,
a child residing with his parents in a town without a high
school had no right to attend an outside school at the expense
of the town for tuition unless the town failed to contract as
provided.
The Court ruled in favor of the inhabitants of the
town of Palmyra. Since the town had furnished adequate
31Maine Central Institute v. Inhabitants of Palmvra.
139 Mo. 30inT91|3')V .
32 Ibid.
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secondary school educational opportunities to its youth under
contracts, it was not liable for tuition bills for the youth
of Palmyra who wished to attend other secondary schools.
Justice Hudson in speaking for the Court said in part-
'
tuition? “if t?spell absolute repugnancy inten ions would clearly
Under Section 1291 of the current statute in effect,
a pupil may attend any secondary school to which he may gain
entrance if the local high school offers less than two approved
occupational courses of study; fails to offer a two-year
course, in mathematics, science or a foreign language; or fails
to offer an approved technical or vocational course which the
pupil wishes to pursue*
A series of opinions from the Attorney General’s office
have consistently upheld this section. They are as follows:
”(a) School Administrative District #14.7 was held
responsible for the tuition of a Sidney Student
who attended an Institute for the purpose of
studying Latin III despite the fact that the
District claimed it would have offered the
had the student requested
"(b) The town of Bristol was held responsible for the
tuition of Bristol pupils attending Lincoln
Academy for the purpose of studying foreign
^^Ibid *
3li
Attorney General Report (1966), p. 68.
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lanpagea not available locally despite the factlanguage teacher was employed
after the school year started, ”35
"(c)
"(d)
The town of Webster was held responsible for thetuition of a pupil attending Lewiston High School
n" o??e?ed'’lolany?"3^^"“®
A Bristol pupil was granted tuition privileges atLincoln Academy for the purpose of studying Latin IIdespite the fact that he was in his fifth year of
secondary school study. ”37
Finally, three opinions from the Attorney General's
office on miscellaneous matters pertaining to tuition are here
inc luded:
"(a) A receiving school may not charge a full semester's
tuition for pupils who enroll late or leave the
school before the end of the term, as tuition may
de charged for pupils while they are receiving
instruction in the schools. "38
"(b) Free tuition privileges in the public school system
do not extend to postgraduate courses. "39
"(c) Based on present law it would not be proper to charge
tuition to students attending a public school during
the summer.
^
Pupil Control
School committees and boards of directors charged with
^
^Attorney General Report
^^
Ibid
.
, p. 59.
3'^Ibld
.
,
p. 60.
3°Attorney General Report
^°Attorney General Report
^
^Attorney General Raport
(1965), P. 59.
(1961).), p. 165.
(1963), p. 72.
(1959), p. 37.
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the management and operation of the public schools have the
legal right to adopt reasonable rules for the discipline and
management of the schools. The rules of a board of education
are final in such respect, and the courts will not interfere
unless the board acts unreasonably or in violation of law.
The courts are very reluctant to declare a board regulation
unreasonable. They will rarely substitute their own discretion
for that of the school authorities.
As has been stated repeatedly in this study, the teacher
stands in loco parentis to children under his supervision and
may exercise such powers of control and discipline as are
reasonably necessary for him to perform properly his duties
as a teacher and to accomplish the purposes of the school.
Generally, so much of the authority of a parent is impliedly
delegated by law to a teacher as is necessary for the proper
control, supervision, and discipline of a child.
Those areas which have resulted in most of the litiga-
tion in connection with pupil control include exclusion, which
has been discussed earlier in this chapter; corporal punishment;
regulations concerning pupil dress and appearance; married
pupils; required subjects including religious and moral in-
struction; and regulations governing pupil behavior off
school grounds and after school hours. These subjects will
now be considered separately.
Corporal punishment . The courts have held repeatedly
that a teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punishment on
a pupil for insubordination, disobedience, or other
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misbehavior^! While school officials, including superinten-
dents, principals, and teachers, are vested with broad dis-
cretionary authority in the infliction of corporal punish-
ment, the punishment must be reasonable and within the bounds
of moderation^ it cannot bo cruel or excessive, and the
official administering the punishment must not act maliciously,
wantonly or in a fit of anger. In the determination of whether
the punishment is reasonable, the courts have hold that con-
sideration must also bo given to the age, sex, and size of the
pupil.
Regarding the criminal or civil liability of a teacher
who inflicts corporal punishment, certain general rules are
important. In a civil action against a teacher for damages
caused by improper punishment of a pupil, the burden of proof
rests on the plaintiff to satisfy the Jury that the teacher
unlawfully beat and injured the child and that damages re-
sulted therefrom. Whether the punishment was unreasonable or
excessive and whether there was an injury are questions of
fact for a jury to determine in a civil lawsuit.
On the question of a criminal liability it has been
held that moderate and reasonable correction by a teacher
with a proper Instrument is not a criminal offense. Mere
immoderate and excessive force does not constitute a crime
unless it is of such a nature as to produce or threaten lasting
^^Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools
(2d ed. rev.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, »
p. 610.
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or pormanont injury and la accompanied by express or Implied
malice.^
Two very early cases reached the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court on the subject of corporal punishment and the precedents
established still hold today. In Stevens v. Passett,^^ in l8i;7,
a pupil by the name of Calvin Passett charged the master of a
school, and the school agent, with assault as a result of
having been forcibly removed from the schoolhouse. The boy
had refused to remove himself from the instructor's desk,
and the master being unable to remove physically the twenty-
one-year-old pupil by himself, sought the aid of the school
agent who assisted the master in ejecting the boy from the
school. The Court held in favor of the teacher and the school
agent. Pertinent excerpts from the decision follow:
. . . When a scholar in school hours
,
intrudes himself
into the desk assigned to the instructor, and refuses to
leave it, on the request of the master, such scholar may
be lawfully removed by the master; and for that purpose
he may immediately use such force, and call to his
assistance such aid from any other person, as is neces-
sary to accomplish the object, without the direction or
knowledge of the superintending school committee.
The right of the parent to keep the child in order and
obedience, is secured by the common law. He may lawfully
correct his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner,
for this is for the benefit of his education. He may
delegate also a part of his parental authority during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is
then in loco parentis, and has such portion of the power
of the Parent, committed to his charge, viz: that of
restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer
the purpose for which he is employed.
^Robert L. Drury and Kenneth C. Ray, Principles of
School Lav (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1965; , p 31 •
^^Stevens v. Passett , 27 Me. (11^. Shep.) 266 (1847).
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The power of the parent to restrain and coerceobedience in children, cannot be doubted, and it hasseldom or never been denied. The power delegated toby the parent, must be accomplished for thetime being, with the same right as incidental, or theobject sought must fail of accomplishment.
. , . Thepractice, which has generally prevailed in our town
schools, since the first settlement of the country hasbeen in aocordance with the law thus expressed, and
resort has been had to personal chastisement, where
milder means of restraint have been unavailing.^
The legality of corporal punishment was perhaps more
strongly worded in the second and only other case to reach the
Maine courts on the subject in 1886. This was an action
charging the schoolmaster with assault and battery for
switching a pupil for refusing to bring in wood for the
school stove. In deciding in favor of the schoolmaster.
Justice Emery clearly spelled out the legality of corporal
punishment along with certain other general propositions of
importance to school officials, teachers and pupils. He said
in part;
... A schoolmaster has a right to inflict reasonable
corporal punishment. He must exercise reasonable judgment
and discretion in determining the manner of punishment,
and to what extent. In determining what is reasonable
punishment, various considerations must be regarded. The
nature of the offense; the apparent motive and disposition
of the offender; the influence of his example and conduct
upon others and the age, sex, size and strength of the
pupil to be punished. . . .
Among reasonable persons much difference prevails as
to the circumstances which will justify the infliction of
punishment and the extent to which it may be properly
administered. On account of this difference of opinion
and the difficulty which exists in determining what is a
reasonable punishment and the advantage which the master
^
^Ibid .
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has by being on the spot and knowinp- allstances, the manner, look ^ circum-
of the offender, which ar4 not language
and thus to form a correct described
and the extent of the punishment
the necessity
should be made to the teach^ by^wavin the exercise of his discretion P^^tecting himhave this indulgence, when he annio ^®P®®lally should he
good motives anftrt’ftorall|et'’trt;tute‘:£r
Pupil dress and appearance
, a second area of pupil
control which has precipitated a number of controversies be-
tween school officials and parents is that of rules and regula-
tions pertaining to pupil dress and appearance. Especially
in this age of long hair and short skirts, the subject has
received a good deal of publicity and much concern among
school officials. It should be pointed out, however, that
current fads are by no means responsible for the bulk of the
litigation which has arisen on the subject.
As early as 1923 in a landmark case which was referred
to for years, the Supreme Court of Arkansas set the judicial
tone for later decisions on this subject. The decision of the
Court in this case would unquestionably be overruled in this
day and age but is here included as an example of how far the
courts will go in backing up rules and regulations of local
boards of education. As stated earlier, the courts will
rarely substitute their judgement for that of school boards
when they have acted in good faith.
In Pugslev V, Sellmeyer the Court upheld the right
Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 909. 97 Am. Reo. 8l8.
7 A. 273 (IHBBT
^^Pugsley V. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 2k7. 250 S.W, 938
(1923). .
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of a school board to deny admission of a girl using cosmetics
contrary to a board rule that stated that the wearing of
transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses or any style of
clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, or the use of face
paint or cosmetics, is prohibited! While the board rule may
seem a little unreasonable in 1968, the reasoning behind the
Court's decision is not. Excerpts from this opinion follow;
The question . . .is not whether we approve this
rule as one we would have made as directors of the dis-
trict, nor are we required to find whether it was
essential to the maintenance of discipline. On the
contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that
the directors have clearly abused their discretion,
and that the rule is not one reasonably calculated to
effect the purpose intended, that is, of promoting
discipline in the school; and we do not so find.
Courts have other and more important functions to
perform than that of hearing the complaints of disaffected
pupils of the public schools against rules and regulations'
promulgated by the school ‘boards fo r the government of the
schools. The courts have this right of review, forthe
reasonableness of such rule is a judicial question, and
the courts will not refuse to perform their functions in
determining the reasonableness of such rules, when the
question is presented. But in doing so, it will bo kept
in mind that the directors are elected by the patrons of
the schools over which they preside, and the election
occurs annually. These directors are in close and
intimate touch with the affairs of their respective
districts, and„know the conditions with which they
have to deal.^' (Italics mine)
It is interesting to note that as recently as 1951 » a Maine
Attorney General referred to this same case in ruling that
school authorities may prescribe the kind of dress to be worn
by pupils or make reasonable regulations as to their personal
Ibid.
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appearance,^®
The question of rules and regulations concerning pupil
dress and appearance has not as yet reached the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court. The Attorney General opinion cited above is
currently the only guideline that Maine school officials have. '
A very recent case on this subject in our neighboring state of
Massachusetts, however, reflects a judicial attitude which
would probably carry considerable weight in Maine should a
similar case arise.
In Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro
.
a
seventeen-year-old high school senior was suspended for wearing
an extreme "beatle-type” haircut, until such time as he got
an ''acceptable" haircut. The boy and his parents brought an
action to require the school committee to lift the suspension.
Their contention was that the hair style was necessary to the
boy’s profession since he performed as a musician and that
the board's regulation was an invasion of personal privacy
as well as that of the domain of the home and family.
Not so, held the Court. They ruled that the unusual
hair style of the boy could disrupt the maintenance of proper
classroom atmosphere and decorum. It held that any unusual,
immodest or exaggerated mode of dress, or conspicuous departures
from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts wore legal
grounds for suspension.
i
^^Attorney General Neport ( 1951 ) » P • 93 •
! ^^Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 3li.9 Mass,
i 70k, 212 N.e7 (2d) (1^65).
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Married pupils. It has been held in Louisiana,
New York, and Ohio,^^ that school boards cannot compel married
pupils to attend school even though such pupils are within the
compulsory attendance age. On the other hand, pupils wishing
to attend school may not be excluded because they are married.
Attorney General Frost, in addressing himself to the question
of the legality of excluding married pupils under twenty-one
years of age said:
Such action is not permitted
. . . and would, in
fact, bo repugnant to public policy, in that the courts
have always frowned upon any action which might be
construed as restraining marriage after the party has
reached marriageable age, where no immorality or mis-
conduct is present.
V/hile there are no Maine cases so holding, four recent
decisions in Texas, Michigan, Ohio,^^ and Utah^7 ]^ave all
uphold the right of school authorities to exclude married
pupils from participation in extracurricular activities, in-
cluding athletics. The weight of legal authority is clearly
on the side of the pupil on the question of marriage. Married
^^State V. Priest
,
210 La. 389, 27 S (2d) 173 (19l;6).
^^In re Rogers , 23 I4. NYS (2d) 1?2 (1962).
^^State of Ohio v. Gans, 168 Ohio 17i;, l5l NE (2d)
709 (WS)":
^^Attorney General Report (1961), p. 91;.
^^Kissick V. Garland Independent School District , 330
SW (2d) 708 (1959).
^^Cochrane v. Board of Education of Mesick Consol .
School Dist .
,
36 o'~
M
ich. 390, I03 NW (^d) 5^9 (l^^boy.
^^Ohio ex rel. Baker v. Stevens on , 189 NE (2d) I8I (1962).
^'^Starkey v. Board of Education of Danis County Dist^.
,
381 P ( 2d) 718 ( 1963 ).
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pupils may not be excluded solely on the grounds of marriage
nor may they be forced to attend school to satisfy compulsory
attendance requirements.
In 1929, Attorney General Pogg ruled that a school
committee has the power to expel a student who is the admitted
father of an illegitimate child, if, after a proper investiga-
tion, the committee is satisfied that it is necessary for the
peace and usefulness of the school, and if they act in good
rai'bh.. This question has not since been raised with the
Attorney General for an opinion nor has it reached the courts.
Curriculum
Required subjects
. The state has the legal right to
require that designated studies essential to good citizenship
be taught and that nothing be taught which is contrary to the
public welfare. Local boards, in the absence of statutory
regulations, have the discretion to provide for the teaching
of such studies as they deem advisable.
While the school committee, subject to state law,
has the ri^t to establish generally the curriculum, the law
contemplates that general methods of instruction are within
the control of professionally trained teachers, principals and
superintendents. While school authorities have the ri^t to
define the school curriculum, parents may make reasonable
selections from the prescribed studies for their children. A
^^Attorney General Report ( 1929 ) » p . ii-0
.
parent cannot insist that his child be taught subjects not in
the program of studies or that he use a textbook different from
that adopted by the school authorities.
The Maine laws provide that the school committees and
school directors, "Direct the general course of instruction '
and approve a uniform system of textbooks and make provisions
for the instruction of all pupils in schools supported by
public money. "^9 ^he legislature, under the authority of
Article VIII of the Constitution has, from time to time, directed
the local boards of education to provide for specific instruction
in such areas as physiology and hygiene; effects of alcoholic
drinks, stimulants and narcotics; American history; geography
and natural resources of Maine; virtue and morality; and a host
of other topics which need not here be enumerated.
The only real controversy in Maine concerning required
subjects has been in connection with moral and religious in-
struction.
Maine, as most other states, had a statute which re-
quired readings from the scriptures and recitation of the Lord's
prayer. The Supreme Court of the United States, in 1963, in
the historic Schempp and Murray cases, rendered these prac-
tices unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it applied
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
^^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (1961|.), Title 20,
c. 15 » sec. I4.73 .
^
^School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa . v. Schempp ;
Murray v. Curie tt, U.sV ti07» ti3 S.Ct. 2^, ^ L.Ed. 2d 5^
TT^7.
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These cases received wide publicity throughout the
country. The arguments and reasoning of the Justices have been
widely reviewed and need not be reported here.^^ The interpreta-
tion and implementation of the Court’s decision has differed
somewhat throughout the country. Of interest at this point
is the interpretation of the Maine Attorney General and the
State Board of Education.
Following the June 17, 1963, Supreme Court decisions,
Attorney General Hancock forwarded a synopsis of the decisions
and an interpretation of its effect under Maine law to the Com-
missioner of Education, dated Juno 21, 1963
.
Quotes from this
letter follow:
. . . There is no question that the exercises set
forth in section 11^5 of chapter 4l> and the statute
itself, are unconstitutional and must be considered
henceforth null and void. All practices in our public
schools of Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer or any other prayer as part of a religious
exercise shall cease. The pamphlet printed and dis-
tributed by the Department of Education entitled
"Suggested Bible Readings for Maine Public Schools"
should be now discarded by school officials.
It is clear that the decision does not prohibit the
secular study of the Bible or of those subjects in which
the history of religion may be an integral part.
It also would not prohibit the study and recitation
in our schools of documents and books containing references
to God nor would it prohibit the singing of religious hymns
by students as long as that singing was not a part of a
regular religious exercise or program. ^3
^^See Educational Policies Commission, Religion in the
Public Schools (Washington: American Association of School
Administrators, I96I4.)
.
^^"How Do You Prohibit Prayer," Time , Aug. 25, 1967,
p. 58.
°^Letter from Hon, Frank Hancock, Attorney General,
State of Maine, Augusta, Maine, to Dr. Warren G. Hill, Com-
missioner of Education.
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Following several letters of protest not only of the
Supreme Court decision, but of Attorney General Hancock's
interpretation, a second letter was addressed to the Governor
on November 7. 1963 . In this second opinion the Attorney
General went into considerably more detail in answering
specific questions. Excerpts from this second letter are as
follows:
The only way to nullify or override the Supreme Courtdecision is by an amendment to the Constitution of theUnited States.
. . .
Teachers may not voluntarily conduct the reading ofthe Bible or recitation of prayers in the public schools.
• • •
The teacher has no inherent authority to conduct
religious exercises and she may not effectuate a policy
which is beyond the power of her employer to authorize,
nor may she attempt to accomplish by indirection that
which is directly forbidden by the law of the land.
. . .
Most of the letters I have received bemoan the fact
that children no longer may be subject to the practice of
Bible reading and prayer recitation. There is some ex-
pression of fear that, because of the discontinuance of
the practice, our children will be deprived of a vital
religious indoctrination formally provided by the public
schools. This is the very nub of the decision, to keep
government separate from religion. If we as a society
have gone so far that we must depend upon our schools to
provide the only touch of devotional exercise for our
children, then we should admit to failure in parental
and community guidance and leadership.
. . .
Finally, I am alarmed by those who urge defiance of
the ruling of the Court.
Disagreement with the Court, or dislike of its rulings,
is no excuse for defiance. Private citizens, as well as
public officials, are bound by the law as pronounced by
the highest court in the land. ... We cannot properly
ed \cate our children, and we cannot demand of them respect
and discipline, if we ourselves do not show respect for
the law. To be responsible citizens we must practice what
we preach and sot the example by obeying the law.®^
^^!jetter from Hon. Frank Hancock, Attorney General,
State of Maine, Augusta, Maine, to Hon. John Reed, Governor of
Maine.
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Another question which has resulted in considerable
confusion is the extent to which the Bible, as a purely
literary document, may be studied in the schools. The Supreme
Court pointed out that the decision does not prohibit the
secular study of the Bible or of those subjects in which the
history of religion may be an integral part,^^
The State Board of Education issued a comprehensive
policy statement on "Use of the Bible in Maine Public Schools"
on May 22, 19614.. In the concluding paragraph it states:
In summary, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Schempp and Murray cases does not alter the schools'
responsibility for proper use of the Bible in the public
schools. It is a proper part of secular education. School
officials are free to continue use of the Bible as a source
book and to utilize it as an integral part of appropriate
courses
This policy statement appears in its entirety in the Appendix.
In i960 a question was directed to the Attorney General's
office concerning the propriety of excusing certain students
from required instruction in the field of physiology and hygiene
on the grounds of conscientious objection. The opinion was
stated as follows:
A statutory duty of the school committee is to
"... make provisions for the instruction of all
pupils in schools supported by public money or under
state control in physiology and hygiene, with special
reference to the effects of alcoholic drinks, stimulants
and narcotics upon the human system." It is my opinion
that the Legislature has acted in this area and the
agencies charged with administration of the law are
^
^School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa . v. Schempp ;
Murray v. Curlett , 371 U.S. ti07» 63 S.Ct. 2^, ^ L.Ed"ii 2d~"52
66Maine, State Department of Education, Use of the
Bible in Maine Public Schools (Augusta: State Board of
Education, 19b4)*
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textbooks. The authority of the legislature
to prescribe specific subjects to be taught in the public
schools implies authority to designate the textbooks to be
used. This authority has been challenged only once in the
Maine courts. The primai*y issue in the case was the legality
of requiring the Protestant version of the Bible to be used
in the daily opening exercises. In Donahoe v. Richard
s
,^^
a Roman Catholic pupil was expelled for refusing to read from
the Protestant version of the Bible. The Court upheld the
decision of the school committee in this historic case.
In view of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions Just cited, the Maine decision of upholding the
school committee *s right to prescribe which version of the
Bible shall bo used is largely academic. Certain excerpts
from this decision, relative to textbooks and prescribed
studies are still valid, however, and are here included:
. . .
With such committee, the Legislature has reposed
the power of directing the general course of instruction
and what books shall be used in the schools; and they may
rightfully endorse obedience to all the regulations by
them made within the sphere of their authority. . . . For
a refusal to read from a book thus prescribed, the com-
mittee may, if they see fit, expel such disobedient
scholar. ...
No scholar can escape or evade such requirement when
made by the committee, under the plea that his conscience
will not allow the reading of such book.”^
^^Attorney General Report (I960), p. 160.
^®Donahoe Richards , 3® Me. 379 > 6l Am. Deo. 256 (1854).
^^ Ibid .
f
A
i
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Transportation
The matter of pupil transportation is largely regulated
in each state by statutes. The constitutionality of laws pro-
viding for the transportation of public school pupils has con-
sistently been upheld by the courts. The ages of pupils and
the distance they reside from schools, in order to be eligible
for transportation, varies from state to state and from school
district to school district. The Maine statutes leave these
decisions almost entirely to the discretion of the local boards.
f
Chapter 505> section 35^1 of the Revised Statutes pro-
vides that "Conveyance of all elementary schools, a part or
the whole of the distance, to and from the nearest suitable
school, shall be procured when such pupils reside at such a
distance from the said school that, in the judgement of the
school committee, such conveyance is necessary. Section 358
of Chapter 11 pertaining to Community School Districts, on the
other hand, states that, "Transportation shall be provided by
the community school committee in the same manner as is pro-
vided for transportation of elementary pupils in section 3561*
f
the expenditures for transportation to be considered an ex-
71
pense of operation of said school or schools.” Finally,
section 220 of Chapter 9 provides that the transportation of
all pupils residing in a school administrative district shall
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (I96I4.), c. 505»
'sec. 3561 .
*^^Ibid,, o. 11, sec. 356.
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be provided in accordance with provisions of section 358.72
Although the matter of distance from the nearest
suitable school is clearly left to the discretion of the
school committee, the question of age, or more specifically
grade level, is not. Secondary pupils residing in a local
independent district or in a school union district are not
entitled to transportation under the statutes whereas secondary
pupils residing either in a community school district or a
school administrative district are.
While these statutes are not contradictory, nor have
they been challenged in the courts as discriminatory, legis-
lative scrutiny is indicated. It is apparent from the statutes
that some secondary pupils in the state must be provided with
transportation while others, depending upon the local admin-
istrative organization, do not enjoy the same privilege.
Questions frequently arise concerning the responsi-
bility of pupil control on school buses. The general legal
principle is that schools have ”home to home” responsibility.
That is to say that a pupil eligible to be picked up at a bus
stop or at his home has the right to be returned to the same
place after school. This is not to suggest that pupils
cannot
be denied the privilege of transportation because of
disorderly
conduct, however. The "home to home” responsibility
carries
with it the implied right of pupil control and the
authority
to enforce reasonable rules of behavior while
on the bus.
Attorney General Beport (1958 )> P» 72.
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There are no court cases of record on this point in
Maine but the Attorney General's office has offered the opinion
that a bus driver has the authority under the statutes to con-
trol the conduct of the pupils and can use reasonable force to
do so if necessary, and furthermore, has the same authority as
a teacher while the pupils are under his control,
The opportunity to ride on a school bus is a privilege
and not a right. Pupils who refuse to obey reasonable rules
and regulations while on a bus may be denied the right of
transportation. The question of liability of a bus driver in
the event of an accident has been discussed elsewhere in this
study. The question of liability due to an injury to a pupil
who has been removed from a school bus before reaching his
regular bus stop and forced to walk home has not been settled
in the courts. School officials and/or the bus driver might
well be held responsible in such a circumstance.
The question of the legality of transporting private
school pupils at public expense has caused considerable litiga-
tion and the courts in various jurisdictions are not in agree-
ment on the subject. The United States Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of a New Jersey state law which
provides for the transportation of parochial school pupils at
public expense. In the famous Everson case,*^^ the Court held
^^Attorney General Report (1958)> P* 72.
"^^Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp. et al .,
US. 1, 67 sT^tTToii dWT
1814.
that the state did not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment
I
of the Constitution or the First Amendment in providing for the
transportation of parochial pupils at public expense. Such
expenditures for transportation, in the opinion of the Court,
did not constitute the conduct, establishment, or support of ‘
religion.
Whether or not a parochial pupil may bo transported at
public expense in the respective states depends largely on
the constitutional or statutory laws of each state.
V This question was settled in Maine as a result of
j!
the Squires case.*^^ The city council of Augusta had appro-
t!
!
printed funds for the transportation of those elementary
school children residing in the city who attended parochial
' schools. The council claimed it had this authority under its
I
I
charter from the legislature. Thirteen taxpayers of the city
I challenged this appropriation as being unconstitutional. In
deciding against the council, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that:
1
I
In enacting the laws pertaining to education, the
j
legislature intended that no municipality should regulate
' by ordinance or order any subjects which would affect or
influence general education unless permitted to do so by
an express delegation of power ... the state educational
policy cannot and must not be interfered with by any
' subordinate governing body.
In the absence of express authority from the legis-
I
lature in the city charter or in a statute, the Augusta
; city council has no authority under its police power to
enact an ordinance providing for thg transportation of
pupils to or from private schools.'
"^^Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta, 155 Me.
151 , 153 A. id Bo (l9?^r
T^ibid.
I
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Tha Supreme Court Justices added some dictum in their
written opinion, however, which suggested to the legislature a
method of solving this problem. This is one of the very few
times that the Court has entered into the realm of speculation,
at least in the field of education, so far as this writer has
been able to determine. The Court said the following:
A properly worded enabling act, authorizing municipal-
ities to expend funds for the transportation of children
to private schools, not operated for profit, if one were
to be enacted by the legislature, would meet constitu-
tional requirements.
Just two years after this decision was handed down,
the legislature passed the enabling act suggested above. The
constitutionality of this act remains unchallenged to date.
The legislation is permissive, however, and there is a
monetary penalty involved in that sums expended for the trans-
portation of parochial students are not included in the com-
putation for determining the foundation program subsidy. The
legality of the financial penalty has been referred to the
Attorney General on two separate occasions. In each instance
78
the opinions have upheld the legality of the statute.
Summary
The legislature, in carrying out its mandate under
Article VIII of the Maine Constitution, has enacted a number
77 ibid .
78Attorney General Report (I960), p. 120; Attprr^
General Report (lvb3)^f P> lb7»
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of statutes pertaining to pupils. Some of these are mandatory
on a statewide basis; others leave the authority to the dis-
cretion of the local school committee or school directors.
All pupils, excepting those with severe handicaps, be-
tween the ages of seven and seventeen must attend public schools
or approved private schools in the school district where they
live. Residence has been defined as the municipality where
the father or legal guardian of the child maintains a home
for the child.
Children of compulsory school attendance age may be
excluded on the basis of physical or mental unfitness or dis-
orderly conduct. In the case of conduct, the exclusion may be
temporary or permanent but the child has the right of re-
admission upon his repentance.
Pupils residing in school districts not maintaining
high schools or maintaining a high school without certain
prescribed courses of study have the right to attend high
schools in other districts on a tuition basis although they
may not be compelled to attend. The local district is
responsible for the tuition.
The legislature has delegated the authority for the
care and management of schools to the local boards of educa-
tion. This authority includes the ri^t to make reasonable
rules and regulations concerning pupil behavior. This
authority is further delegated to school administrators and
teachers* They may use corporal punishment in enforcing these
187
^'^Iqs if ddomed nocessapy*
The local control principle includes curriculum as
well as behavior. Local committees may prescribe which sub-
jects shall be taught as well as the textbooks to be used.
The secular study of the Bible may be included if the local
school district deems it advisable.
Transportation of public school pupils at the elementary
level is mandatory in all districts although the distance that
pupils may be required to walk is left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the local committees. Transportation of public
school secondary pupils is mandatory in community school
districts and school administrative districts although the
same option of establishing a reasonable "walking" distance
is left with the school officials. The transportation of
secondary pupils in supervisory unions and in independent
districts is optional with the local authorities. Trans-
portation of private school pupils is optional with the local
district. No state reimbursement for such costs is provided
for under the law.
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CHAPTER IX
TEACHERS
Introduction
The profession of tesching hss undergone dramatic
changes, especially over the last twenty-five years. In the
early beginnings of public school education in Maine, teachers
or "schoolmasters" as they were commonly called, enjoyed few
of the present-day privileges and little or no protection under
the law. They were examined and awarded a certificate to teach
by local officials. They were at the mercy and whim of local
school boards. Indeed it was held in an early case that,
".
. . If all the members of a board should neglect or even
wantonly refuse to examine a person he would not be authorized
to teach and to recover his wages without the required cer-
tificate."^
Contracts in the early days were informal and subject
to termination by the school board at their pleasure. The
teacher was without tenure rights and without the protection
of minimum salary laws. Other benefits, including a retire-
ment system, equal pay for men and women teachers, sick leave
and leaves of absence were not provided.
' ^Jackson v. Inhabitants of Hampden , 20 Me. pt. 1 (2 App.)
37 (I8ia)-
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This chapter will consider the topics of certification,
employment, tenure, dismissal, compensation, and retirement of
teachers. A section on collective bargaining is also Included
since this is the latest issue of concern to educators in Maine,
as elsewhere.
Before proceeding with specific topics, a clarification
of the legal definition of a teacher might be in order. In
general, any discussion of the rights and privileges of a
teacher also includes those, of persons in charge of a school
or schools known as head teachers, teaching principals or
supervising principals. Also, in Maine the statutes do not
differentiate between classroom teachers and those persons who
are assigned to full-time supervisory positions. Basically,
a principal is considered to be a teacher-in-charge and is
entitled to the same privileges under the law as a full-time
classroom teacher.
There is only one reference to the word "principal” to
be found in the Maine statutes on education. This is in
Chapter 7» section l5l> paragraph 5 of the Revised Statutes.
It reads as follows
:
When a School Administrative District employs less
than 15 teachers and owing to geographical location or
other reasons it is not practicable to combine with other
administrative units to form a supervisory unit as
authorized in this section, the directors, on approval of
the commissioner and board, may employ a qualified person
to serve as superintendent of schools and as supervising
principal. 2 (Italics nine)
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (19614.), Title 20,
o. 7, sec. 1$1 , par. 5*
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It would appear that the intent of the legialature here is to
combine the positions of superintendent and principal in small,
isolated districts in which case the legal duties of the position
would pertain more to those of superintendent than teacher.
The position of superintendent of schools is well defined
in the statutes in terms of qualifications, duties and responsi-
bilities. The only direct benefit obtaining to superintendents
similar to that of teachers is that of retirement privileges.
It was held in a 195^4- opinion by the Attorney General that;
Under this section of the law, for the purposes of
retirement only, "employees” of the State of Maine
participate in the Maine State Retirement system;
"employees" include teachers, and teachers are defined
to include the superintendent employed in any day
school within the State.
^
Another Attorney General opinion in 1961 held that a principal,
who had served twenty years as a teacher, could not be put on
a probationary contract as a principal since a principal is
included within the definition of a teacher.^
Certification
Issuance of certificates . In the early history of
Maine public education the authority to issue a teaching
certificate or "license" to teachers was vested in the local
school committee. Later, in 1854 » the newly created Superin
tendent of Gomroon Schools for the state was charged with
^Attorney General Report ( 1954)» P»
K ^Attorney General Report (1961), p. 55*
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advising" the superintending school eoranittees "in methods of
ascertaining the qualifioations of teachers for their duties."?
Still later in 1923 the authority to certify teachers was vested
in the Consaissioner of Education under sec. 1751 of Chapter 201
which reads as follows
:
• • e No certificate shall be crantftri onw vn
to teach in the public schools of the State unlLrhe°"furnishes evidence of good moral character and meets such
??
to preliminary education and training asmay be prescribed by the commissioner.^ ®
The most recent change in certification was enacted by the 103rd
Legislature in 196? by replacing the word “commissioner" with
"Board of Education" in the section stated above. This is a
rather major change in keeping with recent trends in Maine to •
separate the policy-making functions from the executive functions
at the state level.
A major revision of the certification requirements was
completed in I963 following a five-year study by a special com-
mittee of educators and laymen established by the State Board
of Education. The specific requirements for the various types
of certificates are compiled and distributed in pamphlet form
by the State Department of Education.®
^Maine, State Laws (I85I4.), c. 89, sec. 11.
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (196h). c. 201,
sec. 1751 .
’^Kermit S. Nickerson, Report of Legislation Enacted by
the 103rd Legislature Relating to Education (Augusta; State
Department of Education, 1967T, p. 11.
°State Department of Education, Higher Standards for
Maine Teachers (Augusta: State Department of Education, 1963).
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It la a prerequisite to lawful employment as a teacher,
or for recovery of wages under his contract, or to seek redress
of its breach that such person have a lawful certificate as a
teacher. It is on these points that the courts have had occasion
to oonsider oertifioation.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has consistently upheld
the principle that teachers are unauthorized to teach without
the required certificate. In Jackson v. Inhabitants of Hampden .
the Court held that, ”... A teacher is not authorized to
teach, and cannot recover pay therefore, without the requisite
certificate."^ In Pore v. Billings
. the Court said in part:
• • • Although a teacher of a public school may notbe entitled to recover her wages, by reason of having
neglected to obtain the certificate required by the
statute, yet the tovm alone is entitled to raise that
objection.
Later, in Jose v. Moulton
,
the Court once again confirmed this
point by saying in part, ".
. .A person teaching a school with-
out the required certificate is by the statute barred from re-
covering pay of the town."^^
The last case to reach Maine's highest court in which
certification was considered was in 1914.8* In Perkins v.
12Inhabitants of the Town of Standish
,
the plaintiff, a teacher
^Jackson v. Inhabitants of Hampden, 20 Me. pt. 1 (2 App.)
37 (1841).
^
^Dore V. Billings , 26 Me. (13 Shep.) 58 (1846).
^^Jose V. Moulton , 37 Me. 3^7 (1853)«
'
^^Perkins v. Inhabitants of the Town of Standish , 143 Me.
253 » 82 A (2d) “321 (19487.
”
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by the name of Doris Perkins, sought to recover wages for the
balance of the school year after her alleged wrongful discharge.
She had been employed on January 6, 19i|.7, to finish out the
school year for a teacher who had resigned. She had no teaching
certificate at the time of employment, although she had hold a
valid certificate some eight or ten years before. She informed
the superintendent of this fact at the time of employment. Ho
told Mrs, Perkins that it would bo all ri^t to accept the
position without a certificate ”if she would apply for one at
Augusta. **
Mrs. Perkins started teaching on January I3 and taught
through to January 2I4. for which service she was paid. On
January 24 she was informed by the superintendent that her
employment was at an end, the reason given that she did not
have a teacher's certificate. Although it is not apparent
from the facts of the case
,
one may assume that her performance
in the classroom was unsatisfactory, and, rather than follow
the dismissal proceedings, the school committee chose this
alternate method for a fast and legal termination of the con-
tract. In finding for the town of Standish, the Court confirmed
earlier decisions that a teacher may not teach without holding
a valid teaching certificate. It said in part:
. . . Under these sections of the statute, the actual
holding of a state teachers' certificate by the plaintiff
was a condition precedent to the authority of the town to
employ her, and it was a condition precedent to her right
to teach; such conditions precedent cannot bo waived by
^
the town or anyone acting in its behalf. . . .
It would indeed bo incongruous to hold that a person
could recover as damages, for not being allowed to teach.
1914.
wages which she could not recover had ah«
RQ,YiL9atlon. Along with the authority to grant a teaching
certificate is the authority to revoke or annul a certificate.
This authority still rests with the Commissioner, The pertinent
P&rt of the statute reads as follows!
. . . Any certificate granted under this or any precedinglaw may for sufficient cause be revoked and annulled. Nothingin this section relative to revocation of teachers* cer-
tificates shall be retroactive. Any teacher whose cer-
^l^lcute has been revoked shall be granted a hearing on
request before a committee.
. . . The hearings before this
committee may be public at their discretion and their
decision shall be final,
There are no court cases of record on revocation but the Attorney
General *s office has twice rendered opinions on the subject. In
194.3 It was stated that:
Ch. 38 of P.L. 1931 provides, ”... that any certificate
granted under this or any preceding law may for sufficient
cause be revoked and annuled
. . . any teacher whose cer-
tificate has been revoked shall be granted a hearing on
request before a committee, one member to be selected by
the department of education, the second by the teacher
involved, and the third by the other two members. The
hearings before this committee may be public at their
discretion and their decision shall be final." This
language is sufficiently broad to give you authority to
revoke the certificate of any teacher when in your opinion
,
such revocation is Justified, The law in the language I
have quoted above provides for an appeal and a decision
by a committee of appeal after hearing the evidence is
final.
The second opinion considered the permanency of a
sec. 1751»
V 1 r-
^3ibid .
^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated (1964.)# c. 201,
:i.
^
^Attorney General Report ( 194-3 )f P* 53
•
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revoked teaching certificate. In 1963 the Attorney General
said that:
A limited revocation is not possible. To revoke aninstrument is to aimul or make void by recalling or takingback, cancel, repeal, reverse.” Thus, the Commissioner in*the present matter cancelled the teacher's certificate: heannulled it; he took it back; and he repealed it. It nolonger exists
. The following action is available to theCommittee, affirm the action of the Commissioner, or
reverse the action of the Commissioner. The latter action
would require that the Commissioner issue another certificateto replace the one revoked.
Employment
Procedures
. The legal authority to employ teachers
generally rests with the school committee and may not be
delegated. In some' states, school boards may select and employ
teachers only from a list recommended by the superintendent,
while in others, a school board may employ with or without a
superintendent's recommendation.
In Maine the prescribed procedure for initial employ-
ment is : nomination of a teaching candidate by the superin-
tendent; approval, ratification, or "election” of the candidate
by the school committee or directors; and "employment" or
placement of the teacher in a Job assignment by the superin-
tendent. It is interesting to note that the authority to employ
is vested in the superintendent. In fact, the statute itself
is found under duties of the superintendent rather than under .
the duties of school committees. This is undoubtedly a hold-
over from the old school-agent days. It will bo recalled from
^
^Attorney General Report (1963), p, l$k»
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the discussion in Chapter III that the school agent, the fore-
runner of today's superintendent, was given the authority to
employ teachers without ratification by the local school com-
mittee. This system created a number of problems and con-
tributed to the eventual repeal of the school district system.
The legislature, in drafting the new legislation, wisely saw
fit to provide the school committee with veto power over the
superintendent in the matter of teacher employment. They also
provided for an emergency procedure in the event that a stale-
mate is reached between the superintendent and the board in
which either the superintendent refuses to nominate a candidate
of the board's choice or the board refuses to approve the
nomination of the superintendent. The statute provides that,
".
. . In case the superintendent of schools and the super-
intending school committee or school directors fail to legally
elect a teacher, the commissioner shall have the authority to
appoint a substitute teacher who shall serve until such election
is rnade,"^^
The current procedure for employment, seemingly simple
and effective, has led to a considerable amount of litigation,
however. In some instances it would appear that school com-
mittees, disenchanted with their choice of candidates, have
challenged their own employment procedures under the law as a
roundabout method of discharging teachers or bresdcing their
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (196l|.), o. 7»
sec. 161, par. 5*
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contracts.
Three cases, all decided since the abolition of the
district system, have reached Maine’s highest court on the sub-
ject of teacher employment. The decisions reached and the
I
opinions stated by the Justices have legal implications for
Maine school officials today,
1 A
In Dennison v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven
,
a teacher
was offered a position to fill out the remainder of a school
year, by telegram, by the superintendent, which he accepted.
There had been no school conxnittee meeting held to approve
the nomination of this teacher. After having tau^t for two
of the three remaining quarters in the school year, the
teacher’s employment was terminated.. The reason for his dis-
charge is not given in the facts of the case. The teacher
brought an action to recover his salary for the remaining
quarter because of a wrongful discharge. The defendant school
committee claimed that the teacher was never legally employed.
In finding foi^ the teacher the Court said in part:
While the authority to hire teachers was conferred
on the school committee , , a contract with a teacher,
made at their request by the superintendent of schools,
is valid. ...
A contract with a school teacher by a person not
authorized may be ratified by those having authority
,
either expressly or by acts.^^
Other points of interest brought out in this case
^^Dennlson v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 100 Ma. 136
( 1905 )
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include the following: a, superintendent may hire teachers at
the request of the school committee since he is an instrument
of their official responsibility; a telegram contract is
valid; a school committee may ratify the employment of a
teacher, without a formal vote, by issuing payment of bills
presented for wages due; and in the absence of definite terms
in a contract, an offer of employment made in the middle of a
school year carries the inference that employment is for the
remainder of that year.
The second case, Michaud v. Inhabitants of St. Francis
.
- was settled in 1928 but is still frequently quoted as a land-
mark case in Maine on teacher employment. Briefly, the facts
of the case were as follows. A teacher by the name of Michaud
had been employed to teach in a school known as the Nadeau
school. She had taught in this school for two years, when in
June, 1926
,
at a regular meeting of the school committee, it
was urged by the Committee that Miss Michaud be transferred to
another school known as the Jones school at the beginning of
the fall term. The superintendent saw no good reason for the
transfer and refused to nominate Miss Michaud for a position
in the Jones school.
On August 23 , the date fixed for the beginning of the
fall term, two members of the school committee appeared at the
Nadeau school and instructed Miss Michaud to go to the Jones
^^Michaud v. Inhabitants of St. Francis , 127 Me. 255
( 1928 ).
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school cod promised her that she would be paid for her services.
Miss Michaud understood that this arrangement was in opposition
to the superintendent. s plans, and soon after she began teaching
was advised by the superintendent, by letter, that she had not
been nominated as a teacher for the Jones school.
Miss Michaud continued, however, to carry on the work
of the Jones school without interruption during the entire
school year. She was not paid for her services and thus
brought an action to recover her year's salary. The Court
found in favor of the defendant, the town of St. Francis, refused
to allow recovery of salary, and in its decision stated the
following;
. . . To constitute a legal employment of a public
school teacher, there must be a nomination by the super-intendent, an approval of the nomination by the school
committee, and an employment by the superintendent of
the teacher so nominated and approved.
The committee has no authority to employ teachers
and contracts of employment by it do not bind the town.
One teaching under contract with the committee cannot
recover from the town even though services were actually
rendered and the price charged was reasonable.
Persons working under the employment of town or city
officers must take note at their peril of the extent of
the authority of such officers.^^
The third and final case on employment was settled in *
193Q- A teacher by the name of Benson, without formal employ-
ment, had acted as principal of Newfield High School during
the school year 1935-36. On April 26, 1936, at a regular
school board meeting, he was reelected for the ensuing school
Ibid.
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year of 1936-37 at a salary of $1020. He was not formally
nomlnatad as principal nor. following approval of his nomina-
tion, formally employed by the superintendent as principal of
Newfield High School. The record shows, however, that he worked
at the school as principal until the Christmas vacation with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the superintendent, and that
during this time he received his salary checks regularly from
th.0 town treasur©!*.
On December 28, 1936, Mr. Benson received a letter from
the superintendent stating that the school committee had
decided to ask him to resign as principal of the high school.
This he refused to do and was henceforth dismissed by the
superintendent. This resulted in an action by the plaintiff,
Mr. Benson, to recover his salary for the remainder of the
contract. Once again it appears that the school committee,
disenchanted with the services of a teacher, attempted to
dismiss the teacher on the basis of illegal employment rather
than by the regular dismissal procedures.
In finding for the plaintiff, the Court found the
contract to be valid, the dismissal illegal, sind the contract
breached. The Court’s opinion reads in part:
... To constitute a legal employment of a teacher in
a school union, there must be nomination by the superin-
tendent an approval of the nomination by the committee,
and an ©n^jloyment by the superintendent of the teacher so
nominated and approved. The school committee has no
authority to employ a teacher.
After legal ©lection of the plaintiff, it was the duty
of the superintendent to employ the one elected and the
presumption obtained that he performed his duties as
required by law. ...
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the Totlt vesl^d ^^one f®
$awfSfl" and invest!^a?l^S:dismissed only for proven unfitness or forservices it deemed unprofitable to the school.
****.****••••••••#•.
It is not expected that boards of this kind nri-gi-eat formality nor that their recorda arl aa full andexplicit aathoae of a legialative body or a court; andit undoubtedly often happens that the selection ofteachers is made after a general discussion between thecommittee and the superintendent in which all reach an
^reement without
^ a^jToi^al nomination having been made
^_^e superintendent and without a formal
xmying been registered /by the committee (Italics mine
)
These three cases leave little doubt as to the proper
procedures to be followed in the employment of teachers. While
the procedure may be informal, even to the point of an oral
contract, or a telegram confirmation, or of no formal school
committee action, the employment of a teacher is valid by
subsequent acts of the school committee which may include
authorizing vouchers for their salary checks. The "employment'?
or actual job assignment of a teacher by the superintendent
is absolutely essential and the school committee may not usurp
this authority.
Contracts and tenure
. Maine teachers serve under one
of two types of contracts, the probationary, or the continuing'
contract. The statute reads in part as follows;
. . .He shall nominate all teachers, subject to such
regulations governing salaries and the qualifications of
teachers as the superintending school committee or school
directors shall make, and upon the approval of nominations
by said committee or directors, he may employ teachers so
nominated and approved for such terms as he may deem
22Benson v. Newfi eld, I36 Me. 23 » 1 A (2d) 227 (1938) •
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^
^ w J.J J.**, oU.UOf3UUt3llUyears, although the right to an extension for a longerperiod of time through a new contract is specifically
reserved to the contracting parties, ...
The right to terminate a contract, after due notice
of 90 days, is reserved to the superintending school
committee or school directors when changes in local
conditions warrant the elimination of the teaching
position for which the contract was made,^3
Probationary contracts are usually issued a year at
a time for the first three years of employment. A school com-
mittee is under no obligation to renew a probationary contract,
nor are they under any obligation to provide a hearing or
reasons for not renewing a probationary contract. It should
also be noted that a continuing contract may be awarded earlier
than the fourth contract. The statute requires only that the
probationary period not exceed three years.
to tenure, it is reasonably clear that the intent of the legis-
lature in providing continuing contracts is to make available
to the successful teacher a measure of security and protection
through continued employment. Tenure legislation varies in
the several states from that which provides merely that the
teacher’s contract shall continue from year to year unless the
teacher is notified within a specified time that it will not
While the statute quoted above contains no reference
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (I96I4.), Title 20 ,
0.
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be renewed, to more elaborate systems which provide that after
a stated probationary period the employment becomes permanent,
allowing dismissal only for stated specific causes. The pro-
bationary period varies from one year in some states to five
years in others. During the probationary period, the teacher
may be dismissed at the end of the year for any or no reason,
but once his tenure has become permanent he may be dismissed
only for causes stated in the law. Thus, there is a distinct
difference between failure to renew a contract and the breaking
of a contract or dismissal.
The tenure status of Maine teachers is not entirely
clear under the continuing contract. Another section of the
statute on contracts cited earlier reads as follows:
. . . After a probationary period of 3 years, any
teacher who receives notice in accordance with this
section that his contract is not going to be renewed,
may during the 15 days following such notification re-
quest a hearing with the school committee or governing
board. He may request reasons. The hearing shall be
private except by mutual consent and except that either
or both parties may be represented by counsel. Such
hearing must be granted within 30 days of the receipt
of the teacher's request.^h
This section of the statute has not been interpreted by the
courts, except for the "l5-day” clause. In a case decided so
recently that it is not included in the latest Maine Report,
the Supreme Judicial Court held unanimously that the dismissal
of a teacher serving under a continuing contract was not invalid
because the school superintendent and school committee failed
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to explain adequately the failure to renew her contract. While
the teacher had asked for “an explanation” following the notice,
she failed to request a hearing within the 15-day period specified
in the statute. In its ruling the Court noted that:
• • • [T]he superintendent did not answer the requestfor an explanation, but the failure to give desired in-formation has no bearing upon the fact that at no time
within the statutory 15-day period from the Feb. 3 noticedid Mrs. Beckwith request a hearing, 25
The Court also pointed out that the statute does not provide
that dismissed teachers be notified of their rights to hearing
or ri^ts to request reasons for the dismissal before a hearing.
And it added:
There was thus no failure on the part of the school
authorities to advise Mrs. Beckwith of her rights under
the statute. She must be held to have knowledge of the
statutory requirements and she must suffer such loss as
may have risen from her failure to comply with the plain
terms laid down by the legislature.
Except for the "changing conditions" clause cited
earlier, the reasons for which a teacher's continuing contract
may be terminated have never been defined. There is consider-
able confusion between this section of the law and the dis-
missal statute which will be discussed later.
A case to reach the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in
1941 upheld the validity of an oral contract. In Elsemore
27
V. Hancock
,
a teacher was contracted orally by the
^^Portland Evening Express , June I8 , 1968, p. 1.
Elsemore v. Inhabitants of Town of Hancock , 137 Me.
2k3 (191A).
205
superintendent to teach at Hancock High School during the school
year of 1939-40. His employment was ratified by a meeting of
the school committee on May 3 , 1939. During the summer of
1939, however, the town of Hancock, at a special town meeting,
voted to close the high school. Following this action, the
school committee voted to terminate the contract of the teacher,
a Mr. Elsemore. The teacher brought an action to recover his
salary in the amount of $775 for breach of contract. The
defendant town of Hancock argued that the teacher did not hold
a valid contract since the teacher was employed without a
written contract; was employed at a school committee meeting
which one of the three members was not present; and
that the town of Hancock terminated its liability under the
contract by its vote to close the school.
In finding for the teacher the Court held that the
affirmative vote by the two members of the school committee
present constituted a legal employment; and that the abolish-
ment of a school did not negate the contract of a teacher
employed to teach it. Evidently the school committee had failed
to give Mr. Elsemore the 90-day notice of elimination of his
teaching position. On this point Justice Murchis said in part:
The continuing supremacy of the State
,
if exerted for
the common good and welfare, can modify the contract . . .
but in the case of a teacher losing his contract because
of the closing of the school, there is no implied
limitations of the contract, therefor the town does not
terminate its liability.
Where the contract is to do acts which can be performed,
nothing but the act of God or of a public enemy or the
interdiction of the law as a direct and sole cause of the
pQ
failure will excuse the performance. ®
Several Attorney General opinions have been rendered
pertaining to contracts or tenure which are pertinent to the
present discussion. In 1961 it was held that the matter of
contracts between teachers and superintending school committees
for employment is a local question and the communities involved
may determine the dates at which the contracts will begin and
terminate. It was held in 1951 that part of a probationary
period served in one municipality will not serve as part of
30
the probationary period required by another municipality.
Also in 1951 it was held that when a probationary period is
required as a prerequisite to permanent employment, inter-
ruption of that probationary period nullifies any benefits
secured prior to the interruption.
Newly organized school administrative districts are
obligated to honor contracts between member towns and teachers
which are in effect at the time of the merger. Thus, teachers
serving on a continuing contract in a local district are
entitled to the same status in a reorganized school admin- ^
istrative district. The pertinent statute reads in
part as
follows:
^^ Ibid .
^^Attorney General Report (1961), p. lOlj..
^^Attorney General Report (1951) > P* ^7.
^^Ibid. , p. 58*
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School Administrative District
uL^^%hTdis1^?ct^^aSd°:K
the^d^tffo
Of course this would not hold in the case of a position being
eliminated as a result of the merger. It should be noted that
this protection for teachers does not apply in the formation
of school community districts.
The law is silent on the matter of teachers' terminating
contracts. Of course a contract can always be terminated by
mutual consent of both parties. The matter of a teacher re-
signing before the end of the contract period has never been
brought before the Maine courts. In the absence of a specific
clause in the contract to the contrary, common law practice
would suggest that a teacher may terminate a contract upon a
written notice of thirty days. The standard contract form
recommended by the Maine Teachers Association and widely used
throughout the state, prohibits a resignation, except by mutual
consent, during the months of July, August, and September.
Dismissal
. The subject of dismissal of teachers
occupies a prominent place in the literature. That monumental
study by Edwards, referred to several times in this study,
devotes some thirty pages to the topic. Court cases on dis-
missal are plentiful in jurisdictions all over the country.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (19614.), c. 9,
sec. 22l\.,
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A school committee may dismiss a teacher for such causes
and in such manner as is prescribed by statute. It is a well-
established rule, of which teachers should be cognizant, that
all pertinent provisions of the statutes are, by implication,
read into contracts of employment. Thus, it was said by
Justice Harris, speaking for the Supreme Court in Oregon:
The contract of teaching is made with reference to
the provisions of the statute, so that the contractual
obligations of the teacher are not necessarily limited to
the words found in the written contract, and therefore
the contract of teaching includes not only the duties
enumerated by the written paper, which for convenience
is called the contract, but it also embraces those duties
which are imposed under a then-existing statute; and if
the teacher breaches this contract of teaching, one of
the ordinary legal remedies available to the school
board, unless some statute declares to the contrary,
would be found in the right summarily to discharge the
teacher. 33
The Maine statute on dismissal is remarkable for its
simplicity. It is found under the duties of school committees
and reads as follows:
After investigation, due notice of hearing, and
hearing thereon, they shall dismiss any teacher although
having the requisite certificate, who proves unfit to
teach or whose services they deem unprofitable to the
school; and give to said teacher a certificate of dis-
missal and of the reasons therefor, a copy of which they
shall retain. Such dismissal shall not deprive, the
teacher of compensation for previous services.
It should be emphasized here that the teacher serving under a
probationary contract, while having no remedy for fail\ire of a
33poreman v. School District No. 25 * 81 Ore. 587 » 159
Pac. 1155»
^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated ( 1964.), c. 15»
sec, 4-73» par* 4*
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school committee to renew his contract, is protected from breach
of contract or ^smissal during the term of the contract, at
least to the extent of a hearing and a certificate of dismissal
stating the reasons therefor.
As would be expected, controversies over the dismissal
statute have centered around two points
,
the mechanics or pro-
cedure of dismissal, and interpretation of the phrases "unfit
to teach" and "services deemed unprofitable to the school,"
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has heard two cases, one
involving procedure and the other interpretation of the
language, Althou^ both cases were settled many years ago
they are landmark cases for Maine and are still useful as guide-
lines.
In the first case a schoolmaster by the name of Farwell
was contracted to teach school in Searsmont for a period of
three months. After two months on the job, he was discharged
by the school committee after the committee received a petition
from the inhabitants alleging that for want of natural abilities
he was not qualified to teach in their school. No notice of
discharge was given nor was a hearing held,
Mr, Parwell continued, however, to instruct the school
for another month and brought an action to recover his wages.
The plaintiff argued that his contract had been breached and
that the dismissal was illegal since the order of discharge
given by the committee did not contain any express adjudication
respecting the fitness or unfitness of the instructor, nor was
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any hearing held. The defendant claimed, on the other hand, that
the oommittoe was not bound to render any reasons for the dis-
missal of a schoolmaster, the law having made the contract sub-
ject to their discretion. They argued that an instructor is
continually under a course of trial, and the committee may
adjudicate whenever they are satisfied, without a more formal
notice or hearing.
The attorney for the plaintiff countered with the
argument that it was as important to the community that school-
masters be protected from unfounded popular caprice and dis-
affection, as that none but fit teachers be employed and that
the powers granted to school committees should be interpreted
as all other limited powers, and like them, to be strictly
pursued. The committee might, he said, upon proper application,
summon the party before them, and after due hearing and examina-
tion, might for good cause dismiss him but this they failed to
do.
The Court decided in favor of the schoolmaster. While
the facts of the case suggest that there was sufficient evidence
upon which to dismiss the master legally, the school committee
failed to follow the proper procedure as prescribed by law.
Excerpts from the opinion follow;
. , , The third section of the law, provides that
"Said committee shall have power to dismiss any school-
master or mistress, who shall be found incapable, or
unfit to teach any school, not withstanding their
having procured the requisite certificates." This, being
an authority given to those who represent one party only,
to vacate a contract,' must in our opinion be strictly
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pursued according to the provisions of the act, to have
that effort. The superintending committee, not binding
or assigning the reasons, which by the act would authorize
them to discharge the master, he cannot therefore be con-
sidered as having been discharged, by any adequate or
competent authority. 35
The other case to reach Maine's highest court was
Hopkins v. Bucksport in 1920,^^ In this case the Court was
called upon to interpret the meaning and legislative intent
of the clauses "unfit to teach," and "services deemed unprofit-
able to the school."
Lucinia Hopkins, a teacher of seventeen years experience,
was duly employed to teach a school in Bucksport for the school
year beginning in September, 1918. At a meeting of the School
Committee of Bucksport on September 16, 1918, Mrs. Hopkins was
dismissed from her job as her services in the judgement of the
Committee would "bo unprofitable to said school on account of
her admitted associations with a German Alien Enemy of the
United States of America, under suspicion and under investiga-
37
tion at this time by the Government." Mrs. Hopkins had been
given due notice of the mooting to consider her dismissal but
had not been provided with any reasons for such action prior
to the meeting. Mrs. Hopkins did not attend the meeting. Her
dismissal resulted in an action brought by Mrs. Hopkins to
^^Inhabitants of Searsmont v. Farwell , 3 Me. kSO (1825)*
^^Hopkins v. Inhabitants of Bucksport , 119 Me. f
111 A. 734 (ftiTTy.
37 Ibid.
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recover her salary for the 1918-19 school year because of a
wrongful discharge or breach of contract.
It appears from the testimony that in the summer of
1918 Mrs. Hopkins purchased an automobile to enable her to
teach in Bucksport, and to return to her home in Verona each
night on account of her mother's illness. Her husband had
secured the services of a Mr. Margraf to teach her to drive the
automobile. Mr. Margraf was a German alien. He was also a
summer neighbor of the Hopkins whom they had known for several
years.
It does not appear from the record that any complaint
against or criticism of Mrs. Hopkins had been lodged with the
Committee, nor does it appear that Mr. Margraf was in fact a
German alien enemy under investigation by the Government or that
the Committee had any evidence to that effect.
Judgement was found in favor of Mrs. Hopkins and she
was awarded her year's salary. Among the findings of the
Court were the following:
. . . The authority given by statute to a superin-
tending school committee to vacate a contract, being an
authority given to those who represent one party only,
must be strictly pursued according to the statutes to
have that effect.
The statute in question authorizes the dismissal of
a teacher upon two grounds: Unfitness to teach, and
failure of practical success in the work of the school
rendering the teachers services unprofitable to the
school; the first may be apparent either before or after
the work of the school has begun ; but failure of practicaj.
Access in the work of the school can only pecome apparei^
after the work has actually beguiT
It is evident that these causes may run into each
other; yet they are substantially distinct . Unfitness to
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teach, including in that term moral and tenmermentnl
a l^k of“educational Waihin^«nrl
abr^J^, may be apparent either before or after I'he actualwork of the school has begun; but failure of practical
success in the work of the school can only be apparent
after the work has begun.
The action of the committee in this case cannot be
sustained. The fitness of the plaintiff to teach the
school is conceded; she should have had the opportunity
to show practical success in the school work.
> the action of the committee can only be
taken ’’after due notice and investigation,” The statementin the record before the court is insufficient as notice to
the plaintiff of the object of the meeting at which action
was taken dismissing her.
The clause, ”or whose services they deem unprofitable
to the school” is first found on the R.S. of l8ij.l in the
form ”or whose services are believed by them to be un-
profitable to the school.” This cause of dismissal was
evidently introduced into the statute to cover cases fre-
quently arising where from some cause it is apparent,
after the school has begun that the teachers usefulness has
become impaired, and that the good of the school requires
dismissal. Such action can only bo justified as for the
good of the school and can only be taken after notice and
’’candid” investigation.
The notice to Mrs. Hopkins of the object of the meeting
was wholly insufficient; from it she could not know what
reason her dismissal was sought
,
whether upon the grounds
of moral unfitness
,
tempermental unfitness, or lack of
educational qualification; much less whether it was sought
on the ground that her services were deemed unprofitable
to the school. She was entitled to know in advance on what
f
round her dismissal was sought . This, she did not have. 38
Italics mine)
A much more recent case was settled in a Superior Court
action on a teacher dismissal case in 1962. While not binding
on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the case is significant
because the findings show that the judicial interpretation of
the dismissal statute has not changed since the first case in
1825.
3®Ibid.
21k
In Richard Mainente v. Inhabitants of Mechanic f»iVc , 39
a complaint was heard by the Court in which a teacher sought to
recover the balance due him under a teaching contract for the
school year of 1963-6i^ as a result of an alleged illegal dis-
missal. Mr. Mainente received a letter from the superintendent
of schools dated January 27, I96I4.. Excerpts from this letter ‘
which were entered into the court record follow:
. . « The Mechanic Palls School Committee at its last
meeting on January 2^th, voted to notify you that after
careful consideration and~ihvestlgation of the facts
concerning your teaching that they feel that it would
be in the best interest of the students, the school, and
yourself if you were released from your teaching position
as of the February vacation. This letter would serve as
an official notice that as of 30'days from today, which
would be February 2?th, that you would be released ,
unless conditions changed to such an extent that a re-
consideration could be possible. From all indications
it would be very unlikely that conditions could change
enough to make such a reconsideration possible.
In all we regret that it is necessary to have to
notify you of this decision
, but it is felt by all that
it would be in the test interest of all if a change could
be made at the time of the February vacation.
If you wish to meet with the board to go over their
decision
,
I'm sure they would be glad to meet with you
during their next meeting or at a special meeting.
(Italics mine)
In delivering the verdict for the teacher, Superior
Court Justice Marden said, in part:
. . . The law in Maine having to do with the dismissal
of a teacher is embodied in the statute cited and three
litigated cases, two under former statutes and one under
the statute in its present form. The cases are:
Searsmont v. Farwell
, 3 Maine kSO; Hopkins v. Bucksport ,
^^ In the matter of Richard Mainente v. Inhabitants of
Mechanic Falls , Androscoggin County, MaineV Superior Court,
June Term, 1962.
^Qlbid .
215
119 Maine 437: and Benaon v. Newfleld
. 136 Maine 23.
cases hold that the authority of asuperintending school committee to vacate a contractbeing an authority given to those who represent oneparty only, must be strictly pursued according to theprovisions of the statute."
io\
statute requires: (1) due notice to the teacher:
J?''^®f^^Sation by the superintending school committee;(3) finding based upon sufficient evidence that, a) theteacher is "unfit," or b) that the teacher's services aredeemed unprofitable to the school; and (1^.) giving to theteacher a certificate of dismissal and of the reasonstherefor.
It is determined that there was valid cause for thetermination of this contract.
While a superintending school committee may not be
expected to follow the terms of a statute with the tech-
nical niceties which are expected from a legal tribunal,
we cannot, within the circumscription of the cases cited,hold that the action of the committee of the defendant
in: (1) dismissing the plaintiff; (2) giving notice of
the dismissal for reasons not specifically identified
with the statutory causes; (3) investigating; and (I4.) giving
the plaintiff a hearing, in that order, complied with the
statute.
As in the Searsmont case, it appears from the facts presented
that there might have been valid reasons for dismissal but
once again the committee failed to adhere strictly to the pro-
visions of the statute in terms of procedure.
Compensation . The authority of a school committee to
set and regulate salaries for teachers is found in Chapter 7»
section 161, paragraph 5 as follows:
He shall nominate all teachers subject to such regula-
tions governing salaries and the qualifications of teachers
as the superintending school committee or school directors
shall make.^
^^ Ibid .
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (196i|.), c. 7»
sec. 161, par. 5 *
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This authority, of course, must conform to other pertinent
statutes on compensation. There are two such laws, one
regulating minimum salaries and the other ensuring equal pay
for men and women holding comparable positions. The first
reads in part as follows:
Each administrative unit operating public schools
within the State shall employ only certified teachers and
after July 1, 1966 shall pay such teachers, except sub-
stitute teachers as defined by the commissioner, the
minimum salaries as follows.
Figures are not here quoted since they were revised by the 103rd
Legislature to become effective in September, 1968.^ The
latest minimum starting salary with a bachelor's degree and no
experience is $5>000. The second statute reads as follows:
In assigning salaries to teachers of public schools in
the State, no discrimination shall be made between male and
female teachers, with the same training and experience,
employed^in the same grade or performing the same kinds of
duties
Except for a few very early cases under the old school
district system when schdol agents established the salaries,
none have reached the courts where compensation was the prin-
cipal point of contention. It would appear that local admin-
istrative units have been able to resolve their own salary con-
flicts with the aid of an occasional opinion from the Attorney
General's office. Those opinions include the following:
^
^Ibid
. ,
c. 209, sec. 1901.
^Nickerson, op. cit ., 17.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes (1954)* sec. 238.
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'(1) No discrimination shall be made between male andfemale teachers of public schools who have the sametraining, experience, and duties. Specific questions
relative to grading, academic load, etc. are admin-istrative problems and can be answered more easilyby local officials, giving common, every-day meaningsto the words used in the law."4o ^
(2) All certified teachers, whether regularly employed bythe superintending school committee on nomination by
the superintendent or working on a substitute basis,but possessing the required certificate, are entitled
to be paid the minimum salaries prescribed."^'
"(3) The superintending school committee has no right to
make a reduction in the salary paid to a teacher who
does not receive notice of termination of contract or
a new contract.
”(^4-) Rblative to the minimum salary law, service teaching
in private schools such as Westbrook Junior College
counts as years of teaching experience. "49
An interesting question, which remains unanswered at
this time, is the legality of a contract executed between a
teacher and a school administrative unit containing a raise for
the ensuing year, prior to formal approval of the new school
budget by the voters of the district.
Retirement . All teachers in the Maine public schools
are required to be members of the Maine State Retirement System.
Five and three quarter percent is deducted from their salaries;
5 percent toward Member Contribution Fund, I/I4. percent toward
the Survivor Benefit Fund, and 1/2 percent toward the Retire-
ment Annuity Adjustment Fund. This last is the provision that
^^Attorney General Report (19^2), p. 120.
^^Attorney General Report (19^1), p. 2?5»
^^Attorney General Report ( 1957 ) » P • 69
.
^^Attorney General Report (195il-)> P*
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enables retirees to receive increases whenever the state
employees receive pay raises. The state contributes about
$8-1/2 million annually toward the Retirement System, which
includes state employees as well as teachers.
Members are eligible for retirement on attaining age 60
or after 30 years of service (at a reduced rate) regardless of
age, and must retire on attaining age 70, except that on request
of the Governor, with the approval of the Council, the Board of
Trustees of the Retirement System may permit employment past
age 70 , The maximum pension may bo attained after 35 years of
service and is an annual stipend which amounts to 50 percent
of the "average final compensation." This is defined as the
average salary for the highest five years which do not neces-
sarily have to be consecutive.
Additional rules and regulations as well as the optional
plans are described in detail in a handbook published by the
51
Maine State Retirement System, and need not here be enumerated.
There are no court cases of record concerning retirement. The
Attorney General's office has, from time to time, been asked
to clarify certain points in the regulations. A summary of
these opinions follows;
"(1) Local school committees do not have the authority'
^^Maine Teachers Association, Handbook for Maine Teachers
(Augusta: The Association, 1967 )> P»
^^Maine State Retirement System, Informational Handbook
for Employees of the State of Maine (Augusta; Maine State
Retirement System, 19b2}.
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to establish a regulation making teacher retire-
ment compulsory prior to age 70 . "52
"(2) Teachers reaching their seventieth birthday during
the school year may be permitted to continue
teaching until the end of the year with special
permission. "53
"(3) A teacher retiring without the full thirty years
of credit may make up time for full credit by
substituting a day or two at a time. "5^
”(i^) Teaching at the Maine School for the Deaf counts
as creditable service. "55
"(5) Substitute teaching after retirement on a part-
time basis will not impair pension payments. "56
In connection with the last opinion cited it should be noted
that there is a limitation on the amount of substitute work that
a retired teacher may perform. The annual salary earned as a
substitute plus the amount of the pension may not exceed the
five-year average used as a basis for computing the pension.
Collective Bargaining
Introduction . Collective bargaining, or collective
negotiations, or professional negotiations in the field of
education are all synonymous terms and used interchangeably
by various groups. The legal right of teachers to bargain
collectively with their employers is becoming more common in
^^Attomey General Report (1964), p. Il8.
General Report (1963)> P« 147*
^
^Attorney General Report ( 1945 ) » P • ^38
•
^
^Attorney General Report ( 195^ ) > P • 318
.
^^Attorney General Report ( 1945 )
»
P • 129
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the various states. Legislation on the subject was introduced
in fifteen legislatures and enacted in at least seven in 1965.^’^
Although there is not yet any legislation in Maine on the sub-
ject, a bill was introduced in the special session of the 103rd
Legislature. This bill was not passed but another one is being
prepared for consideration by the 10l4.th legislative session. The
latest' handbook of the Maine Teachers Association includes the
following comment:
... Probably the biggest movement in education in
Maine is in the area of professional negotiations. Local
associations are seeking written agreements with their
school boards so that the association will be officially
recognized as the bargaining agent for the teachers,
specific guidelines for negotiations will be established,
and provisions will be made in the event that an impasse
occurs.
A recent publication from the Association cited the
fact that as of that date, there wore fifteen negotiating
agreements between school committees and teacher organizations
in force and some forty more in process of development.^^
The advent of collective bargaining in the field of
education is too new for any clear-cut guidelines to have been
established. As stated by Edwards, the law governing the
authority of school boards to negotiate with teachers' unions
^*^Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective
Negotiations for Teachers (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1966), p. 21.
^^Maine Teachers Association,
-
op. cit ., p. 22.
^^”Sanctions in Portland,’’ MTA Newsletter, Dec, 18,
1967, p. 1.
^^Edwards, op. cit ., p. 1|.73*
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is still in the process of development. In the absence of any
statutes or litigation on the subject in Maine, educators are
forced to turn to other jurisdictions for guidelines. This
final section will, therefore, briefly consider the current
status of collective bargaining in other states.
Teacher strikes
. The strike is one of the most con-
troversial and the moat widely publicized source of teacher
bargaining power. The courts are in agreement that teacher
strikes are illegal even in the absence of specific legisla-
tion. Teacher strikes were prohibited by law in at least
fifteen states as of 1965.^^ In addition, six state courts
have ruled that teacher strikes are illegal even in the absence
of legislation. In the opinion of a noted writer on the subject,
'
"It is likely but not certain that other state supreme courts
would also rule teacher strikes to be illegal if they were
62
• called upon to resolve the issue.”
I
In labor organizations generally, the right of employees
to strike is deemed an incident of the right to organize. How-
ever, the right of teachers to organize, as in the case of other
public employees, does not necessarily carry all the benefits
,
and privileges possessed by members of unions of nonpublic
L employees. Perhaps the most important difference in the rights
' of members of organizations of public and nonpublic labor
organizations is the right to strike.
^^Lieberman, op. oit ., p. 289.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 290.
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It is well established that the members of labor unions
generally may strike in order to enforce their demands. This
rule is not applicable to unions of public employees, including
teachers. In a leading case on the point it was held that
teachers may not strike. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
stated that it should be the aim of every employee of the
government to do his or her part to make the government function
as efficiently and economically as possible. The drastic remedy
of the organized strike to enforce the demands of unions of
government employees was, in the opinion of the court, in
direct intervention of this principle. The main basis for
this rule is the absence of the profit motive on the part of
the public employer and the necessity that there be no inter-
ruption in the operation of public functions because of the
serious consequences which would ensue if they were interrupted.
Thus the right of the public to have its children taught takes
its place beside the public right to fire and police protection,
the right that courts shall continue to function, and other
similar rights. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has reached
6 I4.
the same conclusion.
While most persons assume that strikes by teachers are
illegal, there is some precedent for a different point
of view
and the issue is by no means settled. According to
a state
^3yfoyy,alk Teachers* Association v. Board of Education,
138 Conn. 269, b3 A. 2d 4b2 (19^1)^
^^r.lty of Manchester v. Manchest
er Teachers Ouil^d,
100 N.H. 507 , 131 A. 2d ii9Tl9577^
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district court in Minnesota, the view that public employees
cannot strike is:
. .
.
[T]o indulge in the expression of a personal
belief and then ascribe to it a legality on some tenuous
theory of sovereignty or supremacy of government.
. . .
The right to strike is rooted in the freedom of man, and
he may not be denied that right except by clear, un-
equivocal language embodied ih^a constitution, statute,
ordinance, rule, or contract.
The decision in this case was upheld by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1951*^^
Despite the fact that there are many states which have
passed legislation prohibiting strikes, teachers are continuing
to strike in widely scattered sections of the country, including
those jurisdictions with anti-strike laws. In some situations
such laws actually encourage strikes. Penalties may be so
severe that public officials are afraid to impose them. The
New York City teacher strike in I960 was settled in part on the
67
stipulation that there be no reprisals against striking teachers.
68
A recent release from the Associated Press reported on strikes
in Washington, D.C., Florida, Pittsburgh, Pa., and Waterbury,
Connecticut. It also noted that the teachers in the City of
Chicago had voted to strike unless certain demands were met.
In the Waterbury strike, the Superior Court has ordered the
^^Lieberman, op . cit . , p. 298.
Board of Education v. Public School Employees Union ,
N.W. (2d) 797 (i95l)".
67
'Lieberman, op. cit ., p. 1|.0.
^^Portland Evening Express, April 3, 1968, p. 1.
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teachers to justify their strike action. This may imply that
strikes are legal if they can be justified by the teachers.
At the moment, the weight of legal authority appears to
be that teacher strikes are illegal with or without anti-strike
laws. This principle may be undergoing a change, however, and
only future decisions will establish more definite guidelines.
Right to organize
. The right of teachers to organize
as a group or union for purposes of engaging in collective
bargaining has generally been upheld by the courts when no
threat of strike is present. Thus in the Norwalk case cited
earlier, the court was asked to give an opinion on this
question, "Is it permitted to the plaintiff under our laws to
organize itself as a labor union for the purpose of demanding
and receiving recognition and collective bargaining?" The
court's answer, in part:
> The statutes and private acts give broad powers to
the defendant with reference to educational matters and
school management in Norwalk. If it chooses to negotiate
with the plaintiff with regard to the employment, salaries,
grievance procedure and working conditions of its members,
there is no statute, public or private, which forbids such
negotiations. . . .
If the strike threat is absent and the defendant pre-
fers to handle the matter througih negotiations with the
plaintiff, no reason exists why it should not do so.°^
Sanctions . Sanctions constitute another means which
teachers use to enhance their bargaining power. In 1962,
the NEA's Representative Assembly authorized the use of
sanctions and defined them as ’’appropriate disciplinary action
^^Norwalk Teachers' Association v.. Board of Education ,
138 Conn. 56^,' By A. 2d
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by the organized profession.
Various types of sanctions can be applied by local,
state, or national associations. Sanctions applied by local
associations include statements of censure, withholding of
contracts during negotiations) and avoidance of extracurricular
activities. Sanctions applied by state associations may include
public statements of censure, including statements that con-
ditions in a school district are unsatisfactory; withdrawal
of placement services; requests that teachers not accept
employment in a system; and legal action to compel improvements
or equitable procedures.
Sanctions have been used in different ways around the
country since they were formally authorized in 1962. They
have been used on a statewide basis in Utah and Oklahoma.
On a local level, sanctions have been used in such diverse
school districts as Little Lake, California; Waterbury,
Connecticut; Dade County, Florida; Asbury Park, New Jersey;
71
and Stratford, Connecticut.'
Sanctions have been imposed by the Maine Teachers
Association in Maine’s two largest cities, Lewiston and Port-
land. In Portland, sanctions have been imposed twice within
the last two years. Because of the implications for the rest
of the state, this local situation will bo reviewed in the
"^^National Commission on Professional Rules and Respon-
sibilities, Guidelines for Professional Sanctions (Washington,
D.C.: National Education Association, 1963), p. 9.
71
' Lieberman, op« cit ., p. 30^4- •.
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final section of this chapter.
Another form of sanctions is the withholding of salary
agreements. Public school teachers holding continuing con-
tracts
» such as Connecticut and Maine teachers^ after a pro-
bationary period, receive an annual salary agreement form or
notice which is entirely separate from the continuing contract.
Thus, teachers can refuse to sign the annual salary agreement
without Jeopardizing their employment status. They simply
serve notice that the teacher considers himself under contract
to teach in the district, but is not signing the annual salary
agreement because the salary terms offered by the board are
unsatisfactory. This technique was utilized in the first
Portland sanction two years ago.
The legality of the sanction has yet to be tested in
the courts. Also the right of a teachers' union to negotiate
under the threat of sanction, or during a sanction has no
legal precedent. At least one state official thinks this is not
the point. The executive secretary of the New Jersey Education
Association expressed his views at a recent conference as
follows
:
Legality may not be the crucial issue. The argument
that an extreme sanction is legal while a strike is not is
not impressive. Both involve the withdrawal of service,
and in both the children miss certain expected schooling.
The extreme sanction--the resignation of teachers and
blackballing of the district—even though it may be legal,
can have a far more devastating effect upon children than
the typical brief teacher strike. In ray book any work
stoppage, legal or illegal, is a strike, A strike is a
sanction and an extreme sanction is a strike.
72 Ibid.
, p. 306.
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Negotiation agreements
. The legal authority of a
school committee to enter into a negotiation agreement with a
teachers' organization, without state legislation is not
clearly established. What little authority there is at the
present time suggests that the practice is legal if no threat
of strike is present and the items to bo negotiated are proper
ones, i.e., items which the school committee may properly
delegate to a third party. It is the latter question which
has raised considerable question and disagreement. The
definition of items which are negotiable will undoubtedly
need to be defined by the various state courts in keeping
with existing statutes.
The Norwalk case paved the way for negotiation agree-
ments. Justice Jennings expressed the court's opinion on the
subject in the following manner:
. . . The statutes and private acts give broad powers
to the defendant with reference to educational matters
and school management in Norwalk. If it chooses to
negotiate with the plaintiff with regard to the employment,
salaries, grievance procedure and working conditions of its
members, there is no statute, public or private, which
forbids such negotiations. It is a matter of common
knowledge that this is the method pursued in most school
systems large enough to support a teachers' association
in some form. It would seem to make no difference
theoretically whether the negotiations are with a committee
of the whole association or with individuals or small
related groups, so long as any agreement made with the
CO imittee is confined to members of the association. If
the strike threat is absent and the defendant prefers to
handle the matter through negotiations with the plaintiff,
no reason exists why it should not do so.
The claim of the defendant that this would be an
illegal delegation of authority is without merit. The
authority is and remains in the board.
73Norwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Education ,
138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951)
•
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A key point concerning negotiations agreements is that
of whether the school committee may terminate the agreement at
will. Another is whether or not an agreement is considered to
be a legal contract. As of 1965 » no court has declared a
collective agreement terminable at will by a public agency to
be illegal. Whatever their form and regardless of their con-
tractual status, collective agreements in education are becoming
more common.
Existing legislation differs markedly in the scope of
negotiable items included. Some statutes include only salaries
and other conditions of employment while others include educa-
tional objectives, content of courses and curricula, selection
of textbooks, in-service training, hiring and assignment prac-
tices, salary schedules and noninstructional duties.'^
Of particular interest to Maine educators mi^t be the
provisions of the recently enacted legislation in Massachusetts
on the subject. The Massachusetts statute was originally
sponsored by the Massachusetts affiliate of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFL-CIO),
not the American Federation of Teachers. After affecting
some
changes in the proposed bill, the Massachusetts
Teachers Asso-
ciation joined with the AFSCME as a co-sponsor. The bill,
which
applies to all public employees, including
teachers, was signed
76
into law in November , 1965*
^^Lieberman, op. cit ., p. 328.
^Ibl^. , pp . W -4^9
.
^^Ibid., p. 49*
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The statute guarantees employees the right to join
organizations and to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours and
other conditions of employment and to engage in other con-
certed activities. Strikes are prohibited, but fact-finding
with preliminary investigations by the state board of con-
I
ciliation and arbitration is provided.
I The State Labor Relations Commission is authorized to
conduct representation elections, to select exclusive bargaining
j
agents, to determine appropriate units of representation, and
I
to enforce the prohibited practices section of the statutes.
I
ii
Employer practices which are prohibited include; interfering
I with the rights of employees; dominating or interfering with
|!
the formation, existence or administration of any employee
Ii
If
I
organization; and refusing to bargain in good faith. Employee
I
organizations are prohibited from restraining or coercing a
municipal employer in the selection of its representative for
I
,! purposes of collective bargaining, and refusing to bargain
Ii
in good faith.
!| The State Labor Relations Commission is given the
power to issue orders requiring the parties to cease and
desist from the practices prohibited by statute. The Com-
mission is further authorized to impose penalties such as with-
I
drawing certification of an employee organization, ordering
reinstatement with or without back pay of a discharged employee,
I
I
' or directing either party to pay the entire costs of
i
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fact-finding.
The most difficult problem in drafting negotiation
agreements is now, and will continue to be, that of defining
working conditions." Does class size, selection of text-
books, free lunch time, qualifications for personnel, in-
service training, hiring and assignment practices, etc., con-
stitute working conditions or are these administrative matters
which cannot be negotiated even if the employer is willing to
negotiate such items? These are questions which will eventually
have to be decided by the courts.
Crisis in Portland
. As stated earlier, Maine has no
legislation on the subject of collective bargaining for teachers
nor has there been any litigation as yet. The City of
Portland, however, representing Maine's largest school district
with over 600 teachers, has had its problems in this area in
the past two or three years and they are not as yet resolved.
Recent events in Portland, while not necessarily providing
definitive guidelines for other Maine school districts, are
worth reporting in this study since they are current and, if
nothing more, may suggest procedures for both teachers and
employers which will prevent similar stalemates in future
negotiatipns.
Difficulties between the Portland Teachers Association,
an affiliate of the Maine Teachers Association, and the Portland
School Committee reached an impasse in 1965. The major
^^Por the full text of the agreement see Appendix E.
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disagreement was over a salary increase although the teachers
had other grievances concerning class size, employment pro-
cedures and curriculum concerns. The refusal of the school
committee to adopt the salary schedule recommended by the PTA
resulted in sanctions being imposed on the school system for
a period of about two months. This local sanction was sup-
ported by the Maine Teachers Association.
One of the conditions insisted upon by the teachers for
lift of the sanction was an opportunity to enter into collective
bargaining with the school committee. This was eventually agreed
upon, the sanction was lifted, and representatives of the
Portland Teachers Association and the Portland School Com-
mittee went to work in drafting an agreement.
In October, 1966, after many months of work, a
negotiations agreement, acceptable to both parties, and their
lawyers, was signed. With optimism on both sides, it was
heralded as the beginning of a new era in public relations and
in cooperation between the school board and teachers in Maine's
largest public school system.
Key points of the agreement include the following:
"(1) The Portland School Committee recognizes the Portland
Teachers Association as the exclusive representative
of a majority of the certified personnel of this city.
”(2) The Portland Teachers Association recognizes the
Portland School Committee as the elected representative
of the people of Portland, Maine, and as the employer
of the certified personnel of the Portland Public
Schools.
"(3) The Portland Teachers Association agrees that much of
the preliminary work involved .in negotiations or all
232
of the discussion in a specific area requiring
mutual understanding or agreement can be conductedbetween the Superintendent of Schools and repre-
sentatives of the Portland Teachers Association.
"( 4 ) The Portland Superintending School Committee
recognizes the Portland Teachers Association for thepurpose of negotiating proposals concerning standardsfor employing personnel, community support for the
school system, in-service training of personnel,
curriculum concerns, class size, teacher turnover,
personnel policies, grievance procedures, working
conditions, communication with the school system,
contracts and other items of concern to the extent
it is administrative or otherwise feasible.
”( 5 ) Failing agreement between the Portland School Committee
and the Negotiating Committee of the Portland Teachers
Association, an impasse will be recognized.
"(6) In the event that any matter being jointly considered
by the two parties is not settled in a mutually
satisfactory manner by the means provided by this
agreement, either party may request the assistance
and advice of a Board of Review.
”(7) The Board of Review shall meet with the School Com-
mittee and the Portland Teachers Association, make
inquiries and investigations, hold hearings and take
such steps as it deems appropriate. It shall, within
twenty days after the Board of Review holds its first
hearing, make findings of fact and recommend terms of
agreement. These findings and recommendations are
to be made public.
"(8) The report of such third party shall be advisory only
and shall not be binding on either party.
"(9) This agreement shall take effect at the time of
signing the agreement and will remain in effect
until June 30, 1967* or as long as the Portland
Teachers Association is authorized to represent
a majority of the certificated teachers of Portland.
It shall be a continuing contract for a period of
one year for each succeeding year starting July 1st
unless changed as herein provided.
”(10) Either party desiring changes in this ’ agreement must
notify the other party in writing prior to April 1st
of any negotiating contract year; however, changes
may be made at any time by mutual agreement. While
this is a continuing contract from year to year, if
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changes are to be made, thirty days' notification
shall be given by the party proposing the changes,in which case the same procedure as outlined here-
tofore shall be followed,
"( 11 ) If there is any disagreement by the School Committee
or the Portland Teachers Association as to the
interpretation or application of the terms of this
agreement it shall be submitted to the Board of
Review.
"
After more than a year of continuous disagreement over
interpretation of the document, negotiations once again
reached an impasse. Sanctions were imposed, salary talks
ceased and the School Committee initiated two court actions,
one to impose an injunction on the sanction, the other seeking
a declaratory judgement on whether the negotiating agreement
itself was legal.
As might have been predicted, disagreement centered on
the paragraph defining negotiable items. As pointed out in
number 14. above, these include: standards for employing per-
sonnel, community support for the school system, in-service
training of personnel, curriculum concerns, class size, teacher
turnover, personnel policies, grievance procedures, working
conditions, communications within the school system, contracts,
and other items of concern to the extent it is administratively
or otherwise feasible.
The PTA interpreted this paragraph to mean that the
teachers association has a right to be consulted as changes
"^Negotiation Agreement Between the Portland School
Committee and the Portland Teachers Association, signed Oct. 24,
1966. For the full text of the Agreement, see Appendix D.
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are introduced into the school system. The School Committee
held that the paragraph allows the teachers to ask for negotia-
tion of a particular item, but does not prevent the School
••
Committee from introducing a unilateral change without prior
notification and consultation.
The disagreement came to a head over administrative
procedures in developing curriculum changes and setting up new
positions without discussions under the negotiating agreement.
In keeping with Article III-H of the agreement, a letter
request from the PTA to the School Committee for the appointment
and advice of a Board of Review concerning the interpretation
of the document was forwarded in November, 196?. The School
Committee ignored this request and responded with a Superior
Court action for a declaratory Judgement that:
(a) it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to have entered into the
agreement;
(b) it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to comply with the agreement;
(c) under Maine law the agreement is illegal, ultra
vires and of no force and effect;
(d) it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to recognize the Association
as the exclusive representative of the certified
school personnel of the City of Portland;
(e) under Maine law the School Committee cannot bargain,
negotiate or contract away its power, duty and/or
responsibility.
In response to this action by the School Committee,
the PTA voted overwhelmingly (551 to 44) to ask the MTA and
NBA to intervene. On December 7# 1967* the announcement was
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made by the Executive Secretary of the MTA that sanctions wore
once again in effect.
The Portland School Committee countered this move by
seeking a temporary injunction from the Superior Court on the
sanctions. Meanwhile, the Governor reconvened the 103rd
Legislature in a special session on January 9, 1968. Among
other bills introduced was one concerning collective bargaining
with teachers.
Possibly motivated by anticipated legislation, the
resignation of the Superintendent, the approaching deadline
for the now school budget, or all of these, both sides declared
a truce. The Maine Teachers Association lifted the sanction
and the School Committee withdrew its action from the courts.
Both sides have agreed to scrap the existing agreement at the
close of the current school year and draft a new one.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the bill failed
to pass and a new one is being drafted for the lOL^th Legis-
lature to consider. Whatever the outcome, the Judiciary can
look forward to a number of requests for interpretation in
this new field of activity in education.
While disconcerting to some, it is perhaps literary
Justice that this study of Maine School Law be concluded on a
note of uncertainty. Still another need for future research
and updating of the facts is indicated.
Summary
It is Illegal to teach in the public schools of Maine
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without a valid teaching certificate issued by the State Depart-
ment of Education. Responsibility for establishing qualifica-
tions for certificates has recently been shifted from the Com-
missioner of Education to the State Board of Education although
the Commissioner still retains the right to revoke a certificate
under certain conditions.
The employment procedures for hiring teachers are
defined and must be strictly adhered to. The superin-
tendent must nominate, the school committee must approve the
nomination, after which the superintendent ’’employs" the
teacher under such terms and conditions as he deems proper.
Teachers serve at their peril who obtain employment not in
keeping with the legal procedures.
An oral contract has been held to bo valid. Also, no
formal action by a school committee in approving a nomination
is necessary, if subsequent action, such as approving pay
vouchers, is taken.
A contract cannot be breached simply because no formal
action by the school committee or superintendent is taken in
assigning a teacher to a particular position. Thus, it has
been held that a principal's contract could not be invalidated
just because there were no written records of any formal
nomination by the superintendent or approval by the school
committee. The fact that the principal was allowed to perform
his duties and paid for same for a portion of the school year
was considered sufficient proof that the school officials
237
ratified the employment,
Maine teachers serve a probationary period of up to
three years before being issued a continuing contract. School
committees are under no obligation to renew a contract during
this period nor do they have to provide reasons for such
action. The question of permanency of employment or "tenure”
under the continuing contract has not been adjudicated by the
courts. While teachers have the right of a notice at least
six months in advance, may request a hearing, and are entitled
to reasons for the termination of the contract prior to the
hearing, these "reasons” lack definition. Unlike the dis-
missal statute which stipulates the reasons for which a teacher
may be dismissed, the contract statutes are silent on this
point. The statutes are also silent on the matter of a teacher
terminating a contract. In the absence of specific regulations
in the contract itself, a teacher may, presumably, terminate a
contract with a written resignation at any time. The number
of days of advance notice is not defined.
Maine teachers enjoy the protection of a minimum salary
schedule. Unlike some states, the minimum salary for each
step from minimum to maximum is set. Private school teaching
has been held to count in total years of experience in de-
termining a teacher's salary. Teachers also have an "equal
pay” clause for male and female teachers performing similar
duties and have a compulsory retirement system.
The field of collective bargaining is new in Maine
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although there are several negotiating agreements in effect
around the state. The Maine courts have not as yet been
called upon to determine the legality of a teacher strike
although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is currently con-
sidering the legality of a sanction imposed upon a school
district by the Maine Teachers Association. Legislation in
this field is anticipated in the near future. The extent
to which a school committee may negotiate certain items will
probably require judicial interpretation.
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CHAPTER X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The primary purpose of this study has been to identify,
analyze and summarize all existing decisions of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court relating to public school education.
In the absence of Supreme Court rulings, or rulings from lower
courts on important legal principles, opinions from the office
of the Attorney General have been included. So far as the
writer can determine, all such opinions, excepting those con-
cerned with strictly local problems have been included. This
has been done because Maine school officials have come to
place great reliance on these opinions, more so, perhaps,
than
in neighboring states.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court cases included
in
this study cover all pertinent oases from 1821 through
1968.
They are more or less evenly divided in number
among the
major areas of school activity including school districts,
finance, property, pupils and teachers. Evidently,
there are
no glaring deficiencies in the statutes
since no one area has
received a disproportionate amount of
litigation. As was noted
in the introductory chapter, early court
cases pertaining to
statutes now amended or repealed, have
not always been included
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A few decisions from Maine Superior Court cases are
included. It is extremely difficult to find such cases relating
to education. These courts, not being courts of record, have
no uniform system of filing cases. In visiting the offices of
the Clerk of Courts of three of the Superior Court Districts
in Maine, the writer found that court decisions are filed
either alphabetically, alphabetically by date, or alphabetically
by date by action, either civil or criminal. Since these de-
cisions are not binding upon the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
a compilation of such decisions would not appear to add suf-
ficient weight to the body of the law to justify the monumental
task of such an undertaking.
Legal opinions from other jurisdictions have been re-
ferred to frequently in this study. While not binding upon
the Maine courts, it is hoped that they will provide some
insight into what the weight of authority appears to be else-
where and serve as guidelines in the absence of Maine decisions.
Opinions from the United States Supreme Court have been
cited where applicable. Maine, containing a very small number
of Negroes, has not had to face the problems of integrating
schools so troublesome elsewhere. The writer has not seen
the
necessity, therefore, of discussing this problem or reviewing
the many court cases which have been widely reported
elsewhere.
This study has endeavored to provide a systematic
arrangement of the ruling legal principles, as
estaolished by
Maine judicial decisions, for use as an additional tool
to
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assist those who serve public education in the state. While no
substitute for the guidance of the town counsel, city solicitor,
or private lawyer, it is hoped that somewhere between the
initial decision-making process of the school official or teacher
and the necessity of seeking professional legal assistance, that
this document may find its appropriate place.
In conducting this study it has been necessary, of
course, to examine carefully all existing statutes relating to
education in Maine. It is not the writer’s prerogative to
examine the statutes from the point of view of educational
philosophy, or for that matter to question or determine legis-
lative intent. Aristotle is credited with having said that,
”to interpret the law is to corrupt it." A recent observer has
said, "... The opportunity to rephrase the old law creates
in many an irresistible impulse to create a better system with
more effective direction and regulation than was provided by
the old law."^ The conclusions concerning the statutes are
presented, therefore, as an attempt to describe the law, not
to change it. The conclusions and recommendations to follow
are separated into two categories, one on the statutes as they
now exist, the other on general observations noted during the
study of the court decisions.
^Madaline Remmlein and Martha Ware, An Evaluation _qf
Existing Forms of School Laws (Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson
CompanyV 1959), P«
2k2
The Statutes
The writer has found the language of the statutes
generally to be quite clear and without undue rhetorical
flourishes or ornamentation. Paragraph construction leaves
something to be desired, however. The new 1964 Revision
organizes Maine law under thirty-nine titles. Education laws
are contained in Title 20. The basic breakdown is by title,
part, chapter and section. Many sections are long and in-
volved-, covering many subjects in a single paragraph. Section
153 of Chapter 7 is typical of this style. In a single
paragraph, covering one and a half pages of single spaced
type (597 words), it covers such topics as: the mechanics
of joint meetings for school unions; annual meetings; pro-
visions for an office for the superintendent of schools;
apportionment of costs; relative amount of service to be
performed by the union superintendent in each town; the
setting of salary; election of superintendent; discharge of
superintendent; provision for appeal by a discharged superin-
tendent; qualifications of the superintendent; and conflict of
interest of school committee members.
The layman, who only occasionally peruses the statutes,
finds sections like this one extremely difficult to read and
interpret. A further breakdown by subsection or numbered
paragraph, by topic, would be an improvement.
The 1964 Revision is noteworthy in that, for the first
time, the statutes are annotated and include Attorney
General
opinions. Also, opportunity for the addition of new statutes
is provided by the use of odd-numbered chapters and sections.
Wide gaps between section numbers are provided. Thus, Chapter
one pertaining to the Department of Education, while containing
just three sections, has space for fifty.
The State Department of Education periodically compiles
the State of Maine Laws relating to public schools and dis-
t^^ibutes same in paperback form. While the table of contents
is consistent with chapter titles, it is too broad in scope
and provides the researcher with little real help in finding
a particular subject. One interested in searching the law on
duties of school committee members, for example, might turn
to Part I (Administration and Organization) but then find that
further information is to be found in Chapter 7 (Supervisory
Units); Chapter 9 (Administrative Districts); Chapter 11 (Com-
munity School Districts); Chapter 13 (District Meetings);
Chapter 15 (Superintending School Committee); or possibly
Chapter 1? (Union Schools). Then again, he may find his
answer in Chapter 101 (General Provisions); Chapter 103 (Duties
of Administrative Units); or possibly in Chapter 105 (Atten-
dance and Discipline).
While recognizing that it is fairly uniform procedure
in state codes not to use page numbers in the table of con-
tents, the writer believes that the use of page numbers would
facilitate the process of looking up the law. A reader seeking
Section 911, for example, must thumb through the compilation.
section by section, rather than page by page, until it is
found. This is an awkward and time-consuming process which
could easily be corrected.
While this publication by the State Department also
includes an index* it is not all-inolusiv© and requires the
reader to search several headings for possible infomation.
One interested in the law on truancy, for example, would need
to search all of the following index headings to be certain
that all pertinent statutes were found: absence; compulsory
school attendance age; certificate after absence from illness;
compulsory attendance in towns; compulsory education in un-
organized territory; discipline; fines for truancy; juvenile
offenders; habitual truants; truancy; and truant officers.
As with the table of contents, entries in the index are
identified by section numbers only.
It is apparent from the foregoing examples that a
complete codification of the school laws, annotated, with a
comprehensive table of contents and indexing system would be
a significant aid to the schoolmen of Maine and others in-
terested in educational legislation. Consideration might also
be given to the adoption of a decimal system for easy identifies
tion of the statutes, and for a method of keeping the compila-
tion up-to-date with pocket parts.
A final recommendation concerning the statutes is that
consideration be given to updating various terms now used to
identify school districts and school district officers. While
all such terms now in use have legal justification, some
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represent a holdover from earlier types of organization; and the
duties and responsibilities of these various districts, and
their officers, are not always the same. Thus, school districts
are labelled in various ways as follows: administrative units,
incorporated school districts, community school districts,
school administrative districts, school unions and supervisory
units. The legislature, possibly concerned by this prolifera-
tion of terms, has seen fit to define an administrative unit as.
, all municipal or quasi -municipal corporations responsible
.
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for operating public schools.
School officers are known as; superintending school
committees (as noted earlier, "superintending" has now been
removed), community school committees, community school
trustees, and school directors. The legal duties and
responsi-
bilities of these various boards are essentially the same,
yet
defined in separate sections of the statutes, and
not always
identical
.
Currently there are four basic governmental
units
responsible for public education in Maine: the
city or town
operating an independent school system, two
or more towns in a
supervisory school union, the community
school district, and
the school administrative district.
All of these units have
the same basic responsibilities to
the state and to the pupils
they serve. Uniformity in the
statutes of the duties and
responsibilities of the various school
units, and their officers.
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
(1961^), c. par. 1.
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is suggested.
General Conclusions
The conclusions that follow represent a compilation of
carefully considered observations made during the course
of
this study. They include a variety of topics, so, for
the
convenience of the reader, are grouped under subheadings
which
correspond with the chapter titles.
The state and public education . If there has
been any
one recurring theme throughout this study,
it has been that of
state supremacy in the field of public school
education. It
has been pointed out repeatedly that
education is a state
function, and that school districts are
quasi -municipal cor-
porations created by, and responsible to,
the state. School
district officers, while elected locally,
are agents of h
state and serve the state.
While the legal concept that education
is a state
function has been clearly established,
the authority of the
legislature to delegate such duties
and responsibilities as it
deems desirable to the local
level has been confirmed by the
courts on numerous occasions.
The concept of local control
remains strong in Maine, although
in the new school admin-
istrative districts local town
school committees are being
replaced by boards of directors
who represent the district
of school systems by strictly
local committees.
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Wh.il© there exists a dual responsibility for education
by local districts and a state department of education, no
serious conflicts between these two powers has arisen, at least
to the extent of reaching the courts. Maine’s system of admin-
istering the public schools has proven to be satisfactory and
no major shift in the balance of power in this area seems
likely in the immediate future.
School district organization and control . Maine, as
most other states, has set up a system of strong local control,
in which the local school district officers have been given
almost total control of the car© and management of the local
schools. Rules and regulations passed by local committees,
unless contrary to state statutes, have the force and effect
of law in the local district. The legislature, not having
the time nor desire to promulgate regulations to cover all
local conditions, has enacted a minimum number of laws
affecting all school districts in the state. The administra-
tion of a local district for the most part is left then, to
the local school committee or board of directors. The courts
v;iil not review a decision of a local board unless it is
illegal, arbitrary or discriminatory.
It was recognized early in Maine's history that a
professionally trained school official should be employed to
carry out the policies of the local committee. The position
of superintendent of schools, the chief school administrator
at the local level, has been established and his duties
and
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responsibilities are clearly established by statute.
While a local employee serving at the discretion of the
committee, the superintendent is considered by the courts to
be a public officer. The legal status of the Maine school
superintendent is not entirely clear and perhaps should be
clarified by additional legal definition in the statutes.
School district reorganization . The evolution of school
district reorganization in Maine has been gradual. The various
types of districts, beginning with the original school district
system whereby several districts, with their own school com-
mittees, served a single town, to the latest type, the school
administrative district serving several towns, have evolved
as conditions changed.
Continual refinements in the original Sinclair legis-
lation providing for the formation of school administrative
districts have been made to the point that this type ox
organization is now the most popular in Maine. Additional
refinements such as allowing a town to transfer its
membership
from one school administrative district to
another, or allowing
two small districts to combine, should be
given attention by
the legislature. Also, the master plan
for redistricting the
entire state, defeated at the last session
of the legislature,
should be given continued study and
consideration.
Liability . In Maine, the common law
principle of govern-
mental immunity from tort liability
for injuries suffered to
pupils, or other persons, still
applies to school districts and
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their omcers. While this is also true in a majority of the
states, there appears to be a definite trend or pattern
developing around the country in which state legislatures
and state supreme courts are abolishing the immunity of school
districts. This change in judicial point of view has come about
largely because of the opportunity for school districts to pur-
chase liability insurance to protect its assets at a minimum
cost, yet provide recovery of damages where an injury has been
suffered. The Maine Legislature might well consider such
legislat: on in the future. As has been pointed out earlier,
the rule of immunity does not extend to their agents or employees,
or other persons under contract with such school districts.
The legal status of certain school employees, unpaid
volunteers, teacher aides and student teachers is not defined
in the statutes. With the doctrine of governmental immunity
being increasingly questioned, and in view of the fact that a
recent enactment authorizing school committees and directors
to pay premiums on liability insurance for employees, it would
seem that a clear-cut definition of the legal status of all
persons dealing with public school pupils is in order.
School finance . The courts have consistently upheld the
authority of the legislature to impose tax programs on a state-
wide basis for the support of public school education, if
uniformly applied, even though local municipalities or school
districts may not necessarily receive the same proportionate
amount in return. From the very beginning, the legislature
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has demanded that local municipalities raise by taxation a
minimum amount per pupil for school purposes. These funds are
raised by a property tax.
At this time, the state reimburses local districts at
a flat rate of 20 percent of the actual per pupil expenditure.
School administrative districts receive an additional 10 per-
cent bonus. The subsidy formula does not allow for differentials
based on local effort or ability to finance education. In other
words, the richer school districts may spend more money for a
quality program and receive the same percentage from the state
as the poorer districts. It allows the wealthier districts to
provide better educational opportunities with less local effort.
This formula should be revised to provide more equitable oppor-
tunities for education in all districts, regardless of local
property valuation.
It is noted that the fiscal year for school districts
is the same as the calendar year, whereas the state and federal
governments operate on a July 1 to June 30 basis. This neces-
sitates double records and constant confusion over the actual
cost of budgetary items since they are prorated over two fiscal
years. All parties concerned would benefit from a statutory
revision defining the fiscal year for municipalities and/or
school districts to be the same as for the state and federal
governments
,
The courts have upheld the right of school districts
to receive gifts and bequests. A trust fund set up to benefit
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the pupils of a particular school is not invalid should this
school subsequently combine with another school as long as the
pupils for whom the original bequest was made continue to
attend the consolidated school.
While school committees or school directors have the
responsibility of compiling the annual school budget, the final
responsibility for approving the budget rests with the voters
of the district, or, in the case of cities, with the city
council. Once approved, the funds may generally be expended by
the school committee in any manner deemed best for the total
operation of the schools.
The courts have consistently upheld the right of school
districts to incur indebtedness for school construction
pur-
poses. The current debt limit is 12-1/2 percent of
the local
valuation. In school administrative districts it is
12-1/2 per-
cent of the combined valuation of all member
towns. It has
been further held that the indebtedness of a
school district
is not the indebtedness of the town or
towns included, since a
school district is a quasi-municipal
corporation.
Maine is one of the very few states
which has no con-
stitutional provisions prohibiting the
use of tax moneys for
sectarian purposes. There is statutory
authority to transport
private school pupils at public expense
but the state does not
include this expenditure in its
formula for reimbursement.
An unusual situation exists in
Maine wherein some school
districts contract with sectarian
schools for the purpose of
252
iproviding secondary education. Wiiile not as yet ch.allenged,
Ithis might well be considered a church-state conflict if re-
I
[viewed by the courts. They may be called upon to rule whether
Ithis practice is contrary to the First Amendment. ^
I School property . Although school committees and
1 directors are responsible for the management, custody and care
I of the schools, the school property itself, is owned by the
I state. The legislature may control or dispose of such property,
with or without the consent of the district or its inhabitants.
^ School officials have the authority to take land by eminent
' domain procedures if necessary for the location of a school.
V/hile it is common practice to permit community use of
school buildings for a wide range of activities, a
series of
I
Attorneys General opinions have consistently held
that it is
I
illegal to permit the use of school buildings by
any religious
group
.
Pupils . The legislature has enacted a number
of statutes
pertaining to pupils on a statewide basis.
Attendance is com-
pulsory for all pupils between the ages of
seven and seventeen.
Children may be excluded from school on the
basis of physical
or mental unfitness although the
extent of the handicap for
exclusion has not been defined. More
definitive legislation
is noeded in this area.
The local school committee has
the right to make reason-
,ble rules and regulations concerning
pupil behavior. This
ncludes the authority to enact
regulations concerning dress
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and appearance. Pupils may be temporarily suspended from school
for disorderly conduct or they may be permanently excluded by
formal action of the school committee. The permanency of the
expulsion has never been defined and, in fact, pupils must be
readmitted upon repentance, after a reasoftaol© length of tim®,
although the length of time is not defined in the statutes.
Expulsion is legal only after an investigation and a hearing.
« Corporal punishment is legal if deemed necessary by the teacher
in charge and not excessive.
Pupils must attend school in the district where their
father or legal guardian maintains his residence except that
pupils may attend schools outside their district, at public
expense, if the local district does not maintain a school.
Local committees may prescribe which subjects shall be
taught as well as the textbooks to be used so long as they are
not contrary to state-prescribed requirements. The secular
study of the Bible may be included.
Transportation must be provided to all elementary
pupils who live at a "reasonable" distance from the
school
tJhey attend. This distance has never been
defined by the
legislature and should be in the future.
Transportation must
be provided to all pupils in a school
administrative district
regardless of grade level.
Legal definitions of the classification
of pupils are
confusing in the Maine laws. The most
recent enactment defines
. high school as a school containing
grades nine to twelve; a
junior high school as one containing any combination of two or
more consecutive grades from six to nine; and an elementary
school to include that part of the school organization in which
is offered a program of studies preceding that offered by an
approved secondary school.
For purposes of certification of teachers, on the
other hand, elementary is defined as sub-primary through
grade nine; junior high is six through 9; and secondary is
seven through twelve. Throu^out the statutes reference is
made to hi^ school, secondary, junior high school, academy
and elementary school without any uniform definition as to
which grades are included. While the writer recognizes that
there is disagreement among educators on this subject, the
plea here is for consistency within the state and within the
statutes, for purposes of state subsidies, accreditation,
certification and general understanding by Maine school people.
Teachers . The courts have held repeatedly that it is
illegal to teach in the public schools of Maine without a
valid teaching certificate, be it a temporary permit or a
permanent license. The responsibility for procuring such
certification rests with the employee not the employer.
Maine's certification laws are more stringent than those in
neighboring states. In view of the ever-present shortage of
teachers in Maine, a review of the current regulations is
indicated, not for the purpose of lowering standards but for
providing more flexibility
.
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The employment procedures for hiring teachers are well
defined and must be strictly adhered to. The question of
permanency of employment or tenure under the continuing con-
tract has not been adjudicated by the courts. While teachers
have the right of a notice and may request reasons for the
termination of a continuing contract, these reasons lack
definition. Also, under the dismissal statutes, the two
reasons for dismissal, "unfitness to teach," and "services
deemed unprofitable to the school" have never been defined
despite several court decisions in this area. In view of
the increasing militancy among teachers and the active inter-
vention of state and national teacher organizations, the
logislature might clarify the statutes on contracts and dis-
missal with more specific language.
Collective bargaining for teachers has arrived in
Maine. There are several negotiation agreements in effect
within the state. Controversies have arisen and sanctions have
been imposed. Two such sanctions are currently being challenged
in the courts by school committees. The extent to which a
school committee may negotiate needs judicial interpretation.
This area probably represents the most urgent need for legis-
lative action in the field of education. Several states have
already taken action and others are in the process. This is
an area that the legislature can ill afford to ignore.
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Need for Further Research
The need for continuing research and study in the area
of school law is self-evident. The law, or some aspect of it,
changes every time a court decision is rendered; whenever the
legislature convenes; or when a local school committee, or the
State Board of Education, as branches of the state government,
adopt new policies or regulations. Interpretations of the law
are constantly being made. Indeed, as this study is being
concluded, judicial decisions in Maine concerning teacher dis-
missal, tenure rights, corporal punishment and collective
bargaining rights are pending.
It has been the intent of this study to compile and
interpret judicial decisions, sis they affect education, from
the date of Maine’s entry into the Union of States to the
present time to fill a void which has heretofore existed. A
foundation has been established upon which future researchers
may build.
study has been confined to public school educa-
tion. Research is needed in the private school area. The legal
status of the private school and the quasi-private academies
should be more clearly defined. The legality of
payment by a
town of tuition funds to private and/or parochial schools
for
the secondary schooling of its pupils may well
raise the question
of public support of private schools. The
privately owned and
operated academies have occupied a unique place
in the Maine
public school system. The new Sinclair Act
permits them to
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become part of a school administrative district, yet retain
their identity and status as a private school. There is a need
in this area for research.
The subject of school district reorganization also
needs further study, Maine is a very large state in area
but with a relatively small population which is concentrated
in the southwestern part of the state. The Master Plan for
Reorganization needs refinement in order that small school
districts now in operation may join with other districts.
Provision should also be made for the transfer of towns from
one district to another. A uniform method of financing is
also needed. Currently there are over fifty Maine communities
not operating any schools at all. They "buy" their schooling
from other districts. The foregoing suggests the need for a
thorough study of Maine school district reorganization.
Finally, research is needed in the field of higher
education in Maine, Historically, the teacher training in-
stitutions have been under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of Education and the State Board of Education. The legislature
has been content to delegate its authority in this area and as
a result, statutes pertaining to higher education are almost
nonexistent. The "law" so far as teacher training institutions
are concerned is that which has been incorporated into the
minutes of the State Board meetings by way of rules and regula-
tions or policy statements.
The University of Maine, on the other hand, which is
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in effect, a quasi-private institution, has received consider-
able attention from the legislature over the years. A major
change has just recently taken place. The special session of
the 103rd Legislature (January, 1968) enacted legislation which
has effected a merger of the University of Maine and the five
State Colleges into one system under the direction of a
Chancellor and a new Board of Trustees entirely separate from
<the State Board of Education. The legal problems of this merger
are challenging but not beyond solution. Salary status of
faculty,^ tenure rights, administrative responsibilities,
programs at the various campuses, and a multitude of other
problems require a speedy solution. A study of the past
functions of the various institutions included in this merger,
along with recommendations for their future direction would
represent a distinct contribution to the state.
APPENDIX A
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
GIVEN UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3
OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION
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QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY THE SENATE
IN AN ORDER DATED JANUARY 13, 1958
ANSWERED JANUARY li;, 1958
SENATE ORDER PROPOUNDING QUESTIONS
ANSWER OF THE JUSTICES
To the Honorable Senate of the State of Maine ;
In compliance with the provisions of Section 3 of
Article VI of the Constitution of Maine, we, the undersigned
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have the honor to
submit the following answers to the questions propounded on
January 13 > 1958.
QUESTION (I): Do any of the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of
Legislative Document 1637 (An Act Relating to Educational Aid
and to Clarify the Procedure of Reorganization of School Admin-
istrative Units) delegate legislative power to the State Board
of Education and the School District Commission in violation of
Section 1 of Part First of Article IV of the Constitution of
Maine?
ANSWER: We answer in the negative.
The problem raised here is whether or not the Legis-
lature has established adequate criteria which will
control
the exercise of a sound discretion by the State
Board of
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Education or School District Commissions. We are satisfied
that these sections of the proposed Act furnish such standards.
We note no instance in which powers which can he properly
exercised only by the Legislature have been improperly delegated
to any subordinate agency.
QUESTION (II): Must every city or town that is a participating
municipality in a school administrative district, consisting of
two or more municipalities to be created under the provisions of
Section 2 of Legislative Document I637 , take into account its
proportionate part of the indebtedness incurred by such dis-
' trict in computing the extent of its ability to create debt or
liability under the provisions of amended Section of Article
IX of the Constitution of Maine?
ANSWER: We answer in the negative.
A School Administrative District organized under the
proposed Act, is a "body politic and corporate" (Sec. 111-F),
is separate and distinct from the municipalities participating
in its creation. It is a quasi-municipal corporation of the
familiar pattern of school, water, recreational, and sewerage
districts. The indebtedness of School Administrative Districts
thus is not the indebtedness of such municipalities. Kelley v.
School District , 131+ Me. Ij.li+; Hamilton v. Portland Pier Dist.,
120 Me. 15 » Kennebec Water Dist . v. Waterville^ , 96 Me. 231+*
QUESTION (III): Would a school administrative district,
municipalities to be created underconsisting of two or more
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the provisions of Section 2 of Legislative Document 1637, be
subject in any manner to the provisions of amended Section 15
of Article IX of the Constitution of Maine limiting the amount
of debt or liability that may be incurred by cities and towns?
ANSWER: We answer in the negative.
The Constitution reads in part, "No city or town shall
hereafter create any debt or liability, which . . . shall
exceed ..." The limitation on municipal indebtedness applies
to cities and towns and not 1r> other entities, or, as here, a
School Administrative District. Our Court has so held in the
cases cited in our answer to QUESTION (II).
QUESTION (IV): Do the provisions of Section 2 of the Legis-
lative Document 1637 which allow two or more municipalities to
join together to form a new municipality known as a School
Administrative District, which district after its formation
owns, operates, and controls all the public schools within
the district, violate any of the provisions of Article VIII
of the Constitution of Maine?
ANSV/ER: We answer in the negative.
•
The issue arises from the words in Article VIII of
the
Constitution, "A general diffusion of the advantages of
educa-
tion being essential to the preservation of the
rights and
liberties of the people; to promote this
important object,
the legislature are authorized, and it shall
be their duty to
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require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at their
own expense, for the support and maintenance of public
schools; ..."
In Sawyer v. Gilmore
, 109 Me. 169, at p. in-
volving the constitutionality of the levy of a tax for the
support of schools, our Court said with respect to Article
VIII:
"Who is to determine what is suitable? Clearly the
Legislature itself. ’Suitable' is en elastic and varying
term, dependent upon the necessities of changing times.
What the legislature might deem to be suitable and there-
fore necessary under some conditions, they might deem
unnecessary under others."
^ In 1876
,
in an Opinion of the Justices, 68 Me, 582,
approving the constitutionality not of a particular bill but
in general of a school mill tax, the suitable provision Article
was referred to, and the Justices pointed out that the Legis-
lature could do more. ' In brief, the Constitution marks the
mandatory duty of the Legislature, but is not a prohibition
upon its powers.
Municipalities providing for their public school system
by the medium of School Administrative Districts will never-
theless thereby be making suitable provision for the support
and maintenance of public schools, and by their proportional
contributions to the expense incurred by such Districts will
be in compliance with both the letter and spirit of the Con-
stitution. The Legislature, by making provision therefore,
will have satisfied the mandatory constitutional requirements
imposed upon it.
QUESTION (V): Do any of the prohibitions against the passage
of emergency legislation found in Section l6 of Part Third of
Article IV of the Constitution of Maine, prevent the passage
of Legislative Document 1637 as an emergency measure to become
effective upon approval by the Governor?
ANSWER: We answer in the negative.
The Constitution reads, in part:
"An emergency bill shall include only such measures as^
are immediately necessary for the preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety; and shall not include (1) an in-
fringement of the right of home rule for municipalities,
(2) a franchise or a license to a corporation or an in-
dividual to extend longer than one year, or (3) provision
for the sale or purchase or renting for more than five years
of real estate."
The preamble to the Act sets forth that, "... it is essential
that safe and adequate facilities for such administrative units
be constructed without further delay." Evidence of such facts
would constitute a matter of public safety as a matter of
law.
Whether the facts so stated exist is for the Legislature,
not
for us to determine. Morris v. Goss , 1^7 Me. 89, 9li.
As for
home rule, municipal plebiscites fulfill such
requirements.
The creation of a body politic and corporate is
not the granting
of a franchise or license within the meaning
of the constitu-
tional prohibition. The proposed Act
contains no grant of any
franchise or license but does no more than
to provide mechanics
by means of which municipalities may
initiate voluntary action
to form School Administrative Districts.
Nor does the Act by
its terms produce or compel a sale,
purchase or renting of real
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es't&.'to within the intendment of the Constitution,
QUESTION (VI) I Does Section 111“L of Legislative Document 1637
which provides for the financing of the operations of any School
Administrative District to be created under this act violate
Section 8 of Article IX of the Constitution of Maine?
ANSWER: We answer in the negative.
The Constitution reads, in part:
"A13 taxes upon real and personal estate,
authority of this state, shall
equally, according to the Just value thereof.
assessed by
and assessed
The Act proposed observes the requirements
of the
Constitution for equal taxation by adopting
the state
valuation. Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169,
188.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this lllth
day of January, 1958
Respectfully submitted:
S/ Robert B. Williamson
S/ Donald W. Webber
S/ Albert Beliveau
S/ Walter M. Tapley»
s/ Francis W. Sullivan
S/ F. Harold Dubord
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APPENDIX B
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE LIABILITY OP SCHOOL OFFICIALS
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Your question on the liability of school officials
for injuries incurred by pupils in extra-curricular activities
has been given further consideration. As you know, this is
a rather complicated legal question and must be considered
in the light of existing statutes, court opinions and commonly
accepted law.
^
Fundamentally, the support, operation and control of
schools is in the legislature. The superintending school
committee members and school directors are public officers,
obtaining their authority from the statutes whereby the
legislature has delegated to municipalities and districts
the support and conduct of public schools under legis-
lative standards. As public officers, the superintending
school committees and directors exercise administrative
and certain quasi- judicial functions. It follows, there-
fore, that the same rules of law apply to committee members
and directors as apply to other public officers.
As for liability of public officers, the state may
not be sued without its consent, and it is generally held that,
in the absence of a statute, political subdivisions and govern-
mental agencies may not be sued. There is a specific pro-
vision that a municipality may be sued for injuries resulting
from defects in public ways, but there is no corresponding
statute relating to injuries in connection with school
activities. In the absence of such a statute, there would not
appear to be any right to sue a governmental agency such as a
school committee or Board of Directors,
While public officers may be held individually liable
in a civil action for what is called ministerial acts, they are
not usually responsible for acta which are discretionary in
character and the discretion is exercised honestly and in good
faith. Now the question may be raised as to whether a com-
mittee member or director is responsible for the acts of his
agents, i.e., teachers. The opinions I have read seem to in-
dicate that they do not have to answer for either acts of
omission or commission on the part of agents.
There may be a question as to whether a superintendent
is a public officer or not. There has never been a case in
point but attorney generals* opinions indicate that he is a
public officer, due to the public nature of schools, his
official relationship with the school committee or directors,
and the definition of his duties by statute.
In some states committee members and other public
officers may be held responsible for injuries, but Maine law
does not appear to have this force.
I
In summary, it would appear that school committee
members, directors and superintendents are considered to be
public officers, and as long as they are acting in an admin-
igtrative capacity, would not be responsible for injuries to
pupils, but that teachers acting in what is called a ministerial
capacity might be held liable for acts of omission or
commission.
.APPENDIX C
CITY OF AUBURN et als
vs
JOHN B. ANNETT et als.
270
STATE OP MAINE
COPY (1965)
CITY OP AUBURN et als.
vs
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO
JOHN B. ANNETT et als.
Rulings and Order for Judgment.
The City of Auburn and the members of its City Council
in the role of plaintiffs and the individuals composing the
Superintending School Committee as defendants by declaratory
judgment process submit their request that this Court adjudge
whether with the City Council or with the Superintending School
Committee is invested the authority to fix the total maximum
expenditure of the Department of Education of the City of
Auburn for purposes of the annual budget. It is clear that
an authoritative court judgment in this proceeding will termi-
nate an uncertainty and controversy within the purview and
purpose of M. R. S. A. T; llj #59$8 .
Resolution of this conflict will be afforded by means
of an ascertainment of the legislative will clearly and un-
mistakably expressed by the law-making power in the Charter
of Auburn, P. & S. L. , 1917> a. 201 , as amended, Prankfort v.
Lumber Co., 128 Me. 1, i|., and in the public statutes ’in all
respects not modified by the city charter.” Lunn v. Auburn ,
110 Me. 241 , 243 .
"Towns (cities) are created by the statute Thus
271
created it becomes an institution of the State, estab-
lished for certain public purposes, and for effecting
those purposes, it is invested with certain corporate
powers, and is charged with corresponding duties - all
either expressly or impliedly provided for in the sta-
tutes, and adapted to their peculiar nature."
Westbrook v. Peering
, 63 Me. 231 » 235 » 236 .
See, also Concord v. Delaney , 58 Me. 309, 315*
Municipalities must be required by the Legislature to
make suitable provisions at their own expense, for the support
and maintenance of public schools. Constitution of Maine ,
Art. VIII. See M. R. S. A., c. 103, T; 20, #851 et seq.
The inhabitants of the City of Auburn are a corpora-
tion. Charter, Art. 1 . The plenitude of corporate powers
granted by the Legislature to the City by the Charter and by
State laws is vested in the City Council!
"except as otherwise provided by this charter - - - -
"except that the general management, care and conduct of
the schools shall be vested in a school committee.
Examination of the Charter will dispense with all
occasion for further attention to the first exception above.
By logical reduction then the School Committee is the
one arbiter of public school appropriations or the City
Council
is the ultimate appropriating agency and the School
Committee
must exercise its general management, care and
conduct of the
public schools within the limits of the total
public school '
appropriation by the City Council.
The mayor is ex officio a member of the
School Committee
which consists of the Mayor and 10 other
members chosen, 2 from
each ward. Charter, Art - 111, sec.
Art. IV, sec^J,.
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Tho Charter defines the powers and duties of the School
Committee as follows:
"The superintending school committee shall have allthe powers, and shall perform all duties in regard to
the care and management of the public schools of this
City wnich are now conferred and imposed upon the super-intending school committee by the laws of this State,
except as otherwise provided in this charter." Charter
Art. IV, sec. 3 .
*
Logomachy as to the terms "management
,
care and con-
duct" is inconclusive. Apart from financial powers and duties
much latitude remains for tho management, care and conduct of
public schools by the School Committee in the most important
educational aspects. But there can be no denying that for a
completely comprehensive management, care and control of
public schools with full autonomy control of finances is
required. The legislative intent as to the meaning of the
language, "management, care and conduct" is the decisive
criterion and the entire Charter and the public statutes must
be examined to discover the legislative intention as such has
been expressed.
"a doubtful corporate power, it has been said does
not exist; and when any power is granted, and the mode
of its existence is prescribed, that mode must be
strictly pursued." Frankfort v. Lumber Co ., 128 Me. 1, ij..
Article VII of the Charter legislates concerning
"Business and Financial Problems" of the City. Section 1
imposes a close and constant recordation of the financial
transactions and of the financial status of all departments
of the municipality and a monthly report of such data by the
City Auditor to the Manager prior to Council meetings.
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Section 3 requires that monthly financial statements be pub-
lished by the Auditor. Each of the municipal "boards" must
annually on a date fixed by the Council render to the Manager
a report of the yearly transactions of that board. Based upon
such returns the Manager prepares and publishes his annual
report which details receipts, expenditures, balance sheets
and such other financial information as may be required by
the Council. At the municipal year’s end, the Manager "submits"
to the Council budget "estimates" for the ensuing fiscal year.
Such budget is compiled from detailed information supplied by
the municipal boards on blanks devised by the Manager. The
budget must contain an exact statement of the City’s financial
condition and an itemized list of appropriations "recommended"
for current expenses and permanent improvement together with
comparative statements of expenditures for the current and
for the previous year. The budget must present an itemized
statement of estimated revenue from all sources other than
taxation, a statement of taxes required with comparative
figures from the current and from the previous year and any
other information required by the Council.
The budget "estimates" of the Manager must be pub-
lished within 2 weeks after their submission to the
Council.
The Council must fix a time and place for a
public hearing
on that budget and give the public notice of
such hearing to
be held at least 10 days before passage by
the Council of
the appropriate resolve.
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Within a month after the new fiscal year begins, the
Council must pass an annual appropriation resolve based on
the budget submitted by the Manager. The resolve must be
itemized for each department in at least 5 respects, Salaries
and Wages; Other Services; Supplies and Materials; Fixed
Charges; Capital Outlay.
The total amount appropriated shall not exceed the esti-
mated revenue of the City.
Should the Council take no final action to prepare with-
in the time set the annual appropriation resolve by a sort of
default the budget as submitted by the Manager is deemed to
have been finally adopted by the Council.
All moneys appropriated but not spent or owed must at
the municipal's year end be transferred to a reserve fund
except balances in the school fund. Unexpended school balances
by State law must be carried forward and credited to school
resources for the ensuing year. M. R. S« A.» Tt 20) ^3453_*
The borrowing of money for the City and that to a
degree limited in form and purpose is entrusted to the Council.
Bonds of the City for the acquisition of land, the construction
and equipment of buildings, the paving of roads and other pub-
lic improvements under stated restrictions may be issued
upon
a 4/5ths’ vote of the Council after public notice. Every
order for the issue of bonds or notes must provide for
an
annual tax levy to meet annual principal maturities
and
interest.
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Money shall.be paid out only upon warrants on the city
treasury, issued by the Auditor and countersigned by the
Manager.
Save for procedural rules in Article II, #7, Article
VII contains all the budgetary and appropriative prescrip-
tions. The approach toward appropriate funds is to the City
Council through the Manager. The School Committee is one of
the "boards." The Manager submits to the Council budget
estimates from data gleaned from the boards and from other
sources
.
The foregoing paraphrase renders it eminently apparent
that after the informed estimates and the recommendations of
the Manager but by the City Council - and then only subse-
quent to a notified public hearing - are school funds from
the City fixed in amount and authorized. The total amount
appropriated for all purposes by the Council must not exceed
the estimated revenue of the City. The faculties for taxing,
borrowing, and appropriating are reposed in the City Council.
Only one budget is conceived and that is for resolution and
decision by the Council. No finality for school budget fix-
ation is extended to the School Committee by any provision of
the Charter. School estimates and recommendations are not
treated as unique or distinctive. A public hearing upon an
assembled municipal budget would not be purposeful if such
budget were peremptory. It is general information that
school
estimates are the major element of most budgets. The
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conclusion must follow that the City Council are entrusted
by the Charter with a dutiful, prudential, sound and responsi-
ble discretion in the exercise of ultimate budgetary judgments.
In 1917 when the Auburn City Charter was granted the
public laws of Maine provided:
"The management of the schools and the custody and
care, including repairs and insurance on school
buildings
,
of all school property in every town, shall
devolve upon the superintending school committee - -
R. S., 1916, c. 16, #37 > (emphasis added)
The charter of 1917 afforded no powers of budgetary
fixation for the School Committee. In 1917 municipal school
committees had no such powers under the public laws of this
State. R. S
. ,
1916, c . 16 .
The Legislature has for many years imposed by statute
an express and unrevised minimum of 80jz( per inhabitant of
income from corporate school funds, grants from the State,
donations, devises, bequests, and forfeitures to be raised
and expended annually by every municipal corporation for the
support of its public schools. R. S., 1916, c. 16, #l6 i
M. R. S. A.. T. 20 : #851 .
AS for school physicians, their duties and
services in
municipalities having a population of less than 1+0,000,
the
expenditure must not exceed the amount appropriated
by the
municipal government. M. R. S. A., T. 20: #1131
through
1139 . see also R. S.. 1916, c
- 16- #1^0 through
In school Administrative Districts
the Legislature has
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given to the directors the duty and power of preparing the
school budget but that budget must be approved by the voters
of the district at a district budget meeting as to items
dealing with the expenses necessary to operate the School
Administrative District, appropriations for the reserve fund
and capital outlay appropriation. M. R. S. A. , T. 20 : #305 »
In Community School Districts the trustees and not the
school committee set the budget. M. R. S. A. , T. 20 ; #355«
In Maine there has existed for many years a provision
as to liability for municipal, unpaid debts:
’’The personal property of the residents and the real
' estate within the boundaries of a municipality, village
corporation or other quasi-municipal corporation may be
taken to pay any debt due from the body corporate. The
owner of property so taken may recover from the munici-
pality or Quasi -municipal corporation under Title lij.,
section l4-953 »
"
.. 89, #30,
P. L. 1B 33 , Chap. DLXXXVI. sec. 3-
Eames v. Savage , (l885)» 77 M©» 212, 216, 2l8.
Littlefield v. Greenfield , 69 Me. 00 , 09.
Caldwell v.^Blake, 69 MeT 4^8, I4.67 .
Paul V. Huse , 112 Me. I4l-9» 451-
The City Charter concentrates fiscal responsibility
and authority in the City Council. The borrowing
power is
strictly and definitively limited. _Art. VII,. #7, 8, .9.
The
total amount appropriated shall not exceed the
estimated City
revenue. The budget must present an itemized
statement of
all sources of revenue; a statement of
taxes is required,
with comparative figures, etc. The budget
is subject to
public hearing. The Legislature in 1917
was manifestly
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intent upon commissioning the City Council with a steward-
ship to be exercised over municipal finances under exacting
rules particularly so as to municipal debt making and debts.
The Constitution of Maine fixes a municipal debt maxi-
mum. Article IX, #l5 «
As to the correlation of the Charter of 1917 (see Art.
I| , sec. 3) and the statutes this Court
said in Bass v
_
.
Bangojr ,
111 Me. 390, 394 (19114-):
"It must be regarded as settled law, that
charters
or narts of charters, of cities are not repealed by
a
general law if the two can consistently stand
together,
Lie as the intention of the Legislature to repeal the
charter or parts of charter is clear and plain
The general laws of this State direct
superintending
school committees upon the nomination of school
superintend-
ents to regulate the salaries and
qualifications of teachers.
The committees shall direct the
general instruction, may add
some optional courses of instruction,
shall determine the
purchase of text books, shall hire
truant officers and fix
their compensation, may grant
leaves of absence with half pay
to certain personnel and shall
care for school property,
repairs and insurance upon the
buildings.
n 02 ( 7 ) l8l ( ^ ) > 47 3 ^ ^ ) ^ ^ ^
A. to the statutory
duty to effectuate certain
educa-
tional purposes and the
independent discretion granted
there
Por to the school Cossnittee
a construction of the Charter
and
the general statutes
involved, however, indicate
that it was
the will of the law making
Legislature that estimates for
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appropriations submitted on behalf of the School Committee may
be reduced whenever such estimates in the sound judgment of
the City Council exceed an amount reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of their purpose in consideration of the
educational needs of the City, the City’s financial condition
or means and the expenditures the City must make.
As the Connecticut Court said in Board of Education v .
Board of Finance
,
127 Conn. 3kS» 3^2, 16 A. 2d 601, 605:
”It is probably true that in many instances a board
of finance does not have as sound an understanding of
the educational needs of a town as does the board of
education and that therefore a decision by the former to
reduce an estimate submitted by the latter may not in
fact conduce to the best possible educational interests
of the people of the town; but, on the other hand, it is
more than possible that a board of education, less
familiar with the finances of the town or perhaps with
financial matters in general, if left without a check,
might incur expenditures which are not reasonably neces-
sary to serve these interests and the expenses of
which the town could ill afford to meet. One purpose of
the legislature in establishing town boards of finance is
- -
-
- to afford a check against the incurring of such
expenses on the part of the town. It is also true that
where a board of finance reduces an estimate of a board
of education so that the sum appropriated is less than
is reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose to be
served, or where it takes such action not in the exer-
cise of a sound judgment but from improper motives or
without sufficient understanding, there would seem to
be no adequate remedy which the board of education might
effectively invoke. The legislature, however, evidently
deemed it necessary in the interests of sound municipal
finance to give to town boards of finance the powers we
have outlined. If such boards do not exercise their judg-
ment intelligently, fairly, and disinterestedly, the
situation is one, unfortunately not unlcnown, wherein a
public official fails to properly perform the duties
of his office, and the remedy is that inherent
theory of representative government, to replace him
by
another. If the result brought about by the
which are evidently designed to produce a nice
^powers between the two boards, do not a«^^fthe public
interests, there course is not, where no Justifiable
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rights are involved, to seek to make the court arbiters
in a controversy essentially political, but to ask the
legislature to change or better define the respective
powers of the board.”
The Clerk shall enter the declaratory judgment that
the Auburn City Council has the final authority to fix the
total maximum expenditures of the Auburn Superintending
School Committee for the purposes of the annual municipal
budget.
Dated April 29 , A. D. 1965 .
/s/ FRANCIS W. SULLIVAN
Justice, Supreme Judicial Cour¥
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USE OF THE BIBLE IN MAINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A Policy Statement of the State Board of Education
The 1963 decision of the United States Supreme Court
in the cases of Murray v. Curlett and Abington Township v,
Schempp has aroused considerable concern in the minds of many
of our citizens and educators relating to the proper use of
the Bible in school curricula. Statements on this topic have
been issued by the State Attorney-General, the Commissioner
of Education and the State Curriculum Committee. It is evident
that some further amplification and possible clarification is
needed. With this purpose in mind, the following statement has
been prepared to serve as a guide for the use of school
officials and teachers.
In the opinion the Court has stated: "It might
well
be said that one's education is not complete
without a study
of comparative religion and its relationship
to the advance-
ment of civilization. It certainly may be
said that the Bible
is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities.
Nothing that we have said here indicates
that such study of
the Bible or of religion, when presented
objectively as a
part of a secular program of education,
may not be effected
consistent with the First Amendment."
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Attorney-General Hancock has pointed out that religious
exercises as such are unconstitutional hut that ’’the decision
does not prohibit the secular study of the Bible or of those
subjects in which the history of religion may be an integral
' part." He has further advised that the decision does not pro-
hibit the study of recitation in our schools of documents and
books containing references to God.
The Board is in accord with the statements relating to
moral principles which were enunciated in the report of the
State Curriculum Committee. It is agreed that schools have a
right and an obligation to teach those moral principles on
which our government and society are founded. It believes
it
is a function of education to mold the moral strength
of
pupils so that they will understand and respect
such funda-
mental principles as sobriety, industry, frugality,
chastity,
truth, justice and the Golden Rule.
The Board recognizes that our nation was
founded on the
principle of separation of Church and State;
that religion as
Jefferson wrote "is a matter between every
man and his Maker,
in which no other, and far less the
public, had a right to
inter-meddle;" and that because of the
diversity of American
beliefs, it is not the function of
the school to provide a
program of sectarian religious
instruction. This function is
reserved to the church and the home.
- in the light of the Court's
decision and the Attorney-
General's statement, however,
it seems clearly evident that
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the study of the Bible or of religion is a proper part of a
program of secular education because knowledge thereof is
essential and desirable to an understanding of subject matter.
The Bible, therefore, is not excluded from school use, and it
is permissible to teach about the Holy Scriptures and different
religions. Accordingly, the Bible may be used as a valuable
source of material in both literature and history.
The Bible is a library of books closely associated in
thought, philosophy and purpose. It has had an influence upon
mankind in all realms of human activity, moral, aesthetic and
practical. Its study will give pupils a richer background by
providing a better understanding of this great collection of
literature. In anthologies or any collections of literary
masterpieces, portions of the Old and New Testaments are fre-
quently included for study. Pupils should have this back-
ground to understand Biblical references in other great literary
works.
The Bible not only contains examples of great literary
value, but it has served as an inspiration for great music and
painting. For example, Handel's "Messiah,' Michaelangelo s
"Moses," and DaVinci's "Last Supper." Through an understanding
of the Bible a pupil can increase his ability to appreciate
the best in these fields. Justice Jackson emphasized the
importance of such understandings when he wrote: "Music
with-
out sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral or
painting
without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and
incomplete.
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even from a secular point of view, yet the inspirational appeal
in these guises is often stronger than a forthright sermon.
Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible •
and other powerful uses of our Mother tongue for religious
ends would be pretty barren. And, I should suppose it is
proper, if not an indispensable part of preparation for a
worldly life, to know the roles that religion and religions
have played in the story of mankind. The fact is that, for
good or ill, nearly everything in our culture worth trans-
mitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated
with religious influences. One can hardly respect a system
of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of
the currents of religious thought that move the world society
for a part in which he is being prepared.”
It must be recognized, however, that there is a dis-
tinction between teaching about religion, with all the
necessary involvements thereto, and a narrowly religious de-
nominationalism. The line of demarcation may not be clearly
defined but the teacher and school committee have a high de-
gree of latitude and must exercise the discretion vested in
them in each instance. Some factors worthy of consideration
in proper use of the Bible would be the extent to which its
use is connected with the course of study, the extent to
which the exposition is recognized as the teacher's own
opinion with due allowances for others who hold different
views, and whether or not pupils are of a maturity to understand
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th.6 implications, Wh,ere th.e line is to be drawn between the
proper* and the improper cannot be stated explicitly. Teachers
and school officials have discretionary powers in this respect
and should use them wisely.
The premise that a school has a role in building
spiritual values is embodied in a resolution of the American
Association of School Administrators, adopted in 196iv, which
states that: "The public schools should play an important
part in building spiritual values and Association members
should take the lead in developing educational programs that
recognize the contributions of religion in the history and
development of this Nation and that encourage a deep and
genuine respect for religious freedom. To do this the school
is urged to cooperate with the home, the church and other
community organizations."
In summary, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Schempp and Murray cases does not alter the schools’ responsi
bility for proper use of the Bible in the public schools. It
is a proper part of secular education. School officials are
free to continue use of the Bible as a source book and to
utilize it as an integral part of appropriate courses.
Adopted: May 22, I96 I4.
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Chapter 763
THE COMMONWEALTH OP MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-five
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE BARGAINING
AGENTS WITH POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OP THE COMMONWEALTH
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the
same, as follows :
SECTION 1 . Section four C of chapter forty of the General
Laws is hereby repealed.
SECTION 2 . Chapter 149 of the General Laws is hereby
amended by inserting after section I78F the following eight
sections: --
Section I78G . When used in this section and in sections
one hundred and seventy-eight H to one hundred and seventy-
eight N, inclusive, the following words shall, unless the con-
text requires otherwise, have the following meanings; —
"Municipal employer," any county, city, town, or district,
and any person designated by the municipal employer to act in
its interest in dealing with municipal employees.
^
"Employee," any employee of a municipal employer, whether
or not in the classified service of the municipal employer,
except elected officials, board and commission members, police,
and the executive officers of any municipal employer.
"Employee organization," any lawful association, organiza-
tion, federation or council having as a primary purpose the
improvement of wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
"Professional employee," any employee engaged in work
which is predominantly intellectual and varied in character
as opposed to routine mental, manual mechanical or physical
work, which involves the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment in its performance, of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standard-
ized in relation to a given time period, and which requires
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized in-
tellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
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learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the
'performance of routine mental, manual or physical processes.
Section 178H
. (1) Employees shall have, and be protected
in the exercise of, the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist any employee organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing on questions of
wages, hours and other conditions of employment and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, free from actual
interference, restraint or coercion; provided, however, that an
employee organization recognized by a municipal employer or
designated as the representative of the majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit, shall be the exclusive bargaining agent
for all employees of such unit, and shall act, negotiate agree-
ments and bargain collectively for all employees in the unit,
and shall be responsible for representing the interests of all
such employees without discrimination and without regard to
employee organization membership.
(2) Whenever, in accordance with such regulations as may
be prescribed by the state labor relations commission, a
petition is filed with said commission by municipal employer
alleging that one or more employee organizations have presented
a claim to be recognized as the representative of a majority of
employees in a specified unit, or by an employee or group of
employees or an employee organization alleging that a sub-
stantial number of employees wish to be _ represented for col-
lective bargaining by an employee organization as exclusive
representative, or that the employee organization currently
certified or recognized by the municipal employer as the
bargaining representative does not currently represent a
majority of the employees in the unit, said
investigate such petition and, if it has
believe^that a question of representation exists, shall
provide
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.
(3) If, after hearing, the commission
finds ^hat there is
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representative of the employees in the unit. In any election
where none of the choices on the hallot receives a majority
a run off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a
*
selection between the two choices receiving the largest and the
second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
(I4.) The commission shall decide in each case whether the
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining shall
* be the municipal employer unit or any other unit thereof; pro-
vided, uniformed employees of the fire department shall be
in a separate unit and provided, further, that no unit shall
include both professional and non-professional employees unless
a majc rity of such professional employees vote for inclusion
in such unit.
Section I78I . The municipal employer and the employee
organization recognized or designated as exclusive representa-
tive of employees in an appropriate unit shall have the duty
to bargain collectively. In such bargaining other than with
an employee organization for school employees, the municipal
employer shall be represented by the chief executive officer,
whether elected or appointed, or his designated representatives.
In such bargaining with an employee organization for school
employees, the municipal employer shall be represented by the
school committee or its designated representative or repre-
sentatives .
For the purposes of collective bargaining, the repre-
sentative of the municipal employer and the representative of
the employees shall meet at reasonable times, including
meetings appropriately related to the budget making process,
and shall confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours
and other conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and shall
execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached,
but neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal
or to make a concession. In the event that any part or pro-
vision of any such agreement is in conflict with any law,
ordinance or by-law, such law, ordinance or by-law shall pre-
vail so long as such conflict remains. If funds are necessary
to implement such written agreement, a request for the necessary
appropriation shall be submitted to the legislative body. I
such .request is rejected, the matter shall be returned to the
parties for further bargaining. The preceding two sentences
shall not apply to agreements reached by school committees in
cities and towns in which the provisions of section thirty-four
of chapter seventy-one are operative.
Section 1781 . (a) If, after a reasonable period of
negotiation over“the terms of an agreement, a dispute exis s
between a municipal employer and an employee
if no agreement has been reached sixty days prior to
the final
.
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date for setting the municipal budget, either party or the
parties jointly may petition the state board of conciliation
and arbitration to initiate fact finding.
(b) Upon receipt of such petition the board of con-
ciliation and arbitration shall make an investigation to deterr
mine if the conditions set forth in paragraph (a) exist. If
the board finds that such conditions do exist, it shall initiate
fact finding. Prior to such fact finding, or prior to fact
finding ordered by the state labor relations commission in
accordance with the provisions of section one hundred and seventy
eight L, the board of conciliation and arbitration shall sub-
mit to the parties a panel of three qualified disinterested
persons from which list the parties shall select one person to
serve as the fact finder and shall notify the board of con-
ciliation and arbitration of their choice. If the parties
fail to select the fact finder within five calendar days of
receipt of the list, the board of conciliation and arbitration
shall appoint the person who shall serve as fact finder.
(c) The person selected or appointed as fact finder may
establish dates and place of hearings which shall be where
feasible in the locality of the municipality involved. Any
such hearings shall be conducted in accordance with rules
established by the board of conciliation and arbitration.
Upon request, the board of conciliation and arbitration shall
issue subpoenas for hearings conducted by the fact finder.
The fact finder may administer oaths. Upon completion of the
hearings and within sixty days from the date of appointment,
\ijiO_0 ss extended by the board of conciliation and arbitration
for good cause shown, the fact finder shall make written
findings of fact and recommendations for resolution of the
dispute and shall cause the same to be served on the municipal
employer and the employee organization involved.
(d) Only employee organizations which are designated or
recognized as the exclusive representative under section one
hundred and seventy-eight H shall be proper parties in ini-
tiating fact finding proceedings.
(e) The cost of fact finding proceedings under this
section shall be divided equally between the municipal
employer
and said employee organization. Compensation
finder shall be in accordance with a schedule of payment
established by the board of conciliation and arbitration.
^f^ Nothinc: in this section shall be construed to
pro-
hibit tL fact finder from endeavoring ®
in which he has been selected or appointed as fact
finder.
Section 178k. The services of the
oiliation and arbitration shall also bo available
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employers and employee organizations for purposes of concilia-
tion of grievances or contract disputes and for purposes of
\ arbitration of disputes over th,e interpretation or application
of th.6 terms of a written agreement. Nothing in this section
shall prevent the use of other arbitration tribunals in the
resolution of disputes over the interpretation or application
of' the terms or written agreements between municipal employers
and employee organizations.
Section 178l . Municipal employers or their representatives
91* agents are prohibited from:— (1) interfering with, restrain-
ing or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section one hundred and seventy-eight H; (2) dominating or
interfering with the formation, existence or administration of
any employee organization; (3) discharging or otherwise dis-
criminating against an employee because he has signed or filed
any affidavit, petition or complaint or given any information
or testimony under this section; (i^) refusing to bargain col-
lectively in good faith with an employee organization which has
been recognized or designated as the exclusive representative
of employees in an appropriate unit; and (5) refusing to dis-
cuss grievances with the representatives of an employee organ-
ization recognized or designated as the exclusive representative
in an appropriate unit.
Employee organizations or their agents are prohibited from
(1) restraining or coercing a municipal employer in the selection
of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances; and (2) if recognized or designated
as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit, refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a
municipal employer.
When a complaint is made to the labor relations commission
that a practice prohibited by this section has been committed,
the commission may issue an order dismissing the complaint or
may order a further investigation or a hearing thereon. If a
hearing is ordered, the commission shall set the time and
place for the hearing, which time and place may be changed by
• the commission at the request of one of the parties for cause
shown. Any complaint may be amended with the permission of^
the commission. The municipal employer, the employee organiza-
tion 'or the person so complained of shall have the right to file
an ar 3wer to the original or amended complaint within five days
after the service of such complaint or within such other time
as the commission may limit. Such municipal employer, such
employee organization or such persons shall have the right to
appear in person or otherwise to defend against such coitplaint.
293
In the discretion of the commission any person may be allowed
to intervene in such proceeding. In any hearing the commission
shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence prevailing
in the courts. A transcript of the testimony taken at any
hearing before the commission shall be filed with the commission.
If, upon all the testimony, the commission determines that
a prohibited practice has been committed, it shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the
party committing the prohibited practice an order requiring
it or him to cease and desist from such prohibited practice,
and shall take such further affirmative action as will comply
with the provisions of this section, including but not limited
to the withdrawal of certification of an employee organization
established by or assisted in its establishment by any such
prohibited practice. If it is alleged that either party has
refused to bargain collectively, the state labor relations
commission shall order fact finding and direct the party at
fault to pay the full costs thereof. It shall order the
reinstatement with or without back pay of an employee discharged
or discriminated against in violation of the first paragraph of
this section. If, upon all of the testimony, the commission
determines that a prohibited practice has not been or is not
being committed, it shall state its finding of fact and shall
issue an order dismissing the complaint.
Section 1?8M . It shall be unlawful for any employee to
engage in, induce , or encourage any strike, work stoppage,
slowdown or withholding of services by such employees.
Section 1Y8N. Nothing in sections one hundred and seventy-
ei^t F to one hundred and seventy-eight M, inclusive, shall
diminish the authority and power of the civil service com-
mission, or any retirement board or personnel board established
by law, nor shall anything in said sections constitute a grant
of the right to strike to employees of any municipal employer.
SECTION 3 . Section 9B of chapter 23 of the General Laws,
as appearing in section 1 of chapter 345 of the acts of 193o,
is hereby amended by inserting after the word inclusive in
line 4, the words: — , of the chapter, sections one
hundred
and seventy-eight H and one hundred and seventy-eight L ol
chapter one hundred and forty-nine.
Approved November 17 » 196^.
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